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ABSTRACT 
 
 
POLITICAL MANHOOD IN 2000’s TURKEY:  REPRESENTATIONS OF 
DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES IN POLITICS 
 
 
Akyüz, Selin 
 
Ph.D., Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu 
 
May, 2012 
 
 
This dissertation mainly questions the constructions of different masculinities 
in politics in Turkey. It re-reads the different representations of political manhood 
with reference to the AKP, the CHP and the MHP between 2000 and 2008. In order 
to reveal the embeddedness of masculinities and politics, this dissertation analyzes 
not only gendered discourses of the given political parties but also their leaders, 
namely, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. With the 
guidance of Pierre Bourdieu’s analytical tools, especially, on the basis of the 
congruent relation between habitus and the field, this dissertation questions different 
representations of masculinities and identifies typologies of masculinities, namely ; 
(1) Neo-Muslim, (2) Kemalist/Secular, and, (3) Nationalist. With reference to the 
patterns of masculinities in Turkish political culture, this study argues that the 
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gendered nature of the politics, in general, political parties in particular,  use and 
reproduce dominant masculinist strategies. In politics as a field, leaders experience 
the praxis of being man rather than their ideological engagements; leftist, rightist or 
Islamist.   
Keywords: gender, masculinities, political parties, AKP, CHP, MHP, Turkish 
politics, Kemalism, Islam, nationalism, Bourdieu 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
2000’LERİN TÜRKİYE’SİNDE SİYASİ ERKEKLİK: SİYASETTEKİ FARKLI 
ERKEKLİK TEMSİLLERİ 
 
 
 
Akyüz, Selin 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doç. Dr. Dilek Cindoğlu 
 
 
Mayıs 2012 
 
 
Bu tez temel olarak Türk siyasetindeki farklı erkeklik kurgularını 
sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma, 2000 ile 2008 yılları arasında AKP, CHP ve MHP’ye 
referansla farklı siyasi erkeklik temsillerini yeniden okumaktadır. Siyaset ve erkeklik 
hallerinin iç içe geçmişliğini ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlayan bu tez sadece adı geçen 
siyaseti partilerin değil, o partilerin liderlerinin de – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz 
Baykal, Devlet Bahçeli- cinsiyetlendirilmiş söylemlerini analiz etmektedir. Pierre 
Bourdieu’nün analitik araçları rehberliğinde, özellikle de habitus ve alan 
kavramlarının ilişkiselliği temelinde bu tez farklı erkeklik temsillerini sorgularken 
erkekliklerin tipolojisinide çıkarmaktadır. Bu tipolojiler (1) Yeni Müslüman, (2) 
Kemalist/Laik, (3) Milliyetçi erkeklikler olarak sıralanabilir. Bu tez, Türk siyasi 
vi 
 
kültüründeki farklı erkeklik tezahürleri ışığında genelde siyasetin özelde ise siyasi 
partilerin cinsiyetlendirilmiş yapılarının baskın eril stratejileri kullandıklarını ve 
yeniden ürettiklerini savunmaktadır. Kısacası, bir alan olarak siyasette liderler sağcı, 
solcu veya İslamcı olmaktan çok erkek olmanın pratiğini daha çok yaşamaktadırlar.  
 Anahtar Kelimeler: toplumsal cinsiyet, erkeklikler, siyasi partiler, AKP, 
CHP, MHP, Türk siyaseti, Kemalizm, Islam, milliyetçilik, Bourdieu 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. The Background 
This dissertation aims to analyze the construction of masculinities in Turkish 
politics. Having started from the embeddedness of politics and manhood, this study 
attempted to deconstruct some given arguments about the relationship between 
politics and masculinity. However, this mentioned relationship has been very critical 
and also lead to ask more questions: How does politics shape masculinity? How do 
the constructions of masculinity shape politics? Does politics play a significant role 
in the creation and maintenance of masculine identities? How masculinity is 
constructed in the realm of politics?  
With this puzzle of questions, initially I ended up in a dead end. As politics, 
masculinity/masculinities, identities are loaded terms, it was hard to simplify and 
analytically think about them. Questioning the relationship of politics and 
masculinities from a naïve understanding has unconsciously been the first step: What 
is problematic from gender perspective is the lack of women in politics and men is 
the privileged one, so, the most important actor/actress of the study of gender in 
politics should be women. Women have been victimized in the realm of politics and 
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the increasing scholarly interest in underrepresentation of women in politics has 
supported this perspective of mine. Hence, blaming the patriarchal order and power 
networks that have maintained masculine domination was the easiest way. However, 
then, I realized that even as a PhD candidate in social sciences, I have approached the 
topic as self evident and underemphasized the relationality of gender.  
In line with Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity, turning my objectifying gaze 
upon myself and becoming aware of hidden assumptions is very critical (Karakayalı, 
2004: 352). In the framework of Bourdieu’s conceptualization of “intellectualist 
bias” (Bourdieu et.al., 1991a), things are complicated and uncertain to deal with, 
hence Karakayalı argues, taking intellectualist bias in a sense that it “(…) operates by 
taking abstract rules or classifications in a society too literally, believing that people 
‘follow’ them blindly in practice” is more plausible (2004: 362). Though my habitus, 
my social positioning, defines the boundaries of my analytical thinking, the sources 
of my bias can be diverse but, especially, my gender and social position as a 
researcher might have leading role. As a woman who was born in Izmir, last 
daughter of a family of three children, and a researcher who has gender lens since 
graduate studies, I realized that I have devalued the divergent effects of culture and 
power relationships. Remembering Moghadam’s vital argument that emphasizes 
gender and sexuality as two pillars of non-Western cultures, and also her conception 
of “[C]ulture masks more than it reveals” has opened the door of my critical 
analytical thinking (Moghadam, 1994: 22).  
In this context, so as to destabilize self-evident argumentations, I have first 
widened my horizon and try to see the big picture. 
True: Turkey is a land of military coups, repressive policies, 
violations of human rights – but also a land whose cultural 
pluralism ill suits that picture. Land of the world’s biggest 
3 
 
shopping malls, tallest hotels, gaudiest shop windows, but also 
inaccessible villages, deserted farmlands, and cities ringed by 
shanty towns. (…) Land of people proud that their Republic 
recognized the legal rights of women as its founding, but who feel 
constantly threatened by femininity. (…) Land of strong religious 
communities where people expect the army to protect them against 
religion’s threat; of people who boast of a great empire’s legacy yet 
lost their ties to that of cultural inheritance long ago. (Gürbilek, 
2011: 1-2)   
 
In the framework of the paragraph above, Turkey can be considered as a land 
of contradictions, especially from the perspective of ambivalences created by 
Kemalist modernization project and also polarities crystallized by 1980s. As the 
literature on Turkish politics proves students of Turkish politics analyze the history 
of Turkish politics and its effects on today’s political and cultural climate with lenses 
that focus on secularizing Kemalist reforms and its from above characteristics or 
1980s as a turning point in cultural life “(…) whose effects endured after military 
had gone” (Gürbilek, 2011: 4).  
From the perspective of turning points, it is vital to examine modernization 
efforts firstly. Modernization efforts started during late Ottoman period when the 
Empire weakened and reforms in political and militaristic fields were inevitable. 
Tanzimat Reform era (1839- 1871) as a turning and starting point for the 
modernization have witnessed not only structural changes but also cultural reforms 
(Zürcher, 2004; Mardin, 1983; Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Significantly, gender 
and family issues demarcated the frontier line for the reforms (Göle, 1997; Duben 
and Behar, 1991). As Duben and Behar (1991) analyze, family as the basic unity 
symbolized the flaws and crises in daily lives. Such crises in values touched firstly 
male elites as the patriarch in the family and also in the Empire. However, efforts of 
modernization accompanied by the guide of the West deepen its effects towards the 
late Ottoman period and the gap among Westernized, not-Westernized and over-
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Westernized increased (Bilgin, 2004). For Bilgin (2004), from a symbolic 
perspective, the West was considered as a woman and over-Westernization meant 
feminization. Hence, modern man of that period labeled as dandy who was seen as a 
departure from virile masculine and, in parallel way, feminized image (Brummett, 
2000). Considering as effeminate was one of the primary threats to masculine 
identity and has situated masculinity to its prior place within the networks of society. 
Such a dynamic process left its footprints into everyday lives as well. In this 
perspective, it can be argued that although structural changes have had very 
significant effects on functioning of a given society, cultural reforms have challenged 
the way people used to think, perceive and act. Hence, reforms on people’s mind can 
be considered as an attempt to challenge un/conscious internalization of people. 
The significance of symbolic changes is the reason behind why Turkish 
modernity has been examined within the delicate balance between traditional and 
modern. Turkey entered into a new period with the establishment of the Republic in 
1923. Mustafa Kemal and his friends initiated institutional, social and cultural 
reforms so as to modernize the country.  In line with this, Keyman (2006) argues that 
the Kemalist modernization can be considered as an attempt to combine societal and 
cultural modernization and its recent crisis with the emergence of alternative claims 
of modernity constitute the background of fragmentation. While some analyses  of 
modernization processes have concentrated on its effects on state tradition (Heper 
1985), some have put emphasis on its effects on religion (Sayarı, 1984; Yavuz, 2009) 
or rapid urban transformation (Keleş, 1985; Nalbantoğlu 1997) while others 
concentrated on shifts within society (Mardin, 1985, Kasaba, 1997; Keyman, 2006). 
In addition, gender focus studies (Kadıoğlu, 1980; Kandiyoti, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1997; 
Parla, 1998; Y. Arat, 1998) examine the multifaceted process with a gender lens and 
5 
 
try to scrutinize micro level’s changes effects on macro changes. With the interplay 
between micro and macro changes, typologies were simultaneously constructed 
through gendered identities. Dichotomies of the reforms were not only reified in 
identities like traditional/modern; urban/villager but also typologies as dandies, 
kabadayı (tough uncle), girl/women of the Republic have been constructed. This 
pattern has continued its survival with shifts and/or breaks and shaped the contours 
of Turkish political culture from the very beginning. 
Not only the Ottoman times and early Republican period, but also the last 
decades of the 20th century were very significant for Turkey as well. In post World 
War I period, Turkey allied with the West against Communist threat. Especially 
defending the regime has been major concern for politicians and military officers 
(Yavuz, 2009: 28). This period on insecurities has started to reinforce the guardian 
role of the military. In 1945, transition to multi party politics occurred in Turkey and 
for Yavuz (2009) such a transition flourished the tensions between state elites and 
military officers while the CHP, that has had guarding role of Kemalism, did not 
have enough power. However, military’s symbolic position has never decreased 
while war conditions, World War II and Cold War, enhanced its power. Such an 
empowerment resulted in three military interventions (1960, 1971 and 1980). 
Military intervened into politics in the name of restoration of order and has fulfilled 
its duty as the guardian of the regime (Cizre, 1993; Heper, 2005).  
Post-1980 period is another crucial period for Turkish politics. This period 
“(…) was dominated by the politics of identity and the search for individual wealth, 
along with the introduction of a new political language about privatization, human 
rights and civil society” (Yavuz, 2009: 29). The potent change that took place in 
Turkey, has created social and cultural transformations, especially on gendered 
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identities. The revival of Islamic political identity coincided with this period. 
Gürbilek (2011) defines this period as “return of the repressed”. The repressed 
Islamist tone in institutional and individual level has awakened.  
In this context, Turgut Özal introduced measures to ease restrictions on 
Islamic practices and beliefs during his six years as prime minister. For Jenkins,  
(…) he appears to have been content to continue to regulate society 
through secular laws while simultaneously coloring society itself – 
including culture, identity, and the public space- with an 
increasingly Islamic hue; or, from the perspective of his more pious 
supporters, enabling society’s true colors to emerge from beneath 
its Kemalist veneer. (2008: 149) 
 
In the framework of Kemalists’ ignorance of religion as constructing “social 
ethos”, Islamists’ alternative way has not been welcomed (Mardin 1983: 156). 
Mustafa Kemal’s reforms did not challenge Islam but the traditional value system 
that had come to be associated with religion (Jenkins, 2008: 101). In line with Noris 
and Inglehart, “economic growth, socio-economic equality and human development 
result in long term changes in existential security, leading to the erosion of religious 
values, beliefs and practices.” (2004: 2). Hence, traditional value system has become 
coated with religious legitimacy. Although the reforms of Kemalism did not aim 
“(…) to disestablish religion but rather to create a set of institutions and a legal 
system to control, use and reinvent Islam, if necessary, for the furtherance of national 
and state interests.” (Yavuz, 2009: 38). The task of the state was to organize social 
and political life in accordance with Kemalist principles and, in line, alternative 
tones, namely Islamist rhetoric, was not tolerated.   
The liberalistic atmosphere of post-1980 period has provided suitable ground 
for the construction of alternative identities. From the perspective of gender, the 
construction of Islamist identities represented a challenge to the old order. For 
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Bilgin, new Islamist identities, represented “(…) a new form that combines both 
established gender patterns and modern styles” (2004: 193). Hence, while they were 
adapting modern necessities of the era, they did not divorce from traditional 
heritages. The reflections of this period of change and also the antagonism between 
Islamists and Kemalists manifest themselves in identities. Hence, while the 
paradigmatic changes in political and social life in Turkey have created a shift in 
discourses, it has also deepened the dualistic nature of Turkish politics. In the 
framework of continuities, shifts and breaks, in other words, the imbalances or 
fragmentations are clues for “(…) cultural negotiations of engendered modernity” 
(Bilgin, 2004: 75). In order to reveal new insights and deconstruct traditional roots, 
it is significant to analyze the cultural repertoire of Turkish politics and also the 
codes of gendered practices in general, masculinities in particular. In addition, on 
the basis of the decisiveness of micro aspects of a given culture, culturally loaded 
concepts that have shaped everyday life discourses have not been ignored. These 
concepts, statements, sayings are clues for cultural negotiations of engendered daily 
lives. For instance, in Turkish, power as a noun (iktidar) has two meanings. One is 
the common one, shared with other languages, but the other has a connotation of 
sexuality in that its negation, being powerless, means a man’s having erectile 
dysfunction. This usage is embedded into daily conversations and commonly used. 
In the framework of this example, it can be argued that power encapsulates 
masculine ideals and such usage stigmatizes males as unmanly in a way by not 
properly performing its sexual role as he is supposed to. The usages of adam olmak 
(being man/men), adam gibi davranmak (behaving like men/man) are also very 
common and can be listed as the examples of gendered language. Both usages 
define a set of the norms of hegemonic masculinity – toughness, integrity, 
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appositeness – and expect men to behave accordingly. Hence, an ideal manhood has 
been inculcated into the language, everyday lives and culture. Political domain is the 
most popular site that enshrines this embeddedness and, accordingly, politicians 
promote a form of hegemonic masculinity that “(…) deploys norms of manhood to 
justify dominant authority.” (Kann, 1998: 28).     
 With this background, this dissertation aims to mainly destabilize the 
embeddedness of politics and masculinity. Behind this relationship, there are 
hierarchical gender relations that encapsulate power struggles. That’s why analyses 
of patriarchal relations and oppression of women are based on power imbalances 
within a given society. In this line, this dissertation aims to think beyond the 
boundaries. With the need to think of gender in general, masculinities in particular 
not as a singular sex role but as a multiple configurations, this study takes 
masculinities not as a genetic role set but rather as a network of practices, discourses, 
symbols and meanings. Such a dynamic approach enables the writer to discuss in a 
more reproductive way and the reader to comprehend the picture as a whole. Hence, 
this dissertation mainly question whether men from different backgrounds experience 
the praxis of being men rather than disposing of their deep leftist, rightist, Islamist or 
nationalist background. By revealing the codes of gendered field of politics, this 
dissertation aims to fill an important gap in the literature on masculinities in Turkey.  
Men and masculinities and its embeddedness in politics are an area that has 
been almost untouched in the Turkish context. While there are some important 
studies in the Western literature that analyze in depth man and masculinities in 
specific country contexts (e.g. Nye, 1993; Foyster, 1999; Robertson and Suzuki, 
2002; McCormack, 2007), in Turkey there are very few studies. In recent years, there 
is an increased interest in the studies focusing on the construction of masculinities. 
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The studies that scrutinized modernization efforts and the construction of 
masculinities generally focus the perspective of men and their supremacy and/or 
victimized status.1 Studies on masculine rituals and their significance in daily lives 
are also important for grasping the cultural background for understanding 
masculinized power relations.2 There have also been a significant number of 
dissertations on men and masculinities.3 For example, the dissertation of Elif Bilgin 
analyzes the Turkish experience of modernity through the discourses of 
masculinities, with specific focus on the secularist/Islamist dichotomy, while the 
very recent study of Serpil Sancar, Masculinity: Impossible Power (2009), analyzes 
the construction of masculinity and power relations. She investigates the construction 
of masculinity in the family and daily life from an economic perspective, drawing on 
data from sixty in-depth interviews with both uneducated and educated men. The 
number of journal articles and book chapters on men and masculinities in Turkey has 
also been increasing.4 The research presented in this dissertation attempts to analyze 
the construction of masculinities in relation to Turkish political culture and political 
parties. Moreover, none of these analyze manhood and the construction of 
masculinity in politics as a field through investigating the leaders of political parties. 
For the field of political party analysis, such research on the identity side remains 
quite unresearched, too. Some studies do focus on the ideological space of political 
parties from the perspective of party leaders (Heper and Landau, 1991; Rubin and 
Heper, 2002; Heper and Sayarı, 2002), while there are also a number of empirical 
                                                 
1 See Koyuncu & Onur 2004; Saraçgil 2005. 
 
2 See Acıman 2008; Selek 2008. 
 
3 Akyüz 2005; Kundakçı 2007 
 
4 Toplum Bilim, V: 101; Birikim, V: 240; Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce V: 9.  
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studies on voter preferences that examine the ideological positions of parties 
(Özbudun, 1976; Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2000). However, a study that analyzes men 
and masculinities in political parties is absent. 
As the intertwined relation of masculinity and politics, namely its 
embeddedness, does not offer so many spaces to penetrate into, this dissertation aims 
to fill the gap in the literature by incorporating the man question into the Turkish 
political context. In addition, this dissertation will contribute to the literature by 
incorporating the man question with the guidance of Bourdieuan analytical tools. His 
perspective and way of analyzing will offer a more dynamic way of discussing 
representations of different masculinities.  
 
 
1.2. The Scope  
The main goal of this section is drawing the boundaries of the analysis of the   
construction of masculinities in Turkish political parties, namely the AKP (Justice 
and Development Party – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), the CHP (Republican 
People’s Party – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), and, the MHP (Nationalist Action Party – 
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). 
Firstly, as it is has been mentioned before, though there are number of gender 
studies about the role of women, her significance in nation building projects, 
participation in politics; however there are relatively few studies that focuses on the 
location of men and the constructions of man and masculinities in Turkey. 
Additionally, this dissertation is also significant in terms of focusing on an arena that 
has been missed, namely the construction of manhood in politics. As it has been 
mentioned before, there are very few studies that touch man and masculinities in 
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Turkey as a case. Moreover, none of the studies analyze manhood and construction 
of masculinity in politics through political parties. Although the PhD dissertation of 
Elif Bilgin analyzes the Kemalist and Islamist masculinities in early Republican era, 
there is not a comprehensive study that traces different paths of masculinities in 
relatively current Turkish political life. 
For the field of research on political party, as a study on identity of the 
political parties is quite untouched and especially a study that analyzes men and 
masculinities in political parties is absent. Therefore, this dissertation addresses this 
gap in the literature with its emphasis on the issue of masculinity(ies), 
femininity(ies), politics, and political parties.  
This study examines Turkish political parties so as to reveal the patterns 
behind the construction of masculinities. As Turkish politics has generally been 
considered as “party politics”, political parties are the main unit of analysis of this 
dissertation (Frey, 1965 cited in Z. Arat, 2008). Political parties are important 
political machineries and serve as “mediators and communication channels between 
the state apparatus and the public at large”, in addition, “(…) they act as the main 
vehicle of political participation” in representative democracies (Z. Arat, 2008: 7). 
For Arat (2008), the role of political parties in formulating policies so as to win 
elections make them the key players in shaping discourse of the country. In line, in 
Turkey, political parties are the main actors in functioning of politics. The powerful 
role of political parties started to be burgeon with the foundation of the Republic in 
1923 that situated the CHP as the main political organization of the Kemalist reform 
era and such a strong role has substantiated itself with transition to multi party 
politics in 1945. Özbudun argues that political parties in Turkey have been the most 
institutionalized political entities and overwhelming presence of leaders has been 
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common characteristics of Turkish political parties (1996: 136-137). The domination 
of leaders which has not allowed room to intra party democracy serve as developing 
personalistic style of leadership.  
 
Research Questions: This dissertation analyzes the construction of 
masculinities in Turkish politics with specific focus on political parties, namely the 
AKP, the CHP and the MHP between 2000 and 2008. So as to reveal the codes 
behind the embeddedness of masculinities and politics, it will deconstruct not only 
gender perspective of the parties but also analyze the leaders –Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal, Devlet Bahçeli- discourses on masculinities. This study will 
also have the chance to compare their different construction of masculinities with 
reference to their habitus. Turkish political culture and the codes of Turkish 
masculinities will not be underemphasized as they constitute the main pillars for the 
analysis of Turkish political manhood. Therefore, in this line mainly this dissertation 
is a gendered study of political men in Turkey and the main research questions are as 
follows: 
(1) How does politics shape masculinities in Turkey? 
(2) How does masculinities shape politics in Turkey? 
(3) What are the different representations of masculinities? 
(4) How does different habitus produce different constructions of 
masculinities in the field of Turkish politics? 
 
Selection of parties: In Turkish political setting, mainly three political stances 
have historically shaped the whole discourse. Sayarı (2002) mentions that there are 
three principal blocs; namely centre-right, centre-left, extreme right consist of 
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Islamist and nationalist sides. However, in current political atmosphere, it is hard to 
apply this schema.  
First, for the AKP, while the roots of the party have Islamist tone, the party 
positions itself as centre-right party. Leading cadre of the party declared that they 
were not Muslim democrats but conservative democrats (Heper, 2003). The aim of 
the party to represent a new political perception, discourse, method and culture is 
articulated under the political identity as follows: “(…) a political identity that we 
express as conservative democracy represents a very significant approach not only 
for Turkey but also for world politics.”5. In addition, in the framework of the 
construction of masculinities, the AKP and its model of neo-Muslim masculinities is 
very critical to be questioned. 
Secondly, the CHP predominantly represents centre-left votes. Despite heavy 
criticism from liberal socialist interest groups, the CHP defines itself as social 
democrat party. Although, the party has experienced declines and started to be 
known as “the party of congresses, political struggles, and internal strife”, its deep 
rooted institutions make the CHP a very crucial actor in Turkish politics (Ayata, 
2002). For the construction of masculinities, the party and its Kemalist/Secular mode 
of masculinities has also great significance. 
Thirdly, the MHP represents a significant tradition of Turkish political life. 
As a nationalist deep-rooted party, it represents strong nationalist discourse of the 
Turkish political climate. The MHP echoes nationalist discourse inclusive from 
                                                 
 
5 From the speech delivered by the party leader R. Tayyip Erdoğan in the International Symposium on 
Conservatism and Democracy, on 10. January.2004. 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/siyasivehukuk/dokuman/ing.%20başbakan%20konuşma%20UMDS.doc 
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moderate to rigid tones (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002; Heper and İnce, 2006). The party is 
also very critical as it represents nationalist masculinities. 
Finally, it is also significant to mention the reason behind the absence of 
some political parties within the scope of this dissertation. Some centre-right parties, 
such as the ANAP (Motherland Party), the DYP (True Path Party), and centre-left 
party, namely the DSP (Democratic Left Party) have been away from office for a 
period of time. Hence, their influence has decreased in terms of shaping political 
atmosphere. Moreover, although the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) represents 
another deep rooted political stance in Turkey, as a pro-Kurdish political party, an 
analysis of this party requires a different approach that integrates gender and 
ethnicity intersection.6 In other words, if the BDP is taken into consideration, other 
variants, such as ethnicity, regionalism, are needed to be analyzed as loaded 
conceptualization, will be beyond the scope of this study.  
In this framework, based on the hegemony of leaders in conducting party 
politics and representing three prominent political parties in Turkish politics, this 
dissertation will mainly analyze the construction of masculinities of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan as the leader of the AKP, Deniz Baykal as the leader of the CHP, and, 
Devlet Bahçeli as the leader of the MHP.  
 
Research Time Framework: These newspapers and other secondary data 
including party programs and election manifests between 2000 and 2008 will be re-
read and re-analyzed. Mainly, the reason behind of choosing this period lies in its 
significance in terms of Turkish political life. Secondly, as Sayarı (2002) mentions, 
                                                 
 
6 For a detailed analysis of gender and Kurdish ethnicity, see Altınay 2004. 
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there has been the transition from coalition government to a single-party majority 
rule. A newly formed political party, the AKP, has become the major actor of 
Turkish politics. Additionally, as has been mentioned, in the Turkish political arena 
that had been shaped by strong state traditions, political parties are left to their own 
devices in the political sphere. The role of military as a stabilizing factor started to 
diminish in a political atmosphere marked by the consolidation of democracy and the 
membership to the EU. Thirdly, the sharp rise of the AKP is another significant 
factor that needs to be deeply analyzed. Such a major party, with a National Outlook 
background in its grassroots, is at the center of Turkish politics with a charismatic 
leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Finally, the analysis covers years between 2000 and 
2008 that two national elections held in Turkey. As it is discussed in the literature7, 
rhetorical strategies that favor gendered hierarchy and images of manhood are used 
in campaigns. Election times are marked by increase in gendered rhetorics as the 
atmosphere of election requires men’s issues. “Most obviously, the electoral playing 
field is dominated by men.” (Carroll and Fox, 2010: 2). Especially, as elections are 
described in terms of metaphors and analogies drawn for masculine domains of 
battlefields and hence requires the strategy to damage the opponent. In addition, not 
only the rhetoric but also behaviors of candidates are loaded in gendered terms. 
General perception asks dominant and assertive qualities. Therefore, so as to reach 
general public, politicians strategize about how to present themselves to voters 
(Carroll and Fox, 2010). In this perspective, it can be argued that during election 
times, gender matters. Hence, the structural changes in Turkish politics, the sharp 
                                                 
 
7 See Svendsen, 2007; Carroll and Fox, 2010 
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rise of the AKP and two national elections are the main determining factors for the 
research time period of the dissertation.  
 
 
1.3 Methodological Framework 
The dissertation will mainly use the method of discourse analysis that is 
extensively used by scholars of cultural and feminist studies. This method attempts to 
reveal the hidden meanings within a text and argues that every text is shaped within a 
discourse and discursive practices. As such it is nurtured by a deconstructive reading.  
In order to have a clearer picture about discourse analysis, it is relevant to 
mention that this method is a type of content analysis. Researchers in many fields, 
including anthropology, information studies, management, political science, 
psychology, and sociology have utilized content analysis. The range and procedures 
of content analysis is enormous, and its varieties include discourse analysis, 
ethnographic analysis, rhetorical analysis, and narrative semiotics (White and Marsh, 
2006: 23).  
Deconstruction is an additional term that refers to the examination of texts 
(Reinharz, 1992: 148). Deconstructionist rereading is a tool “(…) to display the ways 
in which what appears to be amalgamated whole is in fact made up of distinct 
clusters of meanings” (Bilgin, 2004: 46). In the framework of this dissertation, for 
example, deconstructionist rereading will enable the writer and/or reader to analyze 
the construction of masculinities through separating it into its constituent parts. 
At this point, the key word for the method of this dissertation is discourse. 
The simplest definition of discourse is “(…) a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002: 
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1). Newspapers, books, and journal articles can be read through critical lenses and 
studied as texts. As Reinharz mentions “(…) these products stem from every aspect 
of human life including relatively private worlds, high culture, popular culture and 
organizational life. The only limit to what can be considered as a cultural artifact is 
the researcher’s imagination” (1992: 146). Therefore, it can be said that every 
meaning-producing thing in a given society is potentially an object of analysis; the 
scholar chooses his/her subject among these in accordance with what the social and 
political atmospheres highlight as important in generating meaning. In addition, the 
scholar chooses the subject of inquiry with a critical approach to taken for granted 
and also accumulated knowledge. As this knowledge is shaped by culturally specific 
and contingent representations of the world, researcher aims to reread the text and 
maintain specific social patterns.  
Another significant approach that is valuable to discuss is critical discourse 
analysis. Norman Fairclough is the leading scholar who places emphasis on active 
role of discourse and also intertextuality. Fairclough defines intertextuality as “(…) 
how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts.” 
(Fairclough, 2003: 17). Hence, it refers to the condition that all communicative 
events are based on earlier events. Especially from the perspective of what is said 
and unsaid, critical discourse analysis puts emphasis on a text’s influence on history. 
The analysis of established meanings and both the analysis of what text says and 
what text silences is the tool for examining multifaceted social patterns. Hence, 
focusing on patterns of masculinity will not lead us to isolate social contexts. In 
Fairclough’s book with Chouliaraki (1999), Bourdieu’s concept of field is discussed. 
As field is a domain that is shaped by a specific social logic, actors of the field 
struggle to attain same aim and position themselves accordingly. For instance, in 
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politics as a field, politicians compete to gain power and they are positioned in terms 
of their relative strength. Therefore, the discourses within the field of politics can be 
considered as “resources for differentiation” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999: 15). 
Moreover, the writers aptly argue that “[i]deologies are discursive constructions” and 
add that “[w]w may say that the discourse of one practice colonises that of another, 
or that the latter appropriates the former, depending on how power relations are 
expressed as relations between practices and discourses.” (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999: 26-27). Hence, discourses, ideologies, power relations are 
interconnected and “uncovering the social mechanisms” requires a dynamic 
rereading (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 51).   
Having defined these essential points about the framework of analysis, it is 
valuable to mention about how this method will be employed in this study. Political 
parties are the main unit of analysis. The AKP, the CHP and the MHP’s, in general, 
their leaders, in particular, will be examined in terms of the construction of 
masculinities. The given political parties programs and election manifests will be re-
read through a critical lens that focuses on some tentative questions and/or 
conceptualizations on the construction of patterns of masculinity and patterns of 
womanhood as they are relational, mutually constructed concepts. These party 
programs and elections manifests were re-read with a specific focus on gender. The 
part on women and family were analyzed in depth.   
In addition to parties’ publications, this dissertation also analyzes the 
newspapers Hürriyet, Zaman, and Cumhuriyet. First, the newspapers are chosen 
according to their different stances on politics. Hürriyet (Liberal), Cumhuriyet 
(Kemalist/Secularist) and Zaman (Political Islam) are deep-rooted newspapers that 
each has a long established circle of readers.  
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As Ware mentions party programs are a party’s public face, so they only 
reflect the surface of political group’s beliefs. So, to analyze the party, one must 
question the discursive side of the group’s beliefs. Hence, in this perspective, the 
leaders’ sayings and their declarations in public sphere are significant as well. 
On the basis of the main elements of Turkish political culture that are 
discussed in coming chapters, three newspapers scanned on the first stage with key 
words of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. The second step 
was to scan chosen news with key words of man (erkek/adam), woman (kadın/kız), 
being man (erkek/adam olmak). At this step, culturally loaded terms, statements were 
not detached from the analysis and they were categorized accordingly. For instance, 
being man (adam olmak) is a popular expression in Turkish. It refers to individual 
who behave accordingly to norms widely accepted by others. Hence, an individual 
who act, think, behave gendered in masculine. In parallel to the expression of being 
man (adam olmak), there is also the saying of like man (adam gibi). Like being man, 
this saying is used as an adjective to culturally accepted practices that are considered 
as true and also valuable. Another culturally loaded term is tough man (kabadayı). 
Tough man denotes to a traditional virile image.8 In addition, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
has generally been criticized and/or appreciated with his manner of talking, 
behaving. Hence, the significance of tough uncle lies behind in its traditional role and 
also its reification with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Another expression that is important 
for the scope of this dissertation is the relationship between man/coward 
(erkek/ürkek). The beginning of this expression dates back to 1999 when the MHP 
and the FP (Virtue Party) disputed over testing manhood and cowardice. This debate 
                                                 
 
8 The particular significance of tough uncle (kabadayı) will be elaborated in next chapters in detail.  
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which has turned out to be a cliché in political cultural discourse has reproduced 
itself later on again. For instance, when Hülya Avşar, a very famous Turkish 
actress/singer, described Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as “coward cat” after the interview 
conducted with him, got reaction.9 The politicians of the AKP criticized Hülya Avşar 
and mentioned that “We used to see him as a lion”.10 Therefore, man/coward 
discourse has a very important role in popular discourse and such expressions are 
vital so as to capture how the cultural/political/social discourse is gendered. In sum, 
it can be argued that whole material, party programs, election manifests, newspapers 
were analyzed by not detaching it from Turkish political cultural discourse, e.g. 
metaphors, allegories, expressions.  
While the data were analyzed besides the culturally loaded expressions, 
sayings, any declarations of the leaders about their family, social life, etc. were 
considered valuable to be analyzed as they contain clues about their habitus. As a 
family and social life are important determinants of a person’s background, leaders’ 
declarations about their family were considered as valuable. During analysis all 
signifiers that effect discursive practices, e.g. personal information, social settings, 
cultural codes, were taken into consideration. 
In summary, the most significant questions that guide the reading and also the 
analysis can be listed as: 
(1) Are there expressions that are ideologically contested? 
(2) What metaphors are used? 
(3) Is there rewording or overwording? 
                                                 
9 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/10105079.asp 
 
10 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=10114213 
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(4) Does the material imply something about how men in concern position 
themselves? 
(5) How do the men in concern position their family? 
(6) How do the men in concern say about other men? 
(7) Do dilemmas arise about any issue concerning gender?  
In conclusion, this study examines the leaders of Turkish political parties 
with a special lens on their personal histories, namely the classificatory elements of 
their habitus by not detaching it from social setting.  Therefore, divergent personal 
histories of the leaders are not the sole unit of analysis. Turkish political background 
in general, and Turkish political culture in particular, will be scrutinized in line with 
the hypotheses of the study.  
 
 
1.4 The Organization of the Dissertation 
It is possible to divide this dissertation into three parts. The first part 
introduces the background and the theoretical terrain that this study is based on. This 
part starts with Chapter 2. This chapter will first define sex and gender as starting 
point. It will then introduce the scope of feminist studies and then the trajectory of 
masculinity studies. This discussion is followed by the introduction of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s theoretical framework. Chapter 2 will discuss Pierre Bourdieu as his 
theoretical conceptualizations offer the outline for the theoretical terrain of this 
dissertation. Bourdieu’s theory on gender and the decisive elements of his theory, 
mainly, body, habitus, language, field, and, capital will be defined. The chapter will 
also highlight the congruent relation between habitus and the field. The chapter will 
examine the notion of masculine domination and the concept of nobility as the 
22 
 
background of Bourdieu’s theory and its specificity within the scope of this 
dissertation. Chapter 2 finally states the critiques on Bourdieu.  
Chapter 3 discusses men and masculinities in general. It first tries to touch the 
discussions around defining masculinity/masculinities and then focuses more on the 
masculinities in Turkey and tries to define different paths of masculinities in Turkey. 
Neo-Muslim masculinities with reference to the AKP, Kemalist/Secular 
masculinities with reference to the CHP and Nationalist masculinities with reference 
to the MHP will be discussed towards developing typologies of masculinities in 
Turkey.  
Chapter 4 aims to trace different paths of masculinities with specific focus on 
Turkish political culture. It first briefly analyzes Turkish politics from the period 
when modernization efforts has been increased. Turkish modernization project will 
be discussed with focus on Ottoman heritages and its emphasis on the detachment 
from the past. The gender perspective of the Kemalist reforms will constitute the 
main part of the discussion. The construction of gendered identities in general, 
masculinities in particular will be analyzed in a detailed way. The second part of the 
chapter will outline different paths of masculinities in Turkish political culture. Five 
main parameters of the Turkish political culture are chosen in line with the literature 
and they have been discussed with a specific reference to the construction of 
masculinities. These parameters are identified as (1) strong state tradition; (2) 
militarism; (3) Westernization; (4) Secularists /Islamists cleavage; and finally (5) 
domination of leaders will be elaborated in accordance with the codes of Turkish 
masculinities as (1) Devlet Baba, (2) Every male (Turk) is born soldier, (3) Mon 
Cher vs. Kabadayı (Tough Uncle), and (4) Kemalist/Modern vs. Muslim Traditional 
Man. Hence, it re-situates Turkish manhood in the political cultural codes.  
23 
 
Chapter 5 constitutes this dissertation’s analytical discussion part through 
political parties. This chapter will analyze gendered structure of the Turkish political 
parties. Then it will first examine gender discourse of the official party documents, 
namely, party programs and election manifests. It will question the AKP’s official 
documents from the perspective of whether or not it offers a new approach. 
Secondly, it will examine the CHP’s documents by scrutinizing its liberal approach. 
Thirdly, the official party documents of the MHP will be analyzed and its deep 
rooted nationalist approach’s traces will be followed. This chapter finally re-situates 
typologies of masculinities in Turkey, and, in this framework it will discuss how the 
traditional gender order and the glorification of the family have been reified.   
Chapter 6 analyzes Turkish political manhood and mainly questions the role 
of the different habitus in field of politics. It will first adapt Bourdieuan perspective 
into the analysis of the construction of political manhood in Turkish political parties 
with a specific lens through their leaders. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the 
AKP, will be elaborated with a focus on his kabadayı (tough uncle) manner of doing 
politics will be scrutinized. The leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, and his stance in 
Turkish political life will be examined as he acts like the guardian of Kemalism. 
Devlet Bahçeli’s, the leader of the MHP, manner of conducting politics will be 
analyzed with a specific focus on his fatherhood role. 
Chapter 7 is the final part of the analytical discussion of the dissertation. This 
part will examine political parties and their leaders’ constructions of different 
masculinities and their representations in the field of politics. It will re-read the data 
collected from the newspapers with a lens that reveal explicit and/or hidden codes of 
masculinities. First the AKP and its leader’s neo-Muslim masculinities, secondly the 
CHP and its leader’s Kemalist/Secular masculinities and finally the MHP and its 
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leader’s nationalist masculinities will be elaborated. These three different 
representations of masculinities will be scrutinized from the perspective of how the 
understandings of (1) politics is male, (2) politician is male are incorporated into 
their discourses.  
Chapter 8 is the concluding part that discusses the framework of the 
dissertation and its strengths. It will also open alternative ways for the discussions in 
the field of Turkish politics and constructions of masculinities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL TERRAIN 
 
 
The pioneering efforts by feminist scholars to make women visible, both in 
the traditional curriculum of political science, sociology, anthropology and in the 
newly established interdisciplinary field of women’s studies, have been signs of 
success as well as signs of transformation of traditional methods of inquiry into 
human life. Gender is one of the axes around which social life is organized and can 
be considered as a lens through which we can see the familiar in a different way. All 
current work on women/femininities and men/masculinities proceed from this insight 
about the centrality of gender in social, political and individual life. Gender is a 
social reality and a frame of understanding in the construction of this dissertation. 
This study is not primarily concerned with gender relations; it is concerned with 
gendered discourses/constructions/meanings. Therefore, defining sex and gender is a 
valuable place to start. 
 
2.1. Defining the Boundaries between Sex and Gender  
The questions raised by earlier advocates of feminism put the “nature versus 
nurture debate” at the forefront. Simone de Beauvoir, in her illuminating book The 
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Second Sex (1952), highlights that civilization as a whole has produced the female 
other while woman is not determined by her body and/or hormones but rather within 
social, economic context in which her body is situated. Woman’s physical 
appearance does not constitute a criterion for woman’s social, political, or economic 
position; it is the society that produces a suitable role for women. These roles, 
namely gender roles, specify the ways in which men and women are expected to 
behave, think, and even feel.  
To put it simply “Sex refers to the biological apparatus, the male and female 
– our chromosomal, chemical, and anatomical organization. Gender refers to the 
meanings that are attached to those differences within a culture.” (Kimmel and 
Aronson, 2003: xvi). It can be argued that, sex is male and female; gender is 
masculinity and femininity. Gender is perceived and reflected, as well as 
internalized, and acts and behaviors are assigned by society in accordance with what 
is supposed to be normal for each sex. They are the expression and product of 
structures of social practice, whereby objective structures (division of labor and 
power relations) and subjective characteristics (patterns of behaviors and thoughts) 
correspond with each other (Connell, 2002; Bourdieu, 2001). This understanding of 
gender considers the term as a constantly shifting product of society and the relation 
between each of them as relational and hierarchical. Ever since classical Greece, 
“gender has been understood as a series of binary polarities” (Whitehead and Barrett, 
2001: 22). For instance, so as to have a definition of masculinity as strong, rational, 
and competent, it is necessary to see femininity as fragile, emotional and 
incompetent.11 In the framework of this alterity - otherness, one’s status as an 
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outsider - it can be said that the differences between and across categories of man 
and woman can easily turn into ideological fictions, and thus politicized (Whitehead 
and Barrett, 2001: 23).12 Hence, within this framework for the conceptualization of 
gender in this dissertation, now, taking a closer look at the evolution of feminist 
theory and how feminist scholars question the issue of gender before analyzing 
masculinity studies. 
 
2.2.      Questioning Gender 
Questioning of the notion of gender began with the search for a response to 
enormous change that had overtaken women’s lives with the growth of industrial 
capitalism and research on gender differences and the socialization of women started 
during mid-20th century (Carrigan et al., 1985: 554). As a concept that had developed 
during 1930s, the notion of role was applied to gender with Talcott Parson’s classical 
formulation of sex role theory (Carrigan et al., 1985: 555). Parsons questioned 
socialization and structures, and he rejected arguments involving the biological 
differences between man and woman. However, his arguments were based on 
normative standard cases. For instance, he points out that “(…) the masculine 
personality tends more to the predominance of instrumental interests, needs and 
functions, (…) while feminine personality tends more to the primacy of expressive 
                                                                                                                                          
11 For a detailed analysis, see: Bordo, S. (1993) Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture and 
the Body. Berkeley: University of California. She discusses how the image of woman as gentle, 
domestic, or sensitive is necessary to sustain an image of man as cool, strong, or rational. 
 
12 For detailed information about the embodiment of differences and normalization, see Silverman, K. 
(1992) Male Subjectivity at the Margins. New York: Routledge. Moreover, some works highlight how 
masculine gender performance applies to women’s lives. See Holberstam, Judith. 1998. Female 
Masculinity. London: Duke University Press. 
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interests, needs and functions” (Parsons and Bares, 1953: 101). This mentioned issue 
of primacy preoccupied intellectual arena throughout the 1970s.   
Feminist theory throughout the 1970s was preoccupied with this mentioned 
“issue of primacy” (Adkins and Skeggs, 2004). The problem of primacy emerged as 
a question of whether subordination on the basis of sex was the most urgent problem 
facing women. It was clear that the answer and/or the solution to this problem could 
be eradicated only by transforming deep-rooted social structures and relations 
(Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993).  
 
 
2.2.1. Feminist Studies 
The first sustained Western feminist theoretical work was Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). “Wollstonecraft 
pointed the direction for later feminism by arguing that biological sex differences 
were entirely irrelevant to granting political rights.” (Jaggar and Rottenberg, 1993: 
117). Thus, women’s social inequality is the result, not the justification, of apparent 
inferiority. In addition, for the early feminist thinkers, the reason behind this result is 
the women’s inferior education (Jaggar and Rottenberg, 1993). In this perspective, 
early feminist thinkers questioned social and political inequalities and they criticized 
the domination of men and, also, promoted the ideals of equality.  
 “Liberal feminists favor gender equality in the sense of equal opportunities 
for men and women - a sense continuous with the classical liberal interpretation of 
equality-” (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993: 117).  Liberal feminists are specifically 
concerned with the issue of equal opportunities and the line between public and 
private spheres. For them, enhancing the status of women and also improving their 
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educational prospects requires a reordering of domestic life. Hence, a reform in 
public life simultaneously transforms private life and the roles of women within. As 
Carol Pateman mentions, public and private dichotomy is central to almost all 
feminist writings, and “it is ultimately what the feminist movement is about” (1989: 
118).  
While liberal feminists put special emphasis on equal opportunities, Marxist 
feminists reject the conservative notion of an essentialist and biologically determined 
human nature. Marxists also challenge the liberal assumption that equality of 
opportunity can only be possible under capitalism where a small class of people, the 
capitalist class, controls the productive resources of the society and exploits the labor 
of the working class (Jaggar and Rothenberg, 1993). Therefore, they claim that the 
existence of class-based society is the original cause of women’s subordination.  
While the mentioned deep-rooted feminist theoretical approaches point out 
different targets for gender inequality, radical feminists object to opportunity and 
class reductionism of earlier feminists. For radical feminists women’s subordination 
as a widespread form of domination is a primary concern as it is deeply established 
in individual psyches and social practices. Shulamith Firestone’s The Dialectic of Sex 
(1970) offered courageous propositions to the academic debate on women’s 
subordination. She does not regard sex as unchangeable. Firestone (1970) argued that 
related to advanced technology, it seems possible to compensate for biological 
inequalities by permitting extrauterine reproduction, namely test-tube babies. 
However, Firestone reduces women and men to the biological categories of female 
and male as the book’s key assumption is that “(…) women necessarily suffer from 
fundamentally oppressive biological condition but biology in itself is neither 
oppressive nor liberating” (Pateman, 1989: 126). Therefore, such a Hobbesian 
30 
 
reduction of individuals to their natural state leads theoretical discussions to a dead-
end. Developing a perspective that takes account of social relations, everyday life 
and institutions, and, in parallel, constructing the liaison between micro and macro 
politics are necessary.    
These three mainstream feminist approaches not only enrich the academic 
curriculum, but they also lead scholars to question silences or established social 
norms. “There is silence about the part of the story which reveals that the social 
contract is a fraternal pact that constitutes civil society as a patriarchal or masculine 
order.” (Pateman,1989: 33). Hence, as questioning silences is necessary, this 
dissertation will try to understand the background of masculine order and will help to 
expose other unquestioned dynamics that perform within politics. Examining 
masculinity studies and comprehending its inquiry will enable us to map how to 
deconstruct hidden or in a way taken for granted conceptualizations. 
 
2.2.2 Masculinity Studies 
The area of masculinity studies started to develop in the 1970s. The 
prominent terms of this early wave of masculinity studies were simply coalesced 
around the terms of restrictions, disadvantages, and general penalties attached to 
being a man (Connell 2001; 2005; Kimmel et. al., 2005). This period’s students of 
gender, in general, and masculinity, in particular, criticized the traditional masculine-
value system. They questioned how the traditional system has victimized men, or in 
other words, they mostly scrutinized how men have been oppressed by their roles. 
Hence, during 1970s, the literature on men and masculinity was focused on men’s 
liberation (Adams and Savran, 2002). Moreover, gay liberation movements, at the 
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end of 1960s, heightened their political significance and acted as catalyst to the first 
wave of masculinity studies (Adams and Savran, 2002). Due to these developments, 
masculinity was no longer taken as a monolithic entity and patriarchy attaining a 
universal status as the single cause of the oppression of women started to be 
questioned. “What is to be a man?” had become a significant question, and critiques 
and analyses of masculinity appeared from several research areas (Carrigan et al., 
1985: 551). This generation challenged the unexamined ideology that old models had 
reproduced domination of men over women by highlighting the significance of 
masculine dominance over feminine traits. Moreover, the question of how some 
aspects of men’s lives and experiences are constrained has been scrutinized. For 
Victor Seidler, men needed to take seriously what men felt and thought about 
themselves (1997:3). These first writings were a kind of a request to voice their 
experiences in their own terms.  In addition, this first wave of masculinity studies has 
analyzed and tried to change institutionalized masculine roles in patriarchal 
institutions (Adams and Savran, 2002: 5). Some of the major books published in this 
period are Male Machine by Marc Feigen Fasteau (1974); Liberated Man by Warren 
Farrell (1974)13; The Forty Nine Percent Majority by Deborah David and Robert 
Brannon (1976).14  
                                                 
 
13 These two books highlight how some aspects of men’s lives and experiences are constrained and 
mentioned the costs to men’s health, both physically and psychologically. For detailed information, 
see Carrigan et al., 1985; Hearn, 2000; Kimmel and Aronson, 2003.  
 
14 This book analyzes the meanings of masculinity in USA by adopting a feminist inspired prism. It 
points out not only costs but also privileges of being men in USA. For detailed information, see 
Carrigan et al., 1985; Hearn, 2000; Kimmel and Aronson, 2003. 
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The second wave of masculinity studies applies to 1980s. This period is also 
called as mythopoetic men’s movement.15 In 1981, Joseph Pleck’s book, Myth of 
Masculinity, criticized sex role theory and attempted to replace it.16 Pleck reviewed 
the constituent elements of sex role and argued that certain implicit assumptions have 
long dominated scientific and popular thinking about sex roles, and he outlined his 
sex-role strain mentioning that these roles are constraining (Pleck, 1981). For Pleck, 
the male sex role model is incapable of describing men’s experiences (Kimmel and 
Aronson, 2003). Pleck’s book can be easily considered as the first move toward 
redefining or, namely, revisiting of sex role framework. Sex role literature started to 
focus on attitudes and the process of internalization of these roles. Especially, the 
critics from psychoanalysis put emphasis on the naïve understanding of simple social 
learning and conformity to the rules (Carrigan et al., 1985: 556).17 The effects of the 
expansion in the literature and increasing critics were accompanied with the Gay 
Liberation (Carrigan et. al., 1985: 557). This movement was concerned with the 
critics of the political structure of sexuality and their arguments led to strengthen a 
more dynamic approach. With this background, a marked acceleration of concern 
and curiosity has started in the field of masculinity during the late 1980s.  
During the 1980s, the most significant turn in the field was the shift of focus 
to the notion of masculinities. Scholars have tended to agree that there is a need to 
                                                 
15 Robert Bly’s Iron John: A Book About Men (1990) can be considered as the bible of this 
movement. It was a widespread movement both on ritual process and textual phenomenon. This 
movement was considered as a moment when men were finally answering the claims of the women’s 
movement. For Bly, men believed that they have been emasculated by feminism and effeminizing 
culture. For detailed analysis of the mythopoetic men’s movement, see: Kimmel, Micheal. (1995). The 
Politics of Manhood- Profeminist Men Respond to the Mythopoetic Men’s Movement (And the 
Mythopoetic Leaders Answer). Philadelphia:Temple University Press. 
 
16 Pleck, Joseph (1981). The Myth of Masculinity, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
17 For details of this genre of critics, see: Stock, J., Johnston, M. (1980). Sex Roles. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall.  
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think of masculinity not as a singular sex role but as multiple, contextual 
constructions. Race, ethnicity, and religion were integrated into the content of the 
literature. In other words, it has been recognized that a dominant form of masculinity 
exists in relation to marginalized (men of color, gay men, working class men, etc.) 
forms of masculinities (Connell, 1987).18 Robert W. Connell’s notion of hegemonic 
masculinity has been a challenging point that has still been criticized and analyzed in 
masculinity studies literature.  
Connell has introduced the discussion about different forms of masculinity. 
For Connell, hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to various 
subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women (1987: 183). Connell 
points out that there are processes that create hegemony, subordination, complicity, 
and marginalization among masculinities (Connell, 1995). In this perspective, for 
Connell, “[h]egemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender 
practice that embodies the currently accepted solution to the problem of the 
legitimacy of patriarchy,” and he adds that it is contrasted with subordinated 
masculinities (Connell, 1995: 77). Although Connell’s definition of masculinity is an 
illuminating one, the definition and background of masculinity/masculinities is 
critical to be discussed and next chapter will focus on the issue of defining 
masculinity/masculinities in detail and will draw the lines for this dissertation. Now, 
it is significant to shift the focus to another angle of theoretical framework, namely 
Bourdieuan perspective. Pierre Bourdieu’s analyses on gendered identity 
constructions will complete the theoretical background. 
                                                 
 
18 The year 1987 was a significant year. Key stones of the literature were published in this given year. 
See The Making of Masculinities by Harry Brod; Changing Men by Michael Kimmel; The Gender of 
Oppression by Jeff Hearn; Gender and Power by Robert Connell.  
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2.3. Reading Bourdieu’s Main Concepts 
Pierre Bourdieu is a leading French sociologist and philosopher whose works 
have been very influential in not only sociology but also in other fields of social 
sciences. Bourdieu’s works contribute to social sciences through offering a 
conceptual framework for a multilevel research and also presenting an outline for 
“tackling issues of reflexivity in the research process.” (Özbilgin and Tatlı, 2005: 
855).  
Bourdieu takes reflexivity as a critical aspect of any social research that 
transcends the duality between objectivity and subjectivity as a unique way to unveil 
social reality hidden by presumptions. Bourdieu explains that 
[t]he knowledge we shall call phenomenological sets out to make 
explicit the truth of primary experience of the social world, i.e. (…) 
the unquestioning apprehension of the social world which by 
definition, does not reflect on itself and excludes the question of the 
conditions of its possibility. The knowledge we shall term 
objectivist constructs the objective relations (e.g. economic or 
linguistic) which structure practice and representations of practice, 
i.e. in particular primary knowledge, practical and tacit, of the 
familiar world. This construction presupposes a break with primary 
knowledge, whose tacitly assumed presuppositions give the social 
world its self-evident and natural character. (…) finally it is only 
by means of a second break, which is needed in order to grasp the 
limits of objectivist knowledge - an inevitable moment in scientific 
knowledge – and to bring to light the theory of theory and the 
theory of practice inscribed in this mode of knowledge that we can 
integrate the gains from it in to an adequate science of practice. 
(1977: 3, italics mine) 
 
Hence, what Bourdieu emphasizes is to go beyond the familiar conceptions of 
the world. Especially, for an analysis of the most apparent, most familiar and self-
evident conceptualizations and relationships, his theoretical agenda will be very 
helpful. Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and capital will be beneficiary for a 
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multilayered analysis of the social world in general, Turkish political manhood in 
particular.  
I will analyze mainly Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology on gender, especially 
masculine domination. Having an outline of significant theorists’ conceptualizations 
of power and body, namely Foucault and Butler, this section will focus on 
Bourdieu’s schemata on understanding gendered dimensions of power and identity.  
The rich complexity of Bourdieu’s conceptual world offers a valuable sketch 
for understanding the dynamic construction of manhood. By using Bourdieu’s 
conceptualizations, such as body, habitus, and field, how men from different 
backgrounds experience the praxis of being men rather than disposing of their deep 
leftist, rightist, Islamist, or nationalist background will be under scrutiny. The 
concepts of Bourdieu will be used to illuminate the construction of manhood and/or 
masculinities, and how politics construct masculinities through masculine 
domination strategies that have been reproduced by practices.  
 
2.3.1. Bourdieu’s Theory on Gender 
2.3.1.1 Body 
To Bourdieu, gendered dialectic is structured through hierarchical relations of 
difference. The main site of this difference is body. Power relations are inculcated 
upon the body, and the body is the main site of the naturalized gender identity. 
According to Bourdieu, “the body is the site of incorporated history” (1991: 13). The 
body as the source of individuals’ practices and perceptions reproduce that 
incorporated history. The embodied “social programming of perception is applied to 
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body” and it also constructs the difference between biological sexes (Bourdieu 2001: 
11). For Bourdieu, the anatomical difference between the sex organs can thus appear 
as “the natural justification of the socially constructed differences between the 
genders” (2001:11, original italics). The social constructions of masculinity and 
femininity are actually written on the body, which Bourdieu calls “bodily hexis” 
(Bourdieu, 1990). It is an embodiment process as a product of composition of 
volumes of capital that can be carried by the body and also the habitus and the field 
(Adkins and Skeggs, 2004: 22). Bourdieu uses gender within his whole theoretical 
scheme and argues that gender is hidden under the surface of categories. Therefore, 
analyzing gender is very critical.  
The importance of bodily hexis can be seen in the differing ways that men 
and women behave in the social world. A related concept is “le sens pratique” 
(practical sense) (Bourdieu, 1990). This can be defined as the sense of how to act and 
respond in the course of daily lives. As there is an active relation between subject 
and the world, “ars inveniendi,” le sens pratique” orients the body and gives a sense 
of what is appropriate or not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 122). All these 
significant notions, “bodily hexis”, “le sens pratique”, and “ars inveniendi” direct us 
to the notion of habitus. 
 
 
2.3.1.2. Habitus 
Habitus is one of the most significant concepts in Bourdieu’s theoretical 
world. Bourdieu defines habitus as a constitutive element of the whole schemata of 
perception, thought, and action (1989:14).  
37 
 
Habitus is the durable organization of one’s body and its 
deployment in the world. It is found in our posture, and our way of 
walking, speaking, eating and laughing; it is found in every way we 
use our body. Habitus is both a system whereby people organize 
their own behavior and a system through which people perceive 
and appreciate the behavior of others (Allan, 2011: 172) 
 
As a dynamic theory of embodiment, Bourdieu’s conceptualization permits 
differentiation. He argues that “through the lasting experience of social position” 
(Bourdieu, 1990: 131). In this line, habitus produces practices and also 
representations (Bourdieu, 1989). In this line, it can be argued that all the networks 
of practices and representations mediate an individual’s actions and external 
conditions as well. One’s own habitus contains classificatory elements necessary to 
determine his/her social space. “Habitus thus implies a sense of one’s place and also 
a sense of the place of the others” (Bourdieu, 1989:19). Bourdieu clarifies his 
argument with an example: 
For example, we say of a piece of clothing, a piece of furniture, or 
a book: ‘that looks pretty bourgeois’ or ‘that’s intellectual’. What 
are the social conditions of possibility of such a judgment? First, it 
presupposes that taste (or habitus) as a system of schemes of 
classification, is objectively referred, via the social conditionings 
that produced it, to a social condition: agents classify themselves 
(…) by choosing, in conformity with their taste. (…) They choose 
(…) goods that occupy a position in this space homologous to the 
position they occupy in social space. (Bourdieu, 1989: 19)      
 
This example shows that habitus has a differentiating dimension. An 
individual distances herself/himself from others. Here distance does not refer to 
isolation; rather, it has a connotation of positioning. An individual positions 
herself/himself in parallel with his/her early socialization experiences. As habitus 
results from early socialization experiences in which external structures are 
internalized, “it involves an unconscious calculation of what is possible/impossible” 
and suitable/non-suitable for herself/himself (Swartz, 1997: 106). Hence, habitus 
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works below the level of conscious thought, and its embeddedness gives habitus its 
specific power.  
It is also the reason that different individuals have different tastes. In this 
perspective, even the ways of speaking is a manifestation of the socially structured 
character of habitus. For Bourdieu, it is an aspect that he calls as “articulatory style” 
(1991: 17). Individuals articulate their habitus at an unconscious level. For Allan, 
education influences the kind of language we use to think, and he mentions that “the 
more formal education we receive, the more complex are the words and syntactical 
elements of our language. Because we don’t just think with language, we think in 
language.” (2011: 175, original italics). Therefore, in this perspective, it can be 
argued that individuals are already “predisposed to act in certain ways, to pursue 
certain goals” and also to speak in certain ways (Bourdieu, 1991:17)   
“On one level, habitus can be read as Bourdieu’s attempt to conceptualize 
culture as practice; on another level, it associates practice with habit”, and both 
readings offer a dynamic way of theorizing (Swartz, 1997: 115). Especially if habitus 
and le sens pratique are essentially lived categories, theoretical space is opened for 
explaining the elements of variability in conduct of everyday life. For McNay, it also 
offers the potential creativity “(…) inherent in even the most routine reproduction” 
of gender identity (1999: 103). Hence, a performative reiteration continuously 
(re)produces the constructions of gendered identities and the field draws the 
boundaries that habitus “(…) engenders a potentially infinite number of pattern of 
behavior, thought and expression” (McNay, 1999: 100).  
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2.3.1.3. Field 
Although habitus generates a suitable analytical ground to examine different 
pathways of the constructions of masculinities, it is not the sole analytical tool for 
scrutinizing the constructions of political manhood and the way they overlap. Field 
(champ) is another tool, and is mainly defined through relationships, and hence, field 
is constantly changing. For Allan “(…) fields are delineated spaces wherein ‘the 
game’ is played” (2011: 176). A field’s parameters are defined by networks or sets of 
connections. As a key concept in Bourdieu’s theory, it defines the structure of the 
social setting in which habitus operates. 
Since individuals are the products of particular histories which 
endure in the habitus, their actions can never be analyzed 
adequately as the outcome of conscious calculation. Rather 
practices should be seen as the product of an encounter between a 
habitus and a field which are, to varying degrees, ‘compatible’ or 
‘congruent’, with one another. (Bourdieu, 1991: 17)  
  
This congruent relationship between habitus and field will be discussed in 
coming parts of this chapter. 
 
2.3.1.4. Capital 
Another key concept in Bourdieu’s theory is capital. Bourdieu distances the 
notion of capital from its Marxian tradition and extends the meaning to all forms of 
power. He conceptualizes resources as capital when they function as a “social 
relation of power” (1989; 1990; 1991; 1992). In Logic of Practice, he remarks that 
capital is a kind of “energy of social physics that can exist in a variety of forms and 
under certain conditions and exchange rates can interconvert from one into another.” 
(1990: 122). Economic capital is simply money and income. Social capital is social 
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networks, group membership, and acquaintances. Cultural capital is cultural goods 
and services including education credentials, aesthetic preferences, etc. Finally, 
symbolic capital is mainly the prestige that agents possess, and it is very negotiable. 
All these different kinds of capital determine the relative positioning of the 
individual. It is a kind of “(…) ensemble of cultivated dispositions that are 
internalized by the individual through socialization and that constitute schemes of 
appreciation and understanding” (Swartz, 1997: 76). The categorizing of political 
parties’ leaders according to their different kinds of capital will be elaborated on in 
detail in the next parts. 
 
 
 2.3.1.5. Language 
As it has been mentioned below, language is a very significant analytical tool 
while discussing identity constructions. In addition to habitus that constitutes a force 
revealing the codes behind “every speech act and, more generally, every action”, the 
other force is the linguistic market (Bourdieu, 1991: 37). Linguistic market is “(…) a 
system of relations of force which impose themselves as a system of specific 
sanctions and specific censorship, and thereby help fashion linguistic production by 
determining the price of linguistic products” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 145). 
The linguistic market is a place of exchange and, like in any other market, 
individuals seek profit. Hence, in politics as a field, the linguistic market is 
constructed through the different discourses and symbols that are valued. For 
instance, in the case of the framework of this dissertation, it is manhood or the degree 
of manhood that is valued in the linguistic market of Turkish politics as a field.   
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Another aspect of the language in the framework of this dissertation lies in its 
relation with symbolic capital. Although the notion of capital and its different forms 
is discussed in detail in this chapter, now it is valuable to examine this relationship. 
From a Bourdieuan perspective, in a given market, the accumulation of 
capital, whether economic, social, symbolic or cultural, is a determining force. In 
politics as a field, and in its market, this is especially so of social, cultural and 
symbolic capital. Of these, symbolic capital and symbolic violence are particularly 
determining. For Bourdieu, the way language is used to inflict symbolic violence is 
critical. In politics as a field, there is a struggle for symbolic power that depends 
upon symbolic capital as something that agents and politicians, bring to the field. For 
Bourdieu, symbolic capital is “a recognized power” that is shaped accordingly to the 
conditions of a given institution (Bourdieu, 1991: 72). As he says, 
[A]uthorized language, its rhetoric, syntax, vocabulary and even 
pronounciation, (…) exists purely to underline the authority of its 
author and the trust he demands. (…) [S]tyle is an element of the 
mechanism (…) through which language aims to produce and 
impose the representation of its own importance and thereby to 
ensure its own credibility. (Bourdieu, 1991: 76) 
 
Fairclough and Chouliaraki take a similar line, arguing that “(…) the style of 
the language or the linguistic aspect of symbolic capital has two characteristics: one 
is the capacity to constitute the given; and the other is the capacity to do so in a 
legitimized style which gives credibility” (1999:102). If this approach is applied to 
politics as a field, the politicians’ struggles for symbolic power manifest themselves 
as linguistic styles that constitute the given as meaning priority to manhood; and this 
given legitimacy in turn lends credibility. Hence, in the linguistic market, the 
emphasis on manhood is consciously or unconsciously, yet also simultaneously, 
constructed. The normative characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, such as 
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honesty, bravery, responsibility etc., offer a standard for the linguistic market of 
politics as a field. This dissertation adopts this framework in order to analyze the 
speeches of the three leaders from three complementary perspectives: habitus, forms 
of capital, and the use of language.  
Firstly, regarding habitus, language is a medium of power. For Bourdieu, 
when individuals use language in particular ways, they deploy their accumulated 
linguistic resources and implicitly adapt their words to the market that is their 
audience (Bourdieu, 1991). Hence, while analyzing the construction of the manhood 
of the political parties’ leaders, it is essential to question their speeches and reveal the 
ways in which their linguistic techniques vary or not. Secondly, as every leader has a 
different habitus, and accordingly has a different accumulation of various types of 
capital, they wittingly and/or unwittingly place an emphasis on manhood because it 
is fashionable and/or legitimate in the linguistic market. In politics as a field, or as a 
space of positions, in any speech act there is an encounter between different forces. 
This is the point at which habitus, the accumulation of capital and the field articulate, 
leading to “a language game in which certain ends are pursued with certain 
discursive resources according to established guidelines” (Hanks, 2005: 73).  
The following section will try to elaborate the congruent relation between 
habitus and field that constitutes one of the basic corners of this dissertation 
theoretical and analytical frame.  
 
2.3.2 . The Relation between Habitus and Field     
In Bourdieu’s argument, field denotes areas of reproduction of services, 
goods, knowledge or status. Fields are the social settings that habitus operates and 
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they are organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital 
(Swartz, 1997: 117). While Bourdieu and Wacquant define field as a network or a 
configuration, of objective relations between positions, they designate to a matrix of 
institutions or organizations (1992: 97). Bourdieu applies his “metatheory of field” to 
many studies including studies of social-class lifestyles, higher education institutions, 
religion, literature, etc. (Swartz, 1997: 118). In his book about Bourdieu, Swartz 
analyzes Bourdieu’s applications of field and summarizes the determining 
characteristics of field as (1) arenas of struggle for legitimation; (2) structured spaces 
of dominant and subordinate positions based on types and amounts of capital; (3) 
imposing on actors some specific forms of struggle; (4) structured to a significant 
extent by their own internal mechanisms of development (1997: 122-126).   
Before examining Turkish politics as a field and, especially, the construction 
of masculinities in the structured spaces within the framework of this dissertation, it 
is worthwhile to stress the reasons behind borrowing Bourdieu’s metatheory of field 
and applying it to politics.  
First, the principal field in Bourdieu’s work is the field of power. Power 
functions and struggles throughout all fields (Bourdieu, 1989; 1991; 1992). Hence, 
defining politics as an arena of power relations is clear. Politics is a complex area of 
struggles that forces agents to occupy a position with the ultimate aim of having 
legitimation. As a multidimensional power network, consisting of political parties, 
elections, and institutions within the limits of the law, the agents in politics dominate 
or subordinate each other according to their capital, namely economic, cultural, 
social, and symbolic. The relationship between field and capital is also significant. 
Fields are related to capitals and/or accumulation of capitals.  
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The people, groups, and organizations that fill the different 
objective positions are hierarchically distributed in the field, 
initially through the overall volume of all capitals they possess and 
secondly by the relative weight of the two particular kinds of 
capital, symbolic and cultural. (Allan, 2011: 177) 
 
Especially, from the perspective of symbolic capital, the prestige of an 
individual is relational and cause to perceive and appreciate certain patterns of 
conduct. For instance, in politics, one of the determinants of the level of the respect 
is being elected or being in power hence at this point to be in power is a form of 
symbolic capital, running the office is recognized as a legitimate indicator of 
individual worth. The level of prestige or respect can be gained through the election 
process is one of the determinant that define the hierarchical distribution of the field. 
The results of the elections somehow define the dominant and subordinated 
positions. In this dissertation, the accumulation of leaders’ capitals, and especially 
their education credentials, aesthetic preferences, linguistic styles, and prestige, will 
be challenging decisive factors in their construction of political manhood. 
For Bourdieu, another vital relationship lies in the one between field and 
habitus. On the one hand, conditions of field structure habitus, and on the other hand, 
habitus is constitutive of the field (Bourdieu, 1992:127). The former indicates the 
structuring of different habitus by the governing characteristics of field, such as arena 
of struggle or the structured area of dominant and subordinated positions with the 
ultimate aim of legitimacy with its own internal mechanisms. The latter signifies a 
cognitive construction that habitus shapes the field as different positioning contour 
the sets of connections, networks. Applying this congruent relationship to Turkey or 
to the construction of masculinities in Turkish politics is very challenging. It can be 
argued that this simplified formula does not fully denote the case in Turkish politics. 
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It can be argued that characteristics of the field structure habitus. As habitus 
comprise the whole schemata of perception, thought and action, it is unconsciously 
in individuals’ posture. Especially, from the perspective of language, as a signifier of 
habitus, individuals are predisposed to speak in certain ways. Another key concept 
here is linguistic market. It imposes individuals a certain system that is fashionable 
or valuable. Hence, if politics is taken as a field, what is valued in the linguistic 
market is manhood. Turning back to congruent relationship between habitus and 
field, on the other hand, it is not possible to stress that habitus is totally constitutive 
of the field in Turkish politics. It can be argued that different habitus could not reveal 
their diversity within the field of politics. The field of politics or the dynamics within 
its structure affects exposing of different habitus of gendered identities, in general, 
masculinities in particular. Although politics as a field permits differentiation within 
the construction of gender identity when Turkish political parties and their leaders, in 
particular, is analyzed, despite their different positioning, their masculine domination 
strategies and practices seem similar.  
As the argument of TESEV’s report on nationalism in Turkey (2007) put 
forward that men from left or right wing politics or Islamists are experiencing being 
men rather than being leftist, rightist or Islamist, different socialization experiences 
cultivated in an unconscious level with a capacity of determining one’s positioning 
are repressed by dominant features of the politics as a field. 
In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu clarifies the entire network of relationships in 
one formula: 
[(Habitus) (Capital)] + Field = Practice (cited in Swartz, 1997: 141) 
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Here, habitus and capital connote to the accumulation of past and also its 
reflections to today while field refers to conditions of present. Practice is the total 
outcome of the whole. 
 Hence, my analysis of political parties’ leaders is an analysis of practice that 
involves the examination of the dynamics within the construction of the field where 
they occur, and also the habitus of the agents brought to the field. Their 
interrelationship is the analytical tool of the dissertation and provides the key steps 
for scrutinizing the construction of masculinities in politics in Turkey. In this part, it 
is valuable to deeply analyze the construction of masculinities, masculine 
domination, and codes of masculinities in Bourdieu’s theoretical framework. 
 
  
2.3.3. Dominance of Masculinity in the Political Realm 
From 1980s, Bourdieu’s writings include brief gender analyses, but, for 
feminist critics, Bourdieu paid insufficient attention to gender (Mottier, 2002; 
Fowler, 2003; Adkins and Skeggs, 2004). Bourdieu, himself being aware of the 
insufficient attention, presented his book Masculine Domination as “(…) the 
opportunity to clarify, support and correct my previous arguments on the same 
subject” (2001: vii). Masculine Domination is a very important source, not only for 
sociology and Bourdieu’s theoretical world but also for the students of gender 
studies, especially masculinities studies. Throughout the book, he analyzes the 
historical mechanisms of the relative dehistoricization of the structure of the sexual 
division. His earlier ethnographic analysis of gender divisions in Kabyle society, as a 
“(…) living reservoir of Mediterranean cultural tradition, provides a potent 
instrument for disclosing the symbolic structures of the androcentric unconscious 
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which survives in the men and women of our own societies.” (2001: back cover). In 
the book, Bourdieu enables the reader to examine the historical mechanisms 
responsible for the eternalization of the gender order and its corresponding 
principles (2001: viii). The first and second chapters of the book analyze the ways in 
which bodies and gendered identities are socially constructed. The final part analyzes 
the strength of the gender order and also its reproduction strategies.       
For Bourdieu, social identity is first made from sexual identity, and he 
conceptualizes gender primarily in terms of sexual difference (2001). Although the 
distinction between sex and gender has been the subject of much debate within 
feminist theory, Bourdieu’s definition of gender, in his own words, as “sexually 
characterized habitus” does not suggest that he ignores the importance of power and 
the enduring process of gendered identity construction (2001: 3). To Bourdieu, it is 
through the body that the child learns to experience wider structural features and 
within the family, a social artifact; it is reproduced and operates as a central site of 
normalization. For Bourdieu, there is no instinctual or necessary biological base for 
such masculine domination. There is a pejorative attribution of nature to women and 
the honorific award of culture to men (Fowler, 2003). These critical ascriptions “(…) 
legitimate a relationship of domination by embedding it in a biological nature that is 
itself a naturalized construction” (Bourdieu, 2001: 23). He names the labeling of 
nature as the main reason behind masculine domination. If the sexual relation 
appears as a social relation of domination, this is because it is constructed through 
the fundamental principle of division between the active male and the passive 
female, and because this principle creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire - 
male desire being the desire for possession and/or eroticized domination, as 
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eroticized subordination or even, in the limiting case, as the eroticized recognition of 
domination (Bourdieu, 2001: 21). As he stresses that: 
Masculine domination finds one of its strongest supports in the 
misrecognition which results from the application to the dominant 
of categories engendered in the very relationship of domination, 
and which can lead to that extreme form of amor fati, love of the 
dominant and of his domination, a libido dominantis (desire for the 
dominant) which implies renunciation of personal exercise of libido 
dominandi (the desire to dominate) (2001:80, original italics)     
 
This theory of libido dominandi supports his theory of honor. Historically, 
male honor has been marked by men’s bodily bearing of arms and militaristic roles. 
Starting with representations of the body, it is culminated in representations and also 
profound transformation of bodies. For Bourdieu, as it is mentioned before, bodies 
are the objective foundations of the difference (2001).   
In the book, Bourdieu analyzes masculine domination as a paradigmatic form 
of symbolic violence – “a kind of gentle, invisible, and pervasive violence which is 
exercised through cognition and misrecognition, knowledge and sentiment, often 
with the unwitting consent of the dominated” (2001: back cover). Symbolic violence, 
an imperceptible version that is invisible even to its victims, is exerted for the most 
part through purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition (more 
precisely misrecognition), recognition, or even feeling. (2001: 2). It is recognized by 
both the dominant and the dominated. It can be a language, a lifestyle, or a way of 
acting or thinking, and more generally, it can be a bodily property, such as skin color. 
For the writer, the acts of recognition of the frontier between the dominant and the 
dominated  
(…) that are triggered by the magic of symbolic power and through 
which the dominated, often unwittingly, sometimes unwillingly, 
contribute to their domination by tacitly accepting the limits 
imposed, often take the form of bodily emotions – shame, 
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humiliation, timidity, anxiety, guilt – or passions and sentiments- 
love, admiration, respect. (Bourdieu, 2001: 38, original italics) 
 
 Bourdieu continues to define symbolic power while he criticizes Butler with 
regard to naming, and he states that “[t]he work of symbolic construction is far more 
than a strictly performative operation of naming which orients and structure 
representations, starting with representations of the body” (2001: 23). These 
emotions stemming from symbolic power are more powerful when they are visible 
manifestations such as blushing, clumsiness, and anger.  
Having a sketch of his analysis of masculine domination through the 
unconscious schemes of perception and appreciation, his ideas on the relationship 
between masculinity and nobility are valuable to mention.  
First, it is significant to begin with the definition of manliness for Bourdieu. 
He simply describes a person with manliness as “(…) someone who feels the need to 
rise to the challenge of the opportunities available to him to increase his honour by 
pursuing glory and distinction in the public sphere” (2001: 51). Masculine values are 
aroused by virile games and by an understanding of femininity as a source of 
weakness. Manliness must be validated by other men and women, and he gives the 
example of military milieu that includes so many tests of manliness towards the 
reinforcement of male solidarity (2001: 52). The sexually hierarchized world 
presents an environment that “(…) one has only to think of all the situations in which 
to make men kill, torture or rape, the will to dominate, exploit or oppress has relied 
on the ‘manly’ fear of being excluded from the world of men without weakness” 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 53). Therefore, as has been mentioned, manliness is a relational 
construct, and it is continuously being constructed with/for other men and for 
women. Men are inclined to enter into this daily challenge, and, as Bourdieu 
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highlights, they are more willing to “(…) enter into social games most favorable to 
the development of manliness – politics, business, science, etc.” (2001: 56). While 
women perform so-called feminine dispositions inculcated by family and the social-
order network, men respond to “countless imperceptible calls to order,” too 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 59). According to this “order,” female activities are condemned to 
remain invisible, which means that women’s jobs are considered unqualified or do 
not get the hierarchical title corresponding to their real work. Women “were not 
recognized as performing the same trade (métier) as their male colleagues, from 
whom they are separated by a simple curtain, although they perform the same labor” 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 60). At this point, he compares masculinity and nobility. As the 
nobility had to evade working life in order to retain their noble status, men have to be 
virile and dominating; otherwise, they risk shame (Bourdieu, 2001: 50). While he 
equates men with nobility and women with the exploited, he mentions that “both are 
prisoners and insidiously victims of the dominant representation” (Bourdieu, 2001: 
49). As he writes in Masculine Domination, 
Nobility, or the point of honour, in the sense of the set of 
dispositions regarded as noble (physical and moral courage, 
generosity, magnanimity, etc.), is the product of a social labor of 
domination and inculcation at the end of which a social identity 
instituted by one of the invisible demarcation lines laid down by 
the social world and known and recognized by all inscribes itself in 
a biological nature and becomes habitus, embodied social law 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 50) 
   
According to Bourdieu, under the arbitrary order of the sexes, women cannot 
be naturally noble; “to succeed completely in holding a position, a woman would 
need to possess not only what is explicitly demanded by the job description, but also 
a whole set of properties which the male occupants normally bring to the job.” 
(Bourdieu, 2001: 62, original italics). Such a natural authority of men under the 
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arbitrary order is inscribed in their body and also in their dispositions. In such a 
system, men’s works were considered superior, and it still maintains its value. The 
definition of excellence has been charged with masculine implications, and according 
to Bourdieu, it is universally recognized. Gender hierarchies are embedded in the 
very nature of both the human body and social system. He names the condition as 
“paradox of doxa” (Bourdieu, 2001: 133). He questions why the order of the world is 
broadly respected even by those who are most disadvantaged by it. He answers with 
“dehistoricization or eternalization of sexual difference” (Bourdieu, 2001: 133). The 
historical mechanisms have accomplished their functions, and sexual division both as 
objectification in the physical and social order and as embodiment in gendered 
dispositions serves as an organizing principle. The elements of the constancy of 
structure are all embodied in the repertoire of political subjects. In the same way, 
“masculine domination is embodied in language, texts, knowledge, policies, human 
practices and in notions of that which constitutes the legitimate political subject” 
(Dillabough, 2004: 495).  
It can be argued that Bourdieu’s contribution was designed to articulate the 
conditions upon which the subject might be seen to be reconstituted. He exposed the 
structures of domination and attempted to show how all social subjects come to 
embody such structures in social practices (Dillabough, 2004). Bourdieu aimed to 
discuss the reproduction and reconfiguration of cultural meaning across time. 
Therefore, in his rationale, history, nature, and culture are inseparable from the study 
of self and study of society at large. Individuals neutralize the mechanisms through 
which history is continuously turned into nature. This process of naturalization ended 
in eternalization of embedded constructions.  
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In summary, Bourdieu’s theory of gender builds on the significance of 
practices as a total outcome of habitus and capital, and the conditions of field on the 
basis of historical and cultural roots. For Bourdieu, although there is not a biological 
basis for masculine domination, the honorific award of culture to men legitimate 
relationships of domination. While Bourdieu highlights the misrecognition resulting 
from the application of dominant categories engendered in relation to dominance, he 
mentions that virile games are aroused by masculine values that are symbolically 
accepted as dominant. Gendered hierarchies are inculcated into the social order, and 
this resulted in “dehistoricization of sexual difference” (Bourdieu, 2001). In this 
perspective, this dissertation discusses gendered hierarchies in politics by revealing 
the codes of Turkish masculinity, and questions practices of political parties’ leaders 
by emphasizing their different habitus. This perspective contributes to read different 
political discourses and understand the dynamics of gendered hierarchies embedded 
within the parameters of the field of politics in Turkey.   
The final part of this chapter will mention the critiques on Bourdieu so as to 
clarify the milestones in his theoretical schema.  
 
 2.3.4. Critiques on Bourdieu 
While Bourdieu’s theory has been applauded by gender and social and cultural 
studies theorists, his structural constructivism has also been criticized for its lack of 
subjectivity, agency, and overemphasis on social power. Michel Foucault and Judith 
Butler are two of the main theorists on the construction of subject and gendered 
identity. From a social constructivist perspective, they questioned the 
subjectification, the power relations, and the significance of body. They examined 
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very basically how the notion of power is determinant on gendered identity 
construction. 
As previously mentioned, Foucault’s work on discipline shows how the body 
is not a natural entity but is socially produced through the regimes of power. In his 
later works, his focus shifted from technologies of domination to technologies of 
self. According to Foucault’s intellectual project, identity is not simply imposition 
from above, but it is also actively determined by individuals. Foucault names this 
process “a practice of liberty” (1982). According to Foucault, “this process of 
subjectification involves not only bodily subjection but also a relatively autonomous 
form of self-construction” (cited in McNay, 2000: 166). In this perspective, gender 
identity is not one-sided and fixed but also contains reflexive elements. Sexual 
identity construction is “fully amenable to a process of self-stylization” (McNay, 
1999: 97). It is clear that considering sexuality as embedded in inculcated bodily 
predispositions underestimates reflexive elements in identity formation. In this 
perspective, it is valuable to apply Butler’s critiques to Bourdieu’s sociology in terms 
of lack of agency.  
Judith Butler highlights the open-ended nature of the formation of gender 
identity. Performativity, as the key concept of Butler’s theoretical agenda, 
emphasizes the instability in gendered identity formation. Therefore, the construction 
of gendered identity is a continuing process that individuals re-perform their 
gendered roles. Bourdieu’s theory’s socio-linguistic implications have been attacked 
by Butler as being conservative and underemphasizing agency (Fowler, 2003: 476). 
According to Mottier, the unlimited reproduction of habitus leads Bourdieu to argue 
that masculine domination perpetuates itself, but at the same time his theory 
underemphasizes agency (2002: 354). From Bourdieu’s perspective, the subject is 
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generated by the perceptions and dispositions of the habitus; “(…) he gives us few 
theoretical tools for conceptualizing active practices of self-fashioning and resistance 
to the structures of power” (Mottier, 2002: 354). In line with this critique, McNay 
(2000) also stresses that Bourdieu neglects subjectivity. However, it is valuable to 
mention that Bourdieu does not clearly define the source of dynamism within the 
development of language.  
For Bourdieu (1991), “(…) language emerges in public only in marginal 
areas such as pubs and cafés” and he argues that “(…) it is not enough to speak 
performatively since social authorization is also necessary” (cited in Fowler 2003). 
Social power is a prerequisite for the writer. For Bourdieu, Butler puts forward “an 
idealist constructivism” (Fowler, 2000: 15). In an article that examines the critiques 
of Bourdieu and Butler, Lovell states that “(…) gender change for Butler, he 
[Bourdieu] argues, is much like putting on a new set of clothes, since she ignores the 
way gender is objectified and reified, both through conditioned bodily responses and 
social institutions.” (Lovell, 2000: 31). Bourdieu’s conceptualization of gender, 
especially performances and/or performativity, indicates both the power of social 
institutions that the authority of performances is derived from and also the habitus. 
Hence, in Bourdieu’s formulation, it is not easy to adopt freedom, but on the other 
hand, there is space for self-stylization as he formulates in practices as a result of 
habitus. Adkins and Skeggs aptly argue that while Butler’s emphasis is on the 
surface level of the symbolic, what she calls naming, for Bourdieu, “gender is hidden 
under the surface of categories” (2004:23). Hence, on the basis of Foucault’s 
understanding of subjectification and Butler’s emphasis on performativity, this 
dissertation will argue in support of Bourdieu’s theory on gender.  
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In Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, both the personal histories, that have 
continuously been re-constructed and social power, namely the means of authority, 
encounter. This dynamic and also mutual relationship of habitus and social power 
manifest itself in the continuities and discontinuities in the field of politics. In 
Bourdieuan perspective, the hierarchy of power serves to structure and re-structure 
all other fields. Hence, politics as a field appears to meet not only the dynamism of 
gendered power relations but also how does it reproduce and legitimize itself with 
different networks. Therefore, this dissertation put its theoretical basis on the 
triumvirate of Butler, Foucault and, mainly, Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s scheme as the 
main feet of the theoretical triumvirate helps to bring habitus into a central place in 
the studies of political manhood. As “(…) embodied potentialities of the habitus are 
only ever realized in the context of a specific field”; the relationship between habitus 
and field is valuable to discuss in politics (McNay, 1999: 109).   
To summarize, this study analyzes the different constructions of masculinities 
in Turkish politics in general, Turkish political parties, namely, the AKP, the CHP 
and the MHP, in particular. It attempts to deconstruct some self-evident 
conceptualizations like politics is male dominated, politics is a virile area. As this 
study aims to think beyond boundaries, it will analyze such embedded relationships 
with the guidance of Bourdieuan dynamic analytical tools. It discusses Turkish 
politics as a field that agents, namely leaders, position themselves and act 
accordingly to their habitus and accumulation of capitals. Therefore, while 
discussing how political men from different backgrounds experience the praxis of 
being men, Bourdieuan framework will enable not only the writer but also the reader 
to acknowledge different positioning and practices. Having the basic corners of the 
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theoretical framework, the next chapter will define masculinities and will try to 
develop typologies of different masculinities in Turkish political arena.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
DEFINING MASCULINITIES: TOWARDS DEVELOPING 
TYPOLOGIES OF MASCULINITIES IN TURKEY 
 
 
3.1. Defining Masculinity/Masculinities 
Literature on gender generally begins with reviewing the evidence of the 
existence of fundamental physical differences between sexes. Such a search for 
biological basis is really misguided for studies on gender in general, men and 
masculinities in particular. On the other hand, psychoanalytical analyses of gender 
identity and male identity start from Sigmund Freud’s classical account that focus on 
pre-Oedipal stages and center on boy’s relation with his mother. For feminist 
psychoanalyst Nancy Chodorow, “femininity is associated in both sexes with 
feelings of powerlessness and is experienced as a backward state to be transcended” 
(1989: 34). In addition, for her, until another theory that explains unconscious mental 
processes, conflicts, sexuality, and/or relations of gender, “(…) we had best take 
psychoanalysis for what it does include and tell us.” (1989: 4). Although 
psychoanalytic approach has offered a new perspective on gender analyses, another 
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paradigm that captures diversity explains gender constructions is more embracing in 
the framework of this dissertation, namely doing perspective. 
 “Role theory as the name suggests, is founded upon a theatrical or dramatical 
metaphor in which all social behavior is viewed as a kind of performance. (…) Most 
people, for most of the time, behave in ways which are socially prescribed.” (Edley 
and Wetherell, 1995: 71). Although sex role theory has been criticized by its 
emphasis on stereotypical roles, it can be considered as an important step towards 
new paradigms that underline doing gender and performative perspectives.     
Understanding how individuals do masculinities, the performative elements 
of identity required to be visible. This argument highlights two vital notions in the 
literature of masculinities, namely, doing gender and performative actions. West and 
Zimmerman’s doing gender approach was fundamentally a critique of role theory 
based on the understanding of gender as something that “people do rather than they 
are” (West and Zimmerman, 1987).   
Toward the beginning of the 1990s, gender’s adjectival understanding left its 
place to doing gender perspective. An understanding of gender as something that 
individuals do rather than they are encourages that gender is fundamentally about 
social interactions and relationships performed in everyday life. It simultaneously 
(re)produces, sustains and legitimates social meanings accorded to gender. For West 
and Zimmerman (1987), gender is not only a role or display, but it is also a master 
identity that cuts across situations. 
Another angle that highlights the significance of doing gender is about 
performative actions. Judith Butler, a leading scholar of Queer theory19, stresses the 
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performative aspect of gender construction. According to Butler, gender construction 
is based on performative actions (Butler, 1990). In her work, Gender Trouble (1990), 
Butler points out that gender is created by repeated performances, like ways of 
walking, rather than arising from biology, and that the two sexes are not biological 
facts but social categories. Butler mentions that gender is performative in that it 
“inevitably unfolds as a series of performed operations that render complex meanings 
about standards that individuals cannot escape” and she adds that “(…) naming of 
sex is –an act of domination and compulsion– a means of forcing us to accept the 
idea of the masculine and feminine as an inevitable binary opposition” (1990: 115). 
For Butler, both sex and gender are normative and also expressions of power. In this 
perspective, it is valuable to discuss the notion of power and to question how it is 
determinant in the construction of gendered and masculinized identities. Especially, 
Foucauldian understanding is very decisive to capture the significance of power 
and/or power struggles.  
Foucault’s definition of power is critical to the understanding of social 
construction of gender since the notions of power and oppression are central. 
Foucault’s schema for power flows through a network of disciplinary institutions. 
Norms and standards are key words for his conceptualizations. Through institutions 
(school, family, religion, law, etc.) norms are replicated, and they determine social 
relations and create subject positions. Disciplinary systems are not the only 
institutions; processes also help to replicate and enforce power. During the conduct 
of everyday life, which Connell names as “reproductive arena”, an individual 
                                                                                                                                          
19 Queer theory is a challenge to the “obvious categories (man, woman, Jew, femme), oppositions  
(man vs. woman, heterosexual vs. homosexual), or equations (gender = sex) upon which conventional 
notions of sexuality and identity rely.” For detailed information see Hennesy, Rosemary. “Queer 
Theory: A Review of the differences Special Issue and Wittig’s The Straight Mind.” Signs, 18, no: 4, 
pp. 964-979. 
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subjugates her/himself with a stereotypical gender position (1995: 71). In his essay, 
“The Subject and Power,” Foucault outlines the significance of self-subjectification 
and power relations, and states that “(…) it  applies itself to immediate everyday life 
which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches 
himself to his identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and 
which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals 
subjects”.20 Hence, in Foucauldian understanding, power is not a substance; it is 
“(…) the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular 
society.” (Foucault, 1978: 93). Therefore, here, we encounter the importance of 
social contexts and cultural meanings. The significance of social contexts and 
meanings is their intelligibility. According to Foucault, something is intelligible if it 
“(…) is capable of being understood or grasped. For humans, for something to be 
possible, it must be understood; thus intelligibility sets the parameters for 
possibility.” (Alan, 2011: 382). In addition to intelligibility, Foucault explains that 
things are possible within a historic, cultural context as well. At this point, language 
is also another determinant as it sets the boundaries for what is possible to know, 
think, and feel. Hence, our knowledge is a function of the historical period and 
culture we live in, and it can thus be argued that individuals live within the 
boundaries of cultural intelligibility. For Butler, sex qualifies “body for life within 
the domain of cultural intelligibility” (1993:2). Therefore, Butler’s discussion of the 
construction of sex and also the sexes offers a helpful analysis of the operation of 
power at the level of cultural meanings.  
                                                 
 
20 See Focault, Michel, (1983). “The Subject and Power”, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics, Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus (eds.) (with a interview with Foucault), 2nd ed., 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 212. 
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For Butler (1993), sex as a cultural phenomenon is constructed on a cultural 
discourse about sexuality. In a given culture if that heterosexist discourse is 
hegemonic, the meanings attached to concepts such as masculinity and femininity 
will reflect that heterosexism. Masculine and feminine identities take place within 
structured relations of power. This web of power constitutes hegemonic gender 
divisions and heterosexual arrangements. In this perspective, Butler’s analysis of the 
operation of power can be easily taken as a continuity of Foucauldian perspective.  
Questioning the operation of power and the importance of its dynamics 
within a given culture highlights social constructionism. Gender itself is an 
institution that structures social relationships and upholds rules and patterns of 
expectations that individuals learn how to comply with as natural / common sense 
(Barrett, 2001: 78). In line with this perspective, the relationship between individual 
practices and larger social structures is recursive and mutually constructing each 
other.  
In this framework, the concept of masculinities, then, is not a genetic role set; 
rather it is embedded within a whole network of practices, symbols, discourses, and 
ideologies. Upon this theoretical background, it is clear that defining masculinity is 
critical. Without falling into the trap of normative definitions, it is very critical to 
define or at least to understand the defining characteristics of masculinity within a 
social and historical context. As the concept of masculinity has iconic significance 
and it is used in variety of frameworks in different time periods. In the framework of 
historical context, it is significant to underline that “What might be considered 
appropriate male behavior in one historical period, in another may be thought 
inappropriate or even antithetical?” (Edley and Wetherell, 1995: 135).  
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In addition, wide variety of usage within different time and place may lead 
scholars to use masculinity as shorthand. In this line, Hearn lists some of these 
frameworks as psychological characteristics; gendered experiences; gender identity; 
sex role socialization; power analysis; and/or institutional practices and underlines 
the problematic of using these frameworks as shorthand for a wide range of 
phenomena and, problematically, as a primary cause of other social effects (1996: 
203). Therefore, before following Hearn’s advice, to put the notion of men to the 
contextual background and to use it more precisely, boundaries of the definitions 
should be discussed more.  
To begin with essentialist definitions can be helpful as they offer stereotypes. 
Essentialist definition just picks up a feature and tries to define the core of the 
masculine (Connell, 1995: 68). The terms masculine and feminine are beyond 
categorical sex and, in this perspective, both the essentialist way of thinking and 
positivist social scientist underemphasizes the complexity of the context. Therefore, 
essentialist definitions lack the influence of the whole web of conditions that 
construct masculinity or what it means to be male. For Connell, Freud also flirted 
with such a definition as he equated masculinity with activity in contrast to feminine 
passivity (1995: 68).  Moreover, although normative definitions offer a standard 
question that can help to define the notion, namely, “What men ought to be?”, this 
way of conceptualization lacks the significance of different personalities (Connell, 
1995: 70). It can be argued that normative definitions do not offer grips on 
masculinity on subjective level.  
Another approach is the semiotic approach that defines masculinity through 
the system of symbolic differences (Connell, 2000). However, this approach still has 
problems, especially in cultural analysis due to grappling with “the full range of 
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issues of masculinity” (Connell, 1995: 70). In addition, for Hearn, “(…) the 
overemphasis on masculinity and a neglect of social relations between women and 
men can lead to a redefinition of men as victims of historical, cultural and gendered 
processes, to which men are bound” (1996: 203). This exclusionary tendency renders 
women or men invisible as they are both participants in discourses, processes, and 
constructions. At this point, it is significant to stress that masculinity and femininity 
are “(…) relational categories that are neither separable nor fixed” (Weedon, 1987: 
73). For an analysis of gender and also any topic of inquiry that problematizes 
gender, it is not possible to understand any categories – masculinity and femininity– 
without reference to both genders. In this line, Koyuncu and Onur highlight that 
women and femininity constitute only one dimension of gender studies, but gender 
should be taken as relational constructs and masculinity should be added to the field 
(2004:31). Mainstream Western and also Turkish academics have not been blind to 
women’s concerns and her status in the society (participation in politics, violence, 
etc.); however, Turkish scholars have neglected the privileged men and the 
relationality of men and women. Therefore, upon this theoretical concern, in order to 
have a full picture of gender and its role in whole structure of society and state and 
also in everyday life, in a particular society, it is very crucial to include masculinity 
and the construction of manhood (Kimmel, 1993; Connell, 2001). In this perspective, 
for Connell (2001: 43) the position of woman, as an actress in the patriarchal 
network, has encouraged not only feminist movements but also studies; research on 
that point and this leads to the neglecting of men’s studies.21 
                                                 
 
21 So, it is clear that, in Turkey, in gender studies, the privileged one became invisible or “victim” 
(Onur & Koyuncu, 2004). In the case of Turkey, the academic study on gender has focused on 
women, too (Kandiyoti, 1987; Ayata, 1995; Arat, 1998; Durakbaşa, 1999; Berktay, 2004; Göle, 2004; 
Cindoğlu & Toktaş, 2006).  
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For Connell, “(…) rather than attempting to define masculinity as an object (a 
natural character type, a behavioral average, a norm) we need to focus on the 
processes and relationships through which men and women conduct gendered lives.” 
(1995: 71). Taking masculinity as a process also offers the understanding of 
masculinity as a multifaceted project that takes place in everyday conduct of life.  
For a critical analysis of masculinity in discursive practices, it seems 
plausible to move to the discussion to the discourses of masculinities. Hearn (1992; 
1996), with this new way to define or to conceptualize masculinities, highlights the 
importance of the different constructions of masculinities; this means that the 
constructions are diverse.  
By 1980s, increasing critics in the literature were followed by the Gay 
Liberation Movement. This movement was concerned with the critics of the political 
structure of sexuality and their arguments led to strengthen a more dynamic 
approach. In this framework, an acceleration of curiosity has started in the field of 
masculinity during the late 1980s and research on men and masculinities had entered 
a new stage.22 
The most significant turn in the field was considered as the shift of focus to 
the notion of masculinities. As it is mentioned before, this shift has certified that 
there is a need to think of masculinity as multiple, contextual configurations. With 
the integration of race, ethnicity and religion into the content of the literature marked 
the beginning of a new understanding. Working men, men of color, and gay men 
were all observed as departing in significant ways from traditional definitions of 
                                                                                                                                          
 
22 Key stones of the literature were published in 1987. See The Making of Masculinities by Harry 
Brod; Changing Men by Micheal Kimmel; The Gender of Oppression by Jeff Hearn; Gender and 
Power by Robert Connell.  
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masculinity. Therefore, as Kimmel and Aronson mention, “we understand that we 
cannot speak of masculinity as a singular term but masculinities.” (2003: xxii). 
Scholars have not only acknowledged the complexity of the term but also started to 
scrutinize the diversity.  
“Factors of class, labor market relations, ethnicity and sexuality, as well as 
individual experience and relations with family and peers, are centrally implicated in 
the formation of men’s identities” (Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Webb, 2000: 7). There 
has been a growing literature on multiple masculinities and also “attempts to tie 
discursive dimensions to social practices and histories” has increased (Ghoussoub 
and Sinclair-Webb, 2000: 8). Limiting the scope of the studies prevented students of 
gender studies to inhabit dynamic and also differentiated realms rather than to adhere 
into stereotypes and memorized geographies. Hence, it can be argued that not only 
individual agency but also group constructions of masculinities should be added to 
the field.  
In this framework, as this dissertation problematizes the construction of 
masculinities in Turkey, it will be a brave step to make typologies of masculinities in 
Turkish political arena. On the basis of moving the discussion into discourses of 
masculinities, this dissertation will try to formulate a typology of masculinities in 
Turkish politics. Turkish political background and the milestones of Turkish political 
life will underline the corners of this typology. It means this typology takes its roots 
from the main Turkish political paradigms namely, Islam, secularism and 
nationalism and grows out of political challenges and antagonisms. 
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3.2.     Different Paths of Masculinities in Turkey 
3.2.1. Neo-Muslim Masculinities 
Turkey is a 99% Muslim country and Islam as official religion has been a 
very determining element of Turkish political history.  
Since Ottoman times “Islam provided the source of legitimacy, the unity of 
state and religion, and a source of identity. Islam was not only the basis of the state; 
it symbolized the unity of Turkish society, provided a cognitive map of action and 
meaning, a repository of memory and also a sense of authority.” (Yavuz, 2009: 17). 
Therefore, Islam by providing a cognitive map, it has shaped social and political 
culture. In this framework, it is not surprising that Mustafa Kemal and Kemalist 
elites attacked Islam’s primacy as they aimed to create a new nation with a new 
source of legitimacy. In this line, analysts of Turkish modernization have observed 
that the Kemalist project was monolithic, and its top-down manner restricted its 
potential to capture all social dynamics, particularly the role of Islam. According to 
Mardin, the Kemalists were unable to see the cultural potential of religion; they 
could not provide a “social ethos” for the replacement of religious culture in reaching 
the masses (Mardin, 1983: 156). Secularizing reforms of Mustafa Kemal and his 
friends aimed to control and also undermine religion by reforms. Thus, Turkish 
secularism, as primary principle of Kemalism, simultaneously positioned itself 
against Islam. Kemalist and /or secular regulations undermined “Islamic presence in 
the cultural and social spheres (…) through new alphabet, dress, calendar and official 
rest days” (Yavuz, 2009: 26). In this perspective, it can be argued that the most 
significant transformation was experienced in daily lives. The new set of symbols 
was affected gendered identities. New women and men of the modern Republic were 
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the models towards not only Western world but also to the citizens of the newly born 
nation as well. For instance, Atatürk introduced fez in 1925 as a part of these 
transformative reforms. The fez as a religious symbol was replaced by hat. This law 
on Clothing (1925) was a very critical step from the constructions of modern 
identities in general, masculinities in particular. With the aim of modernizing 
masculine body and empower his role as Republican father, Islam and his strong role 
within the society was undermined. In addition from the perspective of body, a way 
of politics was conducted as well. It has always been through women’s body, namely 
veiling issue, some implications has been experienced and these repercussions 
undercut Islamic constructions of masculinities. Throughout Turkish political 
history, gendered politicization of Islam has been read through women and her 
barriers. However, it is not only secular norms that situate Muslim women as other, 
but Islamic masculinities position women as inferior and affirm their masculine 
control as literature on Islamic masculinities proposes.  
As gender constructions have been considered worthy of scrutiny, 
understanding femininity has been the first task of the students of Islam with a 
gender lens. Muslim women’s oppression, the question of hijab, Islamic discourses, 
and its relation with gender relations received scholarly attention most.23 Muslim 
men, although they are relationally the other part of the gender relations, had 
relatively little attention until recent times in Western academia. The books, 
encyclopedia chapters, and articles problematize the great complexity, variety, and 
                                                 
 
23 Toward the end of 1980’s the studies on Muslim women started to increase. Fatna Sabbah’s Women 
in Muslim Unconscious (1984) was one of the first books that analyzes Islamic legal and erotic 
discourses imprint on female body. Fatima Mernissi’s well-known study named The Veil and the 
Male Elite (1987) questions the Hadits that are manipulated by male elite for their own sake. Another 
known analysis is written by Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (1992). Ahmed gives a well 
organized historical trajectory of Islamic discourses from ancient world to present.  
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difference of male identities in Islamic societies. Generally, all these academic works 
begin their analysis with the problematic notion of Islamic masculinity.  
For Gerami (2005), Islamic society is a totalizing notion. The term “Islamic” 
offers an essentialist definition; however, there is no classification of what a Muslim 
man or woman is (Ouzgane, 2003; Gerami, 2005).  
Islam defines a relatively small proportion of what actually takes 
place in the Islamic world, which numbers a billion people, and 
includes dozens of countries, societies, tradition, languages, and, of 
course, an infinite number of different experiences. It is simply 
false to try to trace all this back to something called Islam. (Said, 
1997: xvi) 
 
Following Said, it is apparent that such an Orientalist usage of the term 
Islamic limits the researcher, especially the ones in the West. Therefore, as 
masculinity constructions differ among Muslim men, it is plausible to discuss 
Muslim masculinities rather than masculinity in Islamic society. For Gerami (2005), 
cultures cannot be reduced into religion, and, therefore, gender identities are not 
reducible to Islamic femininity and masculinity. Although there is a universally 
recognized Muslim men stereotype, as bearded, gun-toting, bandana-wearing men 
with long robes, especially after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the 
United States’ World Trade Center, Muslim masculinities differ. The Qur’an 
contains numerous references to men in their capacity as believers in Allah. 
However, “schools of jurisprudence” interpret these references differently (Flood, 
2007: 661). For instance, Tunisian men enjoy less legal power on their wives than 
their counterparts in Iran (Flood, 2007: 661).  
In addition, for Gerami, the colonized culture also has an effect on the 
construction of masculinities. For him, colonial domination raised challenges to local 
masculinities, and therefore, men’s honor was threatened, and they were called upon 
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to protect it (Gerami, 2005: 450). At the time of Independence War and early 
Republican days Atatürk, a national hero of Turkish Republic, symbolized modern 
Turkish men. Such dominations led to emergence of national heroes who are 
symbolized as strong, more virile masculine character. For instance, Atatürk forged a 
national masculine image (Gerami, 2005: 451). Atatürk used to symbolize both 
progressive aspirations of newly born Republic and resistance within authenticity 
expressed in Islamic terms. As an iconic leader, he restored the prestige of Turkish 
men after the War of Independence. Another war-time masculine image is Shahid. 
They are young, virginal, pure poster men of Islamist masculinity who are 
institutionalized shahadat and its masculine prototypes after Iranian resistance to 
Iraqi invasion (Gerami, 2005: 452).  Therefore, Muslim men’s ethnicity, social, and 
economic situations are the primary factors in their gender constructions. In parallel 
to this, Turkish Muslim men’s positioning should be elaborated with an analytic lens 
that consider social, economic, and also cultural dynamics together. While analyzing 
the constructions of masculinities in Turkey in politics, engaging in discussions of 
religious and cultural background is inevitable while attempting to define typologies. 
At this point, it is significant to put the boundaries of neo-Muslim masculinities in 
the framework of this dissertation. 
This dissertation problematizes Muslim masculinities with respect to the AKP 
and the leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
Very briefly, the AKP is an offspring of National Outlook24 tradition but 
formed as a reformist wing of the FP (Virtue Party).25 The AKP governs the country 
                                                 
24 National Outlook tradition has been represented by the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi- 
MNP), National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi- MSP), Welfare Party (Refah Partisi- RP), 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi- SP) line throughout a period of almost three decades . According to 
Özman and Coşar, the division between reformists and traditionalists was not alien to the National 
Outlook line and the first of such division s within the National Outlook line was experienced in the 
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since its electoral victory in 2002. Throughout this period, the party has identified 
itself as conservative democrats. Although, in terms of party ideology, defining the 
AKP has been the subject of inquiries related to its genesis in political Islam but its 
Western outlook observers define the party as “new Islamism” (Cizre, 2008). In this 
line, it can be argued that the reasons behind the AKP’s transformations are “the 
effect of repression, EU conditionality within the framework of Copenhagen criteria 
and the emergence of a new generation” (Yavuz, 2009: 45). The party’s detachment 
from its National Outlook roots and new Muslim actors, namely effective NGOs, 
media, intellectuals, provided a new discourse for the AKP. For Yavuz, new forces 
and actors have found the fertile ground for political and social transformation during 
Turgut Özal period in post-1980s (Yavuz, 2009).  
Özal’s neo-liberal economic policies enabled suppressed Islamic networks 
and spaces to spring. With the RP of Necmettin Erbakan, Islamic politics has got 
rise. The underlying motive behind Erbakan’s politics was religious. For Yıldız “WP 
was a protest movement; it successfully mobilized the reactions of those voters who 
saw themselves deprived by the privileged class of so called ‘White Turks’ ” (Yıldız, 
2003: 188). The RP instrumentalized Islamic idioms in their campaigns and 
challenged Kemalist form of secularism. The party also emphasized the notion of 
Islamic brotherhood and used the mottos of “the coalescence of state and nation” and 
also “60 million are brothers of one another” (Yıldız, 2003: 188). Their intellectual 
agenda was based on the glorification of the Islam and its norms and also positioned 
the West as other. The political discourse of the FP (Virtue Party), that was opened 
                                                                                                                                          
MSP congress in 1978. For detailed information; Özman, Aylin and Simten Coşar. “Centre-right 
politics in Turkey after the November 2002 general election: neo-liberalism with a Muslim face”. 
Contemporary Politics. Vol: 10, No: 1, March 2004, pp. 57-74. 
 
25 Coming chapters will elaborate more on the development of the party.  
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after the closure of the RP, was also based on the National Outlook tradition. 
Although the party became a sanctuary of the RP’s politicians, it did not sustain the 
homogeneity within the party and separated into two, namely traditionalists and 
reformists. The AKP is the reformist wing of that separation. In this framework, 
Erdoğan and the AKP’s aim has been to get “depoliticization of Islam through 
conservative democracy” (Yavuz, 2009: 129). The party has changed and also shifted 
the discourse on political Islam. Although Islam is still a critical element of the party, 
they do value Western norms such as democracy, civil society, human rights, neo-
liberal economic policies as well. Erdoğan has always been in tune with pragmatic 
needs of Turkish society and also the world, both Western and Middle Eastern. Since 
the AKP governments, Turkey has integrated more with the processes of EU and 
globalization. Therefore, it can be argued that the AKP and especially Erdoğan has 
changed political discourse on Islam and it is plausible to discuss the AKP and 
Erdoğan construction of gendered identities in general, masculinities in particular as 
neo-Muslim. In parallel to Coşar and Yeğenoğlu’s (2011) analysis that stresses out 
that the AKP’s exemplifies a new mode of patriarchy, this dissertation takes this shift 
as a neo-Muslim pathways of masculinities. In addition, in line with the literature on 
Islamic masculinities as Islam is not a totalizing concept and as masculinities are 
socially constructed and diverse across time, defining the AKP as representative of 
neo-Muslim masculinities in Turkey offer an effective ground for analytic 
discussions. 
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3.2.2. Kemalist/Secular Masculinities 
“No idea better epitomizes the ethos of modern Turkey than the doctrine of 
secularism” (Özdalga, 2012: 205). As Özdalga aptly argues secularism is the one 
principles that define Kemalist modernization project and also today’s Republican 
regime. In addition, secularism is also significant as it positioned itself in the 
opposition of Islam and/or practices of Islam in public sphere. As the definition of 
secularism simply encompasses the separation of Islam from politics or political 
sphere, Turkey has experienced a process of secularization that has affected whole 
networks of society as a whole. Modernity/modernization have interwoven with 
secularism/secularization and they offered a macro project. As this dissertation 
concerns with gendered identities, it focuses on micro aspects of this secularization 
that mirror itself in the construction of masculinities and femininities as well. Before, 
analyzing Kemalist/Secular masculinities and gendered identity formation of the 
early Republican era as the background, it is worth to point out how the words 
secular, Kemalist and modern have been used interchangeably.  
During early Republican period, when Kemalist project attacked on religion 
and so as to constitute a modern state they aimed to establish secular norms and these 
norms automatically resulted in the erosion of Islam. As it has been mentioned in 
previous part, Kemalist modernization project did not achieve to encompass all the 
dynamics within the society and was unable to see the vital significance of religion 
(Mardin, 1983).  
The governing ideology was Kemalist-statist. Repressed Islamic ideas and 
practices could not find ways to grow. Secularism was the unique “political 
settlement of controlling and reconstituting Islam in accordance with the needs of the 
state and the political elites who have controlled the Turkish state” (Yavuz, 2009: 
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144). The third military intervention in 1980 changed the whole political climate in 
Turkey. As it has been mentioned in previous section Özal’s period enabled Islamic 
tones to grow. However, the political, social and economic climate that has existed 
since 1980 has made Islamist elements a part of politics as a party ideology and also 
as a source for the expression of dissatisfaction. From this perspective, it can be 
argued that the Kemalist/Islamist debate has formed the antagonistic fabric of 
Turkish political culture. As Navora-Yashin argues, “[the] culture of the state was 
the context for the secularist/Islamist conflict in late twentieth century Turkey. 
Secularism and Islamism competed in a public arena, both wearing different faces of 
the state” (2002: 7). The ambiguities molded in the tension between the traditional 
and modern have taken the form of antagonism between Islamist and secularist and 
also assigned the whole process of modernization and Kemalism into secularism. 
While secularism has been the basic principle of the Kemalist reforms, it has 
encapsulated all the ideas of modernity. These macro changes’ reflections have 
echoed itself in daily lives or micro politics and ended up in labeling old norms as 
traditional and glorifying new ones as modern. Kemalist, secularist, modern have 
started to be used interchangeably as they have offered a whole discourse on the 
improvement of the state and the Turkish nation. Therefore, since the establishment 
of the Republic, Kemalist ideals of modernization are congregated into secularism 
and the politicians of the CHP, since Atatürk, are considered themselves as the 
guardian of the secular Republic. At this point it is plausible to discuss the 
background of Kemalist/secular masculinities in Turkey. 
As it is discussed in the literature, all nation-state formation models  have 
witnessed a woman centric transformation (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Mayar, 2000; 
Mostov, 2000). Woman was one of the symbols of the Kemalist modernization 
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project, while men, as the modernizing elites of the project, had the duty of opening 
the way to Westernization and reaching the level of civilized countries. As it has been 
mentioned before, while the studies of Kemalist project with a gender lens define 
secularist/Kemalist/modern women, they analyzed secular/Kemalist/modern men 
relatively less. Only in recent years there is an increased interest in the construction 
of masculinities. Other studies touch the issue of masculinities from their supremacy 
and/or victimized status.26 
From the perspective of secular man, the first and most important component 
was his role of leader or agent of modernization. This is not an alien thought for 
Turkish political culture. Since Ottoman times, men have been the leading absolute 
authority figure. Modernization efforts in Turkey started during late Ottoman era at a 
time when the basic characteristics that shaped the Ottoman Empire were its absolute 
authority and its hierarchical structure. As the absolute leaders of a powerful empire, 
the sultans established their own rule of governance. However, with the growth of 
Enlightenment philosophy in Europe, and also its increased military power, the 
sultans turned to the West, with the Tanzimat period in particular symbolizing their 
departure from the old order as the main dynamics and patterns characterizing the 
Ottoman Empire started to change. “The era was characterized by a hybrid fabric 
weaved of attempts to reconcile Islam with modernization, traditions with the pace of 
modernism and women’s emancipation with the existing gender requirements” 
(Bilgin, 2004: 111).  
Ottoman male figure was powerful, authoritarian and sober. The sultan was 
the father of the community and had the divine authority to govern the Empire. 
                                                 
26 See Koyuncu & Onur 2004; Saraçgil 2005. 
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That’s why snob of the Tanzimat era have been considered as representing a 
departure from a solid Ottoman masculinity and also a threat to Ottoman 
communitarian conservatism (Kandiyoti, 1997; Bilgin, 2004; Saraçgil, 2005). Bilgin 
names this period the “fatherless society” as the lack of centralized hegemonic power 
and the pace of transformation made difficult to sustain the existing order (2005: 
111). Jale Parla (1998), whose groundbreaking book examines the literature on 
Tanzimat, highlights how the Ottoman male elite and/or writers regarded themselves 
as the father, in turn responsible towards their public and/or readers who needed 
guidance. The fatherless home, expressed through novels where the novelist himself 
took on the role of paternal guide vis-a-vis a disoriented society, was one of the 
signifiers of the lack of paternal authority in society (Parla, 1998). In line with 
Bilgin’s and Parla’s arguments, for Kandiyoti (1994), generational tensions also 
corresponded to changes in the expression of hegemonic masculinity in Ottoman 
society. That is, “(…) men were using women’s plight to bemoan their own 
disenfranchisement in the face of paternal autocracy, a disenfranchisement that was 
mirrored in the political arena by the absolutism of the Ottoman state” (Kandiyoti, 
1997: 121).   
In an era that was already characterized as entailing “de-masculinization”, 
femininity became another a threat that rendered Turkish men effeminate, and there 
was a growing sense that women were getting out of hand (Bilgin, 2004: 111; Duben 
and Behar, 1991). However, the autonomy of the virile elite was not totally lost in 
that, as Kandiyoti (1997) reports, the Ottoman patrician had his counterpart in the 
kabadayı (tough uncle) who typically lived in the mahalle (local district) where there 
was a strong sense of communal identity. Kabadayı of mahalle, household and 
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family had an honor to be defended, so those tough uncles were the guarantors and 
protectors of the normative order.  
Thus, studies of the literature of the cultural elite reveal that the work of this 
period mirrored an anxiety about the loss of a father figure who guided not only the 
reader but also the whole society, especially women. However, as the Ottoman 
Empire experienced an extended period of military conflict, including the First 
World War and, most importantly, the War of Independence, this changed the role of 
men, dandies who lost prestige. That is, the wars turned dandies, borrowing from 
Baudelaire, into soldiers. The rise of brave soldiers protecting the security of the 
Empire and, later, the Republic, altered the image of male bodies, while the virtues 
of femininity were absent during that period as they were considered “(…) ill suited 
for managing the modern state” (Htun, 2005: 165). Thus, this period re-glorified 
masculinity, and creating an idealized form of masculinity that still has heroic 
connotations present-day Turkey.  
After the War of Independence, in addition to protect the country, men, 
“Kemalist fathers of the Republic”, should be equipped with the duty of civilizing 
the country (Kandiyoti, 1997). Despite their hidden role, men represented the cultural 
ideal of the project, but in a different perspective from their sisters. Men were in 
charge with modernizing women and society, and with providing welfare. More 
specifically, the borders of how the new women of the Republic should exist in 
society as modern individuals were defined by the male Kemalist/secularist elites. 
Atatürk and his allies started this transformation with a dress code because 
traditional men could be clearly distinguished by their garments. Therefore, the elites 
passed the Law on Clothing (1925) that recommended wearing a “secularism 
uniform” of hat and tie which signified the new, modern Republican men’s 
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disengagement from traditional masculinity (Kandiyoti, 1998: 109). Wearing a hat 
and tie was also the symbol of the loyalty to the state and the Kemalist regime and 
also the symbol of the detachment from the religious norms. In addition to wearing a 
secularist uniform, having a healthy body also became very significant for the 
modern man of the Republic. Masculine bodies, as the bearer of the national reforms 
should be healthy, with specific reference to their role in promoting the economic 
welfare of the society and their militaristic power (Mayar, 2000; Mostov, 2000).  
Men were the guarantors of the new order. They pioneered other in daily 
lives as well. One of the symbols of the modern daily life was new choices of 
recreation, such as going to balls and theaters, or doing sport. Men were supposed to 
accompany their sisters and wives because, as the head of the family, a Republican 
man had the duty to shape the women of the future, to guide his family members, 
especially his daughters, in accordance with Western life codes. As Kandiyoti 
(1997:123) puts it, “[m]en gave social birth to the new woman of the Republic.” In 
this respect, Atatürk’s adoption of a girl was also symbolically important.  
It can be argued that the secular brothers of the new Republic established 
their own form of life by placing their sister as other (Berktay, 2003). Berktay argues 
that women became the subjects of the public sphere as the visible face of the 
modern Republic, but one that had to be guided by men’s reason, capabilities and 
abilities. Although such an empowerment of women was symbolic, their brothers 
still experienced a crisis of their hegemonic power and patriarchal supremacy, and 
felt a loss of authority (Akyüz, 2005). Because the men were unable to fully 
internalize the abstract project that was proposed within the ideals of Westernization, 
Republican modernization did not go beyond the rejection of traditional symbols. 
Instead, the modernist male elites of the early Republican period felt trapped between 
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the requirement to seem modern and a need to protect traditional values (Akyüz, 
2005). However, this pretending to be modern, not only to his sisters but also to his 
other Western counterparts, made his boundaries become very insecure. This 
dilemma created a crisis of masculinity and led to the contradictory character of 
modernization efforts.  
To sum up, early Republican fathers leaded the Kemalist modernization 
project with the guidance of the CHP cadre. Since that time secularism is the ethos of 
Kemalists and also a way of philosophy of life. Throughout Turkish politics, the 
electorate of the CHP has always identified itself with Atatürk and his ideals. The 
party identifies itself with centre left and social democracy. The authoritarian 
political style of the CHP as the ruling party of the early Republican period has 
transformed itself into an elitist tune (Ayata and Ayata, 2007: 212). The support of 
the CHP has generally come from educated, “secular middle class living in 
socioeconomically developed western provinces of Turkey” (Ayata and Ayata, 2007: 
213). That is the reason behind why the CHP has been identified as the party of 
literate, modern, educated masses. Kemalist elites has created their own codes and 
also produced gender patterns in accordance with the ideal of civilizing nation; they 
have created secularism’s own masculine imagery (Bilgin, 2004: 174-176). For 
Bilgin, their use of “(…) gendered metaphors and cherished values” has proved to be 
long termed and also repetitive (Bilgin, 2004:176). Kemalists still insist upon saving 
the society from Islamic threat and by this way they attribute themselves a heroic 
role. In this perspective, it can also be argued that unlike Islamist politics, Kemalists 
have not shifted their discourse. While Islamist political parties have reconstituted 
their politics according to national and international politics, the CHP constitutes a 
contrast. For Turan, the CHP “has represented elitist modernism moderated by social 
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democratic rhetoric” and has shown inability to adapt to the changing nature of the 
global politics (Turan, 2006: 559). Therefore, deep rooted Kemalist discourse and its 
patterns of masculinities are still alive. In other words, Kemalist cultural, social and 
political imagery of men and women still depict old norms as Kemalists still insist 
upon saving society  and, hence, they attribute themselves a heroic role. 
 
 
3.2.3. Nationalist Masculinities 
“Nationalism in fact is the common ground of nationalist, conservative, 
Islamist, and Kemalist-Republican discourses and manifests itself as the real Turkish 
fundamentalism.” (Bora, 2011: 62). As Bora aptly argues nationalism is one of the 
most critical defining parameters of Turkish society. Since the Independence 
movement, nationalism as a main color has endured its powerful role (Keyman, 
2011; Mardin, 2011). This part discusses how nationalist discourses have affected the 
construction of masculinities and how masculine ideals have served to popularize 
nationalism. It especially analyzes nationalist masculinities with reference to the 
MHP as the party identifies itself directly with nationalist ideologies. 
After World War I, with the liberation of the state from the occupational 
forces, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk became the leader of the Turkish independence 
movement. This resistance against both the Ottoman monarchy and imperialist forces 
ended in the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. After the establishment 
of the new Republic, major transformations started to shape a new political order and 
a modern nation-state capable of reaching and surpassing contemporary Western 
civilization. The West was thus accepted as the model, and modernization efforts 
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were equated with Westernization. In addition, the notion of civilization 
encompassed the idea of progress, and an ideal to realize, as Atatürk put it: 
There are a variety of countries, but there is only one      
civilization. If our bodies are in the East, our mentality is oriented 
toward the West. We want to modernize our country. All our 
efforts are directed toward the building of a modern, therefore 
Western, state in Turkey. (cited in Çınar, 2005: 5) 
 
As is clear from Atatürk’s words, the West was considered as the absolute 
measure of reaching a modern nation’s level of civilization. For the Kemalists, their 
modernization project entailed creating a modern nation and accepting the 
reformation of the past political, social and cultural order, including reshaping the 
role of the religious communities. That is, “Turkey (…) was made in the image of 
Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old 
regime” (Ahmad, 1993: ix). The Kemalist modernization project aimed to make a 
clear rupture from the Ottoman past. When Mustafa Kemal and his friends started to 
implement their secularism project, the Turkish nation, the main source of national 
identity, did not exist. Therefore, it was necessary to erase the Ottoman past and 
create new political, social and cultural foundations. However, the Ottoman legacy 
was unavoidable for any of its successors, so the Kemalist project can also be 
considered as the continuation of the Ottoman modernization struggles, but with 
different characteristics.  
The strong state tradition and elitist character of the ruling class, together 
with traditional values constituted the heritage and also the setting of the new 
Turkish political culture. As the project aimed to transform the value system and 
replace it with Western values, such as Enlightenment philosophy and secularity, the 
significance of religion was undervalued by the secularist elites as it has been 
mentioned before. Instead, the Kemalist project constructed the Ottoman past as 
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other, for which it has been criticized as it marginalized the life worlds of traditional 
people (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997). Although the field of meanings and practices 
that was constituted during early Republican times has shifted through time, it 
remains connected to the paradoxical character of the Kemalist project. The 
interrelationship between the past and the present can not be underemphasized as the 
landscape is same. All norms, codes and also discursive practices originate from and 
in return contribute to the same landscape. Although, it would be “(…) misleading to 
blame modernization” process, it is plausible to mention that its deep-rooted 
characteristics preoccupied society throughout the history (Keyder, 1997). Especially 
“intertwined relation between nationalism and modernity” has affected the political 
culture in Turkey (Kadıoğlu and Keyman, 2011: xvii). For instance, in the 
framework of identity construction, the discourses on men and women, and/or their 
traditional gender roles contribute to the not only maintenance but also 
transformation as the language of modernity has transformed into the language of 
modernity.  
According to Çınar, “modernity may refer to a lifestyle, a culture, a discourse, 
a historical epoch, a movement, a project, a mind-set, an intellectual trend, to 
capitalism, industrialization, democracy, constitutionalism, or secularism” (2005:1). 
Therefore, the representations of newly formed identities and their visibility include 
significant clues to the nature of those identities. Kemalist reforms presented a 
project of modernity that aimed at building a new society based on new principles of 
Western ideals and scientific rationality. In order to establish a homogenous state as 
most projects of nationalism begin with, the Kemalist elites aimed to transform 
identities. That active process of creating and reconstructing included the 
transformation of the identities as an important medium of the nation-building 
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process because, during modernization period of any country, they become the 
visible face of that country. Given this, it is valuable to present Nira Yuval Davis’ 
analysis about the relationship among nation-building processes, nationalisms and 
gender.  
Nira Yuval Davis (2003) argues that the construction of nationhood involves 
specific notions of both manhood and womanhood, and that this gendering of the 
identities. Davis examines the contribution of gender relations to key dimensions of 
nationalist projects - the nation’s reproduction, its culture and citizenship - as well as 
to national conflicts and wars, exploring the contested relations between feminism 
and nationalism. Like Yuval Davis, Kandiyoti (1997) also stresses the importance of 
identity formation in the nation building process. “Gendering the modern” was a 
crucial part of the Kemalist modernization project (Kandiyoti, 1997). Women 
especially have always been considered as symbols of the nation: “Women are 
heroines and symbols of virtue, fertility, strength and continuity” (Mostov, 2000: 91), 
implying that women’s traditional or biological roles are glorified in the general 
context of the nation. In Turkey’s case, the nation’s progress was equated with the 
emancipation of woman in that the Kemalist secularist elites considered new, modern 
Turkish women as essential actors in the modernization project. 
The women of the Republic were to internalize the desirable national image 
of mother and wife, and desexualized members of the community (Mostov, 2000: 
103). Specifically, the “emancipated but unliberated women” of the Republic were 
desexualized by the usage of kinship idioms for to facilitate the sexually neutral 
character of modern interactions, especially in public life (Kandiyoti, 1987).  
The family was another site of the new regulatory discourse. A child-centered 
conjugal family was the signifier of both modernity and nationalistic social 
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responsibility (Duben and Behar, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1991). In addition, to be married 
was also a signifier of safe terrain within the modernization efforts. While marital 
etiquette was already the marker of Islamic regulation of the body, it was now 
encroached on by the new discourse, in which the pattern of domesticity was 
Western originated and was a driving force (Kandiyoti, 1997).  
This new and unfamiliar atmosphere in the newly formed Turkish Republic 
exposed some contradictions for Kemalist project. The modernizing gaze, that is the 
gaze of the early modernizers, tried to impose the reforms not only in the political 
and institutional spheres but also in the cultural sphere. However, their nationalistic 
moralism underestimated the significance of micro politics, and the reproductions 
and reconstitutions of femininities and masculinities that favored the continuation of 
male-dominated hierarchies. Saktanber (2002) notes how the reforms positioned both 
men and women as “obedient/grateful”, but also how men and women responded 
differently to the reforms. That is, the West was not only considered for the 
emancipatory potential of the modern, but also as being a foundation for the dangers 
of excessive individualism (Kandiyoti, 1997: 115). For instance, modernization 
efforts were considered a threat to men’s patriarchal supremacy, and the male 
intelligentsia and elites experienced a crisis of masculinity as their sisters become 
their equal counterparts in both political and cultural life. In other words, while the 
reforms opened the way for gender equity, the outputs of this change were taken by 
men as a threat to their supremacy. In a geography where men historically benefited 
from the gender/power frame in both political institutions and social life, this threat 
coming from modern life styles to their normalized hierarchy destabilized their 
network of meanings of their traditional lives. Thus, the tension between the 
traditional and the modern coincided with this reform period. The modernists defined 
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themselves through the Kemalist project, while the traditionalists located themselves 
in the stable ground of the old order and also religious norms. However, despite the 
critical role that male elites have experienced, they were the reification of the 
national honor as the founding fathers of the new Republic. 
As there is a close relationship between nationhood and manhood, Turkish 
experience of nation state formation has undergone an active gender politics around 
masculine themes. Nagel argues that the culture of nationalism was constructed to 
emphasize masculine themes, such as honor, patriotism, bravery and duty (Nagel, 
1998; 2005). As Cynthia Enloe argues, “nationalism has typically sprung from 
masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (2000: 45). 
In parallel to this, masculinity studies that analyze the role of gender in nationalist 
movements have always highlighted the symbolic role of men as the real agent who 
should protect the honor and freedom of the homeland. Thus, the revolutionary, 
talented, brave and honest men of the Turkish Republic had to show that they were 
the guarantors and also the protectors of the society (Saraçgil, 2005: 205). This 
understanding of saving and preserving have been the marks of modern Turkey’s 
nation-state tradition and has endured until current times (Bora, 2011: 57).  
Contemporary Turkey’s socio-cultural atmosphere and its reflections on 
political sphere have verified that there are plural sites where “(…) different 
constructions of the nation contest and negotiate with each other.”(Özkırımlı, 2011: 
86). In Turkey there is not a single nationalism but discourses of nationalisms. Bora’s 
study on plural discourses of Turkish nationalisms (Bora 2003; 2011) presents that 
there are four main discourses, namely, official Kemalist nationalism; left-wing 
Kemalist nationalism; pro-Western nationalism; racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism 
(2011:62-63). The first discourse is the main paradigm of Kemalist project and it is 
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the official nationalism of the nation-state for Bora and the military is the 
“personified symbol of nationalism” (2011: 64). The second discourse represents the 
secular reaction and Bora defines as “Kemalist Ulusçuluk”27 and adds that” Kemalist 
movement has embraced nationalism during last years with the realization that it 
could serve to popularize secularism” (2011: 65). The third discourse springs from 
modernist-Westernist idea and emphasizes economic perspective with respect to 
catching up modern life styles (2011: 70). The final discourse that this dissertation 
deals with is Pan-Turkist Radical Nationalism that has departed from “patriotic line 
of Atatürk nationalism” and reified more on idealist (Ülkücü) movement of the MHP. 
The idealist movement is the ideological basis of the party and acts as the defender of 
Turkism and supporter of the state (Bora, 2011: 74). Although the party drew closer 
to the center after its heroic leader Alparslan Türkeş’ death, the party with its new 
leader Devlet Bahçeli is the agent of this discourse in Turkish politics. The party 
glorifies the masculine themes such as honor, patriotism and situates itself as the 
protector and guardian of the country. As Nagel argues “(…) nationalist policies are 
masculinist enterprise” and “the real actors” in this enterprise are men “who are 
defending their freedom, their honor, their homeland and their women” (Nagel, 
1998: 244). Heroic masculine image of the party is gray wolfs (bozkurtlar) and they 
have to protect female wolfs (asena). Gray wolf is the totem of original Turkism and 
it is the symbol of the party (Bora, 2011). In addition, the MHP has always been 
identified as traditionally virile party or the party of men and as the culture of 
nationalism is constructed to emphasize masculine themes, it is vital to analyze 
reflections of nationalist masculinities in Turkish politics. Although approximately 
                                                 
27 The term Ulusçuluk refers to nationalism but the writer equates the concept with modernization and 
also secularization in a Kemalist vein (Bora 2003, 2011) 
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all political parties flirt with the idea of nationalism28, this typology of different 
pathways of masculinities analyze nationalist masculinities with a special focus on 
the MHP.  
In conclusion, this dissertation aims to address different expressions of 
masculinities in Turkish politics. In this framework, I have identified typologies of 
different pathways of masculinities and tried to understand different masculinities in 
Turkish politics as a field between 2000 and 2009. Masculinities that are discussed 
within this framework are reflecting political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and 
the MHP, constructions of masculinities are traced. The next chapter will elaborate 
more on Turkish politics and especially the encounters of the elements of Turkish 
political culture and codes of Turkish masculinities.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 In contemporary Turkey, the CHP always use Atatürk nationalism, the symbols of nation state such 
as anthem, flag, Atatürk but especially the party mobilizes its nationalist reaction against the rise of 
Islamis and/or political Islam (Bora 2003; 2011; Özkırımlı 2011). On the other hand, the AKP plays 
with nationalist reactions and “AKP’s discourse is not situated beyond or outside teh nationalist 
parameters” (Özkırımlı, 2011: 97). In addition, Koyuncu-Lorasdağı argues that Islam and nationalism 
have had an instrumental relationship in Turkey and she identifies this relation as “instrumental pious 
nationalism” (2011) 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITIES: TRACING 
DIFFERENT PATHS OF MASCULINITIES IN TURKISH 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
 
 
This chapter analyzes different paths of masculinities in Turkish political 
culture. First it examines the roots of recent Turkish politics with a special focus on 
the Kemalist modernization project and the construction of masculinities since 
Ottoman times until 2008 in Turkey. Following the historical background, the 
chapter will examine the main characteristics of current Turkish political culture, by 
tracing different codes of masculinities as each element of Turkish political culture 
has significant implications for the construction of Turkish masculinities. At this 
point it is critical to stress that this dissertation problematizes the different 
constructions of masculinities in Turkish politics as a field, hence, a brief analysis of 
Turkish politics with a gender lens will provide the background for the analysis. 
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4.1. An Historical Analysis of Turkish Politics 
One who wants to analyze Turkish politics should start with modernization 
project. Modernization has always been an issue actively discussed by a significant 
number of scholars, including sociologists, political scientists, and economists. 
Turkey represents a crucial case as a consequence of its geographical position, with 
its long history of Westernization efforts, starting with Ottoman reforms and 
continuing through the Republican period.  
Westernization in the Turkish context has been generally analyzed in the light 
of the delicate balance between the traditional and the modern. That is to say, in 
order to achieve a homogenous modern nation-state, early Republican reformers tried 
to reconcile the traditional and the modern through the construction of gendered 
identities, namely new man and woman, but by not eroding deep rooted traditional 
face of Turkish nation. Turkey’s adoption of Western norms, styles and institutions 
in many areas of social, cultural and political life has been criticized as “a patriarchal 
and anti-democratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and 
cultural experience of the people in Turkey” (Kasaba and Bozdoğan, 1997: 4). On 
the other hand, the reforms were not limited with social life; institutional changes 
were taken place as well.  
Zürcher analyzes Kemalist reforms in three categories, namely, institutional, 
symbolic, and social (Zürcher, 2004: 194). In the institutional context, law, state and 
education systems were reformed through major secularizing policies. The Sultanate, 
Caliphate were abolished; Şeriat was abandoned; Swiss civil code was adopted. The 
second field that Zürcher mentions is symbolic area (2004). Attempts of 
secularization mainly attacked symbolic identifications with Islam. For instance, the 
religious clothing of imams was restricted; official weekly holiday days were 
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changed from Friday to Sunday etc. Kemalist elites’ aim was to substitute religious 
symbols with those that are labeled as modern and/or Western. According to 
Kemalist elites not only deep rooted heritage from the Ottoman Empire but also the 
powerful existence of religious groups caused erosions of the secularist reforms, 
however, with the ideal of Westernization or adopting Western civilization, reformist 
elites were unable to see the cultural potential of religion. For Mardin, elites were not 
able to provide a “social ethos” that could substitute religion (Mardin, 1983: 156). It 
can be argued that, this lack of social ethos ended in ambivalent characteristics of the 
modernization. As the third field of secularization, for Zürcher (2004), social life, 
encompasses transition of society from a religious and/or traditional order into a new, 
modern way of life, has constructed the past as other. This process included the 
erosion of old social codes and patterns and that is the reason behind the 
conceptualization of Turkish experience as a project nourished from its from above 
characteristics. While Kemalist elites did not intended to eradicate traditional face of 
Turkish nation, the reforms challenged their old value system. What is old was 
equated with what is religious and traditional hence, the new sought to cover the 
refusal of old codes. At this point, it can be argued that reformers ignored the 
tensions between modernity and tradition; rather, as Ayşe Kadıoğlu notes, “they tried 
to manifest the compatibility between Islamic culture and Western civilization” 
(Kadıoğlu, 1980: 180). The norms of the Turkish society, including those governing 
social institutions, were simultaneously integrated with a religious system. Hence, 
norms that govern a traditional society embraced religious prescriptions as well and 
undermining the significance of traditional and religious bonds ended in 
ambivalences between traditional and modern. In the literature, critiques of Turkish 
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modernization emphasize its failure that undermined the significance of the 
normative order in Ottoman-Turkish society (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997: 4).  
After the War of Independence, the nation- building project, especially the 
reforms in societal and symbolic fields, engaged in transforming Turkish society or 
Ottoman past and the (re)construction of identities was a constitutive part of 
Kemalist modernization. The reflections of the past can be found in individuals, so, 
status and also appearance of citizens would symbolize a break-off from the old 
order. The new citizens of the Republic were therefore gendered by the state through 
top-down reforms, with men and women being imagined in a Westernized 
framework in an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991).  
This gendering of the identities of the new citizens of the Republic was made 
with a view to create the new women and men of the Turkish Republic. However, the 
top-down manner and the characteristics of nation-building process in Turkey ended 
in Turkish modernization developing contradictions. The project aimed to construct 
homogenous identities, and their arena was the public sphere, with the visibility of 
the people as modern citizens of the new Republic being a crucial element. In 
particular, as in many nation-building processes, gender identities became a crucial 
visible face of Turkish modernization, and also a symbol of the new nation. Şerif 
Mardin (1997), from his analysis of the literature on Turkish modernization, finds 
too much emphasis on macro models and too little interest in micro aspects of social 
change. If Mardin’s critique is valid, it implies that only by reintegrating everyday 
life as a central dynamic of the practice of modernity in Turkey, we will be able to 
move beyond the shortcoming of existing historical analyses (Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 
1997). Therefore, integrating micro aspects of social transformation will enable the 
writer and the reader to capture multifaceted networks of the processes. Within the 
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framework of this study, the societal and cultural consequences of Turkey’s elite-
driven modernization have greater significance, because the Kemalist transformation, 
especially at symbolic and societal levels, can be seen as the main source of today’s 
political atmosphere and also current confrontations in the social and cultural spheres 
(Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997).  
Kemalist modernization project’s concentration on social and cultural spheres 
is not coincidental as the Ottoman Empire’s modernizing efforts had targeted these 
spheres, during Tanzimat era. When the Ottoman Empire had become weakened and 
fallen behind other regional forces in terms of military strength and economic wealth, 
the Sultan did not limited the reforms to economic, military and institutional fields. 
The reforms had revolutionary cultural implications although these were opposed 
and were unable to achieve popular acceptance (Zürcher, 2004: 66). That is, within 
this era, modernization started to become a cultural project. Then, in post war of 
Independence period, Kemalists’ aim of erasing the old/traditional/Islamic Ottoman 
past and creating a new/modern/secular Republic had social and cultural foundations. 
As it has been mentioned before, modernizing elites’ intended to transform value 
system and replace it with a modern one with modern citizens. As a part of this 
commitment, many reforms targeted identities. Firstly, the emancipation of women 
were indeed initiated: women gained the right to vote and to be electoral candidates; 
Turkish civil law was adopted in place of religious law; the Girl’s Institute, 
established in 1928, guided women towards the task of modernization by applying 
the methods of Taylorism to housekeeping (Y. Arat, 1997: 100). On the other hand, 
women’s activism was restrained. To give two examples, first, the Republican 
Women’s Party, established in 1923, was closed down because of fears it would 
deflect attention away from the soon to be founded Republican People’s Party (Y. 
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Arat, 1997). Then, in 1935, when the Turkish Women's Federation issued a 
declaration against rising Nazi threat, the modernizing elite were displeased, which 
resulted in the closure of the Federation. “The Republican fathers who initiated these 
reforms believed they knew the best interests of their polity and these corresponded 
to the best interests of women in the polity” (Y. Arat, 1997: 99).  
Although it is true that Turkish women gained some progressive rights, their 
role in the new order was a revised one as they continued their traditional roles even 
while playing new public roles. The state itself encouraged the increasing 
involvement of elite, educated women in public life, while other women were 
expected to contribute to the modernization process by becoming modern Republican 
housewives and mothers, raising modern girls and boys for the newly-formed 
republic. As Kandiyoti (1987) puts it, “[t]he emancipated but not liberated women” 
of the republic became the marker of the frontiers between the public and private 
spheres.  
According to another significant student of Turkish politics, Nilüfer Göle, this 
frontier was significantly affected by modernization: “Kemalist feminism, with its 
sights set on public visibility and social mixing of the sexes is creating a radical 
reappraisal of what are considered the private and public spheres” (1997: 86). 
Women designated the new borders between public/private, with the domestic arena 
becoming the terrain on which the private was being both constructed and contested. 
That is, the role of women in the private sphere was also being reshaped so that not 
only their modern look in the public sphere and daily life, but also their roles as a 
mother and wife were being delicately redrawn by their fathers and brothers as it has 
been mentioned in previous parts. Therefore, Kemalist modernization project’s 
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cultural reforms indicate so many clues about historical background for a researcher 
who has gender lens.  
The historical background discussed so far provides a basis on which to build 
a schema to frame the main issue that this dissertation will problematize: namely, the 
different construction of manhood in Turkish political life. That is, clues towards an 
analysis of multiple constructions of masculinity in modern Turkey can be found in 
the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, the modernization efforts of the new Republic. 
As the multiple constructions of masculinities cannot be isolated from the political 
culture, it was vital to outline the general climate that defines the Turkish political 
atmosphere. Then, after the literature review, I identified five main pillars of Turkish 
political culture. These are (1) the strong state tradition; (2) militarism; (3) 
Westernization; (4) the secularist / Islamist cleavage; (5) the domination of political 
leaders. These five pillars were identified in accordance with the scope of this 
dissertation as they all have reflections on the different constructions of 
masculinities.  
Culture is a dynamic symbolic system and provides a new theoretical 
vocabulary for analyzing culture in a given society. For Geertz (1973), culture refers 
to “webs of significance”, and its analysis is not an experimental science in search of 
laws, but an interpretive one in search of meaning. His theoretical formulation aims 
to explain how symbols or meanings embodied and enacted in discourses that 
generate experiential realities.  
In line with Geertz, I would argue that culture, as a constitutive sphere for 
identity formation, is public as significant symbols and their meanings are created 
and maintained in the course of social interactions. Therefore, it is valuable to 
scrutinize both macro and micro politics, throughout Turkish political history. Both 
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macro and micro politics concerning with the state and its institutions and micro 
politics of everyday lives enable the researcher “(...) to analyze people and the state, 
not as an opposition, but as the same domain” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 2). Hence, 
analyzing modern Turkey’s main institutional and political heritages complements 
the study of the dynamics of everyday lives. Especially an analysis that focuses on 
the encounters enables the analysis being more comprehensive. 
The next section will trace different paths of masculinities throughout 
Turkish political trajectory in accordance with their reflections on the constructions 
of masculinities in Turkish politics. It can be argued that above mentioned five 
pillars of Turkish political culture have shaped the general climate hence, they 
provide a vocabulary for the analysis of different constructions of masculinities.  
 
 
4.2. Tracing Different Paths of Masculinities in Turkish Political Culture 
As it has been mentioned before, all three different constructions of 
masculinities, namely (1) neo-Muslim; (2) Kemalist/secular; (3) nationalist, derive 
their roots and also reproduce within the same cultural pool but in a different way. 
The elements of Turkish political culture have been very influential in relation to 
their reproductive texture in sociopolitical life and they have had creative and 
transformative potentialities. The elements of political culture simultaneously 
reproduce some codes and offer a suitable ground. Therefore, the next section will 
not only elaborate on the five pillars of Turkish political culture but also it will 
discuss the codes of Turkish masculinities in an interconnected way. It will 
incorporate the pillars of Turkish political culture into the construction of 
masculinities that are attached to historical memory. This will enable the reader to 
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understand, not only the blueprints of Turkish masculinities but also the 
characteristics of Turkish politics as a field where the “game is played” (Allan, 2011: 
176). 
 
4.2.1. The Strong State Tradition 
Since Ottoman times, Turkish politics has always been characterized by its 
strong state tradition (Heper, 1992; Barkey, 2000). Consequently, the Republic of 
Turkey inherited a strong, centralized and highly bureaucratic state from the Ottoman 
Empire, which is still one of the critical characteristics that define Turkish politics. 
Heper stresses that the “state reflects a notion of public interest” in Turkish politics 
(1992: 3). For Heper (1992) because the evolution of state took place by making 
social groups politically impotent rather than politically influential. Therefore, in 
Turkey, the power has become concentrated in the state rather than other political 
units, primarily political parties. The final perspective on Turkish political culture 
elaborates on the issue of the domination of political parties by their leaders. 
Regarding the historical/social/political background of the Turkish Republic, 
it can be argued that the political culture built around the powerfulness of the state. 
Since the Ottoman Empire, when land was owned by the patriarchal state and people 
were organized into nations (millet) and the notion of potent state has epitomized not 
only the Ottoman rule but also the Republican regime that was based on its strong 
state principles for fostering solidarity. According to Carol Delaney, both Pan-
Islamism and Pan-Turkism were based on the idea of unity and brotherhood provided 
by Islam and vatan (homeland) (1994: 180). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
notion of the father state epitomized Turkish historical memory.  
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In addition, another angle of the strong state tradition or enduring 
Kemalist/statist understanding is its reflections on strong bureaucratic institutions. 
Since Ottoman rule a centralized system has dominated society. “In the Ottoman 
Empire, the political realm was, in fact, identical with a huge Sultanic monor.” and 
Kemalist aimed to transform this personal rule into a legal-rational one (Heper and 
Sancar, 1998: 146). However, the system has preserved its highly coordinated, 
regulated agencies and continuously emphasized on loyalty to the statist rule. 
Especially during the early Republican period, as Heper argues “(…) the 
bureaucratic elite considered themselves as guardians of the Republican norms, or 
Atatürkian principles.” (Heper and Sancar, 1998: 148). Moreover, what is worth to 
mention in the framework of this dissertation is about how they position themselves 
in the politics as a field. Bureaucrats in Turkey have always considered themselves 
as more educated, sophisticated, self-disciplined in contrast to politicians. The 
reflection of this understanding in the contemporary constructions of masculinities in 
politics as a field is Western-oriented bureaucrats that position themselves in a 
superior position. These bureaucrats are the educated, urban elites of Ankara, 
especially Çankaya. Çankaya is an upper class district in Ankara that presidential 
palace is located. The district symbolizes the Republic as the civil servants and high 
ranked bureaucrats reside. Generally state offices, ministries, consulates, and 
government offices are located in Çankaya and that’s why it symbolizes the 
secular/modern/Kemalist state. Hence, Çankaya and its male elites represent 
contemporary founding fathers of the state.  
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4.2.1.1. Devlet Baba (Father State) 
Since early Republican period, Turkey with a political culture that idolizes 
founding fathers has been an arena of men’s politics. The modernization project of 
the Kemalists emphasized the elite and male efforts at enlightening the country. 
While the discourses of modernization redefined the role of women, they 
simultaneously idealized the fathers of the country. Throughout the Kemalist 
modernization project, men represented the cultural ideal charged with the task of 
modernizing women and society, as well as the duty of providing welfare. The 
borders of how the new women of the Republic would exist in society were drawn up 
by the Kemalist fathers. Changing the dress code was one of the first reforms, as it 
signified the eradication of religious codes and also the visibility of the new men. 
The law on Clothing (1925) suggested wearing a hat and a tie, symbolizing the 
country’s disengagement of a traditional and religious masculinity and, also, in the 
same vein, loyalty to the newly formed Republic. Another expectation of the modern 
Turkish man was to possess a healthy masculine body as the bearer of national 
reforms. As the culture of nationalism was constructed to emphasize masculine 
themes, such as honor, patriotism, bravery and duty, the revolutionary men of the 
Republic also had to demonstrate that they were the protectors of society. 
Furthermore, going to events such as balls and plays were considered as symbols of 
the modern daily life.  
According to Altan-Olcay, the nation-building project of the Kemalist elites 
pointed to the patriarchal regulation of society. She adds that “(…) the state defined 
itself as the founding father with the ultimate responsibility to elevate daughters, who 
gratefully obeyed the definition of modernity and their predetermined roles in it” 
(2009:176). Similarly, Rittersberger and Kalaycıoğlu argue that the aim of the 
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Turkish nation state project “(…) was to create a state taking over responsibilities 
from the family” (1998: 78). However, this attempt did not ignore the traditional 
centrality of the family because family and kin networks provided alternative means 
of social control (Rittersberger and Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 78). The Turkish experience 
of nation state formation, it can be argued, thus duplicated the traditional role of 
fathers, in which the state as authoritarian father had the responsibility to control the 
citizen, while the father, as male household head, had the duty to modernize other 
members of his family. As Rittersberger and Kalaycıoğlu put it, “[i]n Turkey, the 
patriarchal state corresponds to the patriarchal family. The patriarch, (…) being 
assured of his absolute authority position inside the family, remains mostly outside 
the personal spheres of the family members, as long as they do not question the 
existing order” (1998: 78).  
Hence, since the establishment of the Republic, the role of the father has been 
constituted as both leader of the family and the country. The notion of devlet baba 
(father state) is a product of this glorification of the relation between manhood and 
the state. The Turkish model has attempted to construct a new national culture and 
citizens, with the image of civilian manhood being tightly woven into the fabric of 
patriotic citizenship. This overlapping and mutually constitutive discourse has 
developed over the years to become a prevailing cultural element in Turkish society: 
the father state protects individuals; it has the duty of providing welfare and offering 
solutions in cases of emergency, and has the right to demand obedience. Another 
image that is interwoven into Turkish political culture is that of the ‘motherland’ 
(ana vatan). Motherland is a generalized medium of nurture under the control of the 
state.   
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Femininity has always been associated with the earth and women are defined 
by their physical and nurturing qualities which come to define their social role 
(Delaney, 1994: 184). According to Carol Delaney, 
Baba (father) and ana (mother) are defined by their culturally 
perceived roles in procreation. These words, (…), are not merely 
labels attached to male and female parents but are also meaningful 
terms that are differentially coded and hierarchically ordered as is 
clear when used in the phrases ‘to father’ vs. ‘to mother’. Thus 
understanding their meaning and role may help to understand their 
significance when they are deployed as Devlet Baba (Father State) 
and Anavatan (Motherland). (1994: 183) 
 
In Delaney’s theory of procreation, while men are believed to be the 
generative agents, women are believed to be the fertile agents. In short, symbolically, 
women are soil and men provide the seed to reproduce. That is, although women are 
necessary agents for procreation, men are associated with divine creativity and 
“partake of its power and authority” (Delaney, 1994: 184). Hence, procreation is an 
arena for naturalizing divine power, and such notions about procreation lie behind 
the rhetoric used in different contexts. For instance, Delaney explains Turkey’s laws 
on citizenship in terms of this rhetoric. According to the Turkish constitution of 
1982, the child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk, but only a child 
with a Turkish father is a citizen. Hence, she argues, citizenship does not coincide 
with nationality and citizenship is not gender neutral (Delaney, 1994: 188). She also 
investigates the meaning of aile (family) in Turkish, noting that the concept refers to 
wife and children, implying that “(…) only men have families; women are part of 
one” (1994: 188). Further examples intrinsic in Turkish social codes can be added. 
Atatürk’s language reform, the usage of Latin letters, the introduction of anadil 
(mother tongue) as the medium of expression but it was atasöz (proverbs) that gave 
shape and distinctiveness to it (Delaney, 1994: 190). Therefore, in line with 
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Delaney’s arguments, it can be argued that gendered expressions that signal the 
unequal position of women and men in Turkey are inherent in the cultural codes. The 
link between symbolization and representations should be understood in terms of 
larger cultural systems, so what is important is the potential of these concepts to 
affect the way people think about men and women. That is, the choice of words and 
conceptualizations reinforce traditional meanings of gender. 
 
 
4.2.2. Militarism 
The military has played a crucial role in Turkish politics since early 
Republican times, and military officers in Turkey have taken power into their own 
hands on directly three different occasions (1960-1961; 1971-1973; 1980-1983). 
That is, they intervened in democratic politics which was supposed to be pursued by 
political parties. The guardian role of the military has shaped a political culture, 
mythologizing a benign political role for the armed forces in national politics (Cizre, 
1993). According to Heper (2005), military officers attempted to implement a 
rational democracy for Turkey in terms of finding the best policies and promoting the 
general interest. However, today, due to changes in both domestic and global factors, 
the role of the military has changed, as in the post-1999 period, Turkey has made 
steady and significant progress from a rational towards a liberal democracy (Heper, 
2005). While in the past, due to military interventions or the threat of interventions, 
political parties were deinstitutionalized and rendered apolitical, since the 2000’s the 
military has no longer been the ultimate stabilizing force filling the vacuum when the 
system goes into crisis. In terms of its relationship with this new situation, “the 
military is committed to the present political order, regardless of the degree to which 
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that order is or is not democratic, and it apparently inspires confidence among those 
who benefit from the status quo.” (Tessler and Altınoğlu, 2004: 44). In Turkey, the 
nation has been considered by many to be indivisible from its military described in 
significant myths. “Every male (Turk) is born soldier!” is the most apparent 
reification of this symbol.  
 
 
4.2.2.1. Every Male (Turk) Is Born Soldier! 
According to Delaney, “[t]he very conception of the nation and the discourse 
of nationalism is itself an inherently gendered discourse” and militarism is one of the 
essential elements of that discourse (Delaney, 1994: 191). Militarism is also critically 
constitutive for the construction of Turkish masculinities.  
Enloe notes that “masculinity has been intimately tied to militarism, yet the 
two sets of ideas are not inseparable” (2000: 235). In this perspective, militarism is a 
multifaceted network of metaphors and symbols that provide a sense of manliness. 
The internalized understanding that ‘every (male) Turk is born a soldier’ illustrates 
one historically constructed reality. The “myth of the military-nation” is constitutive 
of Turkish culture, and a highly gendered discourse that has important implications 
(Altınay, 2004). According to Altınay (2004), in Turkey, this myth has become 
intertwined with the ideology of nationalism and also the understandings of gender, 
especially since 1923.  
During the formation of the new Republic, the Kemalist elites passed the 
Military Service Law of 1927 (Altınay, 2004: 77). According to this law, compulsory 
military service applied to all male citizens. According to Altınay, this creation of a 
gendered citizenship through compulsory conscription “(…) created a
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gender difference that was defined and administered by the state (original italics)” 
(2004: 34). Such political differentiation also naturalizes a cultural differentiation 
between men and women, as Altınay correctly argues. Recognizing military service 
as the access to citizenship, and also to real manhood emphasizes the gender 
difference. That is, military service has been not only considered as a service to state 
but it also defines proper masculinity (Altınay, 2004: 82).     
Hence, to join the army and be a soldier is a marker of being a real man in 
Turkish culture. For instance, farewell to a new soldier recruit for military service is 
an important event. Family, friends and relatives accompany the soldier to the bus 
station or airport. A convoy of relatives in cars follows behind the car carrying the 
new soldier in the passenger seat, “waving Turkish flags and chanting nationalist 
songs” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 117). For many young men, going to the army is the 
most honorable event of their lives, especially for uneducated men, generally from 
shantytowns. Being a soldier “gives them the sort of communal respect, show of 
affection, and high regard of the kind they in no way otherwise could hope to obtain 
in their young adult lives” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 118). This farewell ceremony for 
soldiers is a site of public celebration of the Turkish military. The greatness of the 
country and loyalty to the motherland is expressed through the language and symbols 
of glorification. In these ceremonies, the whole experience can be considered as a 
“show of veneration for the state” (Navora-Yashin, 2002: 119).  
In addition to being a soldier, the notion of martyrdom glorifies dead soldiers, 
the brave men who died for the sake of the nation.29 However, Mehmetçik, the 
                                                 
 
29 The state recognizes two kinds of martyr. One is a martyr of duty that defines a soldier who died in 
an accident while on duty. Their families cannot obtain all the rights of martyrdom. The other is a 
martyr of terrorism that defines a soldier who died during a terrorist attack. The families of these 
soldiers receive salaries, housing and job assistance. Inherited from Turkish history, the traditionally 
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unknown soldier, is also idolized, even if he does not die for the country. Military 
service that is a precursor to manhood and also to marriage and to serious 
employments is inseparable from the interplay between masculinity, nationalism, 
citizenship and soldiering. The formula is very simple: Being a man is confirmed by 
soldiering and being a soldier verifies not only your civic responsibility but also your 
patriotism. Therefore, military service is very significant and also loaded for the 
construction of masculine identity in Turkey. 
In another study, Selek (2008) analyzes the intimate relationship between 
military service and being a man in Turkey. Selek analyzes different men from 
various social backgrounds, and concludes that military service is constitutive in 
Turkish men’s identity formation, and that it is a naturalized process. In parallel with 
this view, for Altınay (2004), military service is significant as it is also 
(…) naturalizing male participation in the military as protectors of 
their families and of the nation. By defining national pride through 
masculine pride in the practice of military service, nation-state 
builders have simultaneously culturalized, masculinized and 
militarized an emerging political process. (2004: 6) 
 
Since the establishment of the Republic, the significance of the military, 
especially soldiers, has increased to become the symbol of the birth of the new nation 
or independence. Hence, being a brave soldier and protecting the nation have 
significant implications for the blueprints of Turkish masculinity. That is, being 
brave like a soldier is one the key codes that Turkish men are entitled to. 
Accordingly, in the field of politics, politicians, and leaders in particular, should also 
have the characteristics of a real man, namely to have completed military service and 
                                                                                                                                          
symbolic representation of women as mothers is embedded in Turkish nationalist narratives. In that 
sense, especially, being the mother of a martyr is something socially and religiously honorable. For a 
detailed analysis of the mothers of martyrs, see Gedik, Esra. 2008. “Ideological Ambivalence of 
Motherhood in the Case of ‘Mothers of Martyrs’ in Turkey”. Unpublished MA Thesis. Middle East 
Technical University.  
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to be courageous while protecting the country. As military officers were the 
guardians of the newly formed Republic after the War of Independence, they became 
the first generation of the political elites. These founding fathers’ control of resources 
and the processes that sustained their control started to shape Turkish political 
manhood. Hence, the characteristics of a statesman started to be matched with the 
characteristics of a soldier.  
Atatürk and his image of father of all Turks have enriched such a stereotype. 
Atatürk’s heroic role as the founder of the state has fostered legitimized male control 
over resources as a commander and statesman. In addition, Bilgin highlights “(…) 
the paternal face and paternal gaze” of Atatürk (2004: 171). According to Bilgin 
(2004), Atatürk’s face in posters, busts personify the nation he created and also the 
victory behind it, and, simultaneously, Turkish citizens remind his authority in so 
many instances during the conduct of everyday life. Such an iconography does not 
only personify the war and victory but also institutionalize masculinized authority. 
Masculine role that Atatürk represents is also constitutive for valuing Western 
images. Atatürk as the leader of the reforms in early Republican period symbolized 
also the new nation. He introduced and applied reforms as a leader. For instance, he 
himself introduced the hat as a replacement for fez in 1925. He was the first who 
used a surname after the adoption of Surname Law in 1934. He started to use the 
surname of Atatürk, meaning the father of Turks. Therefore, enriched with the image 
of Atatürk, modernization offered a repertoire reifying strong collection between 
military and virile manhood. 
 
 
 
105 
 
 
4.2.3. Westernization 
Westernization is another critical perspective in terms of Turkish political 
background. According to the World Values Survey, which uses data from several 
countries from Western Europe and several other societies showing the values of 
young and old, as well as different rates of economic growth, there is a significant 
relationship between democratization and political culture. This leads Esmer (1999), 
who coordinated the survey in Turkey, to draw attention to the need to examine the 
normative orientations of ordinary citizens so as to understand fully the nature and 
functioning of a political system. Hence, it is crucial to understand the 
conceptualizations and orientations of Turkish citizens about democratization, or 
European Union (EU) membership in particular. Since the 1999 Helsinki decisions, 
Turkey has felt itself obliged to further liberalize and democratize itself. As Barkey 
(2000) notes, even the strong state tradition of Turkey has been challenged with the 
potential accession to European Union (EU). Therefore, the political picture of 
Turkey has started to change with (1) the decreasing role of the military since the 
2000’s; (2) the increasing role of political parties as they are left relatively free to 
interpret and also apply democracy in the political arena.  
Research conducted by Cindoğlu et al. (2007) indicates that Turkey's EU 
accession process has enjoyed a high rate of support from different segments of 
Turkish society in the past decade as a result of the hopes and expectations that 
different segments of the society had from the EU. Within this, the issue of gender 
equity is critical in terms of the relationship of gender equality to democratization 
and also EU membership. As Norris and Inglehart (2002) argue “(...) the most basic 
cultural fault line (…) involves issues of gender equality and sexual liberalization 
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and (…) these issues have important implications for democracy’. In terms of the 
analysis of gender equity it is problematic to make overgeneralizations about a 
society. Therefore, it is significant to examine the background and embedded 
patterns from a more dynamic approach.  
 
 
4.2.3.1. Mon Cher vs. Kabadayı (Tough Uncle)  
Modernization or Westernization in today’s Turkish political atmosphere has 
provided a framework for Turkish political history and has affected its political 
culture. Westernization in the Turkish context has generally been analyzed in the 
light of the delicate balance between the traditional and the modern. What is modern 
is equal to what is Western or European, especially in everyday life, Westernization, 
Europeanization and also even democratization are still being used interchangeably. 
These conceptualizations exclude what is traditional, Islamic, and Ottoman. Turkish 
experience of nation-state building exemplifies these antagonisms and the history of 
modernization in Turkey offered a slippery ground for identities. As mentioned 
before, in the late Ottoman period, the Empire weakened in terms of military strength 
and economic wealth. The Tanzimat reform era (1839-1871) was a turning point, as 
the reforms were not limited to just the economic, military, and institutional fields. 
Rather, the era was also characterized by attempts to emancipate gendered identities 
from the existing order. Thus the dandy30 of that era can be considered as a departure 
from solid Ottoman masculinity, and also a threat to Ottoman conservatism 
(Kandiyoti, 1997; Bilgin, 2004).  He imitated his Western counterparts, but his 
                                                 
 
30 Dandies of the era were characterized by their hyper-fashionability and their embodiment of modern 
decadence.  
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identity was defined within the boundaries of dichotomies like traditional/modern or 
à la Franga/à la Turca, although modernization efforts distanced him from traditional 
norms and rules. Following this period, the First World War and the War of 
Independence especially that marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
establishment of the new Republic restored the lost prestige of Turkish men by 
rendering their de-masculinized bodies into soldiers.  
In contrast to dandies, who had de-masculinized behaviors and bodies, 
another key masculine stereotype is the kabadayı (tough uncle). They were the 
protectors of the mahalle (household) and the normative order. Kandiyoti discusses 
the importance of the kabadayı in the mahalle, noting that  
[t]he kabadayı ensured that the women of the quarter were 
protected (…). They were mostly uneducated but could be artisans 
practicing their trade, and they were generally respectable members 
of the community. (…) [T]he masculinities they implied were the 
guarantors and protectors of a normative order that was at once 
stifling and reassuring, constraining yet deeply familiar. (1997: 
121-122) 
 
Such a strong and hyper-masculine figure has become embedded in popular 
and political culture as well. For example, in present-day Turkey, many people 
define Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a kabadayı. As a result of his authoritarian 
personality, and also the neighborhood, Kasımpaşa, that he grew up in, there is a 
popular perception of him as the “heroic leader who resists against all odds.” (Yavuz, 
2009: 119). While his way of behaving is criticized by his opponents, his followers 
appreciate him. The Turkish political arena has witnessed many debates around this 
subject, which are evaluated in detail in the next chapter. For now, this brief outline 
of Erdoğan’s hyper-masculine personality provides further evidence of the 
dichotomies of gendered identity constructions. To sum up, in Turkey, gendered 
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identities have been molded on the tension between being alaturca/alafranga, 
dandy/kabadayı, traditional/modern or Islamist/secular. 
In today’s social/political/cultural atmosphere, the power interplay between 
dandies and kabadayı, namely the symbols of modern decadence and the significance 
of traditions, has found its counterpart in the struggle between mon cher and 
kabadayı (tough uncle). An output of this struggle in the socio-political and historical 
continuum is the rift between Tayyip Erdoğan and “mon cher”. As mentioned 
before, in Turkey, bureaucrats are considering themselves as the guardians of the 
Atatürkian principles. West oriented diplomats’ way of conducting politics is named 
as mon cher style in populist discourse. This understanding of elitist bureaucrats has 
been dubbed by Erdoğan after the Davos crisis31. According to this discourse, 
bureaucrats and diplomats who are overly pro-Western are snobbish like züppe 
(dandy) but more importantly their a la Franga style determines them most. Aras in 
her study that discusses the rift between Prime Minister and diplomats argues that  
[T]wo main reasons come to mind. To begin there is the perceived 
class differences between diplomats and the right-wing political 
parties (such as nationalist and Islamic movements) which have 
their roots in and represent mostly the rural areas and the urban 
working class and which view the diplomats as an elitist group that 
looks down on the common citizen. (…) The second source is 
ideological. Several retired and serving ambassadors are wary of 
the AKP government since its leadership comes from the Islamic 
political movement.” (2010: 47) 
  
These bureaucrats are neither züppe nor kabadayı. They represent a break in 
this continuum. They are in a sense a la Franga, or in other words overly pro-
Western, but on the other hand, they are like kabadayı but the ones who protect the 
                                                 
31 Prime Minister Erdoğan left the stage at World Economic Forum after a debate on Gaza with Israeli 
President Shimon Peres. Erdoğan interrupted Peres’ talk by saying “One minute!” and this attitude 
created a diplomatic crisis. 
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country from external and especially internal threats. Although their understanding of 
threat differs from their Ottoman and early Republican counterparts, they consider 
themselves as the guardian of the secular system. Hence, they are still patriarchal but 
in a different way. Other than kabadayı of the populist discourse who is strictly 
connected to the traditional values, mon chers are considered as “(…) disconnected 
from traditions of the nation” (Aras, 2011: 47).  
 
 
4.2.4. The Secularist/Islamist Cleavage  
The relationship between Islamic identity and Western modernity is a crucial 
one in Turkey, since, although Turkish politicians of the early Republican period 
tried to reconcile the religious and/or traditional and the secular and/or modern, the 
enduring power conflict between the secular modernist and Islamist elites in Turkey 
has become a major characteristic of Turkish political history. During Ottoman 
times, Islam prescribed people’s way of living, and the codes of Islam were highly 
interwoven into everyday life practices. Hence, the first aim of modernizing policy 
makers was to eliminate these old codes: “they sought to manoeuvre religion out of 
public life” (Onar, 2007: 10). The landscape of Turkish politics was taken as 
problematic with Westernization and contrary to Kemalist principles, thereby 
requiring measures for the “cleansing of Islam” (Keyman, 2003). The period of 
modernization can thus be characterized by its attempts to emancipate gendered 
identities from the existing order. At this point, it is also worth mentioning that the 
traditional order referred to the Islamic way of life. Related to their persistence over 
centuries, traditional customs and practices have “(…) become coated with a veneer 
of religious legitimacy to the extent that they are regarded as Islamic.” (Jenkins, 
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2008: 6). For the Kemalist elites, modernization could only be achieved with a shift 
to the modern and this simultaneously embrace erasing religious codes and familiar 
boundaries. Transforming the country through eliminating the “stereotypes of Turks 
as backward and uncivilized” lead to changing boundaries (Onar, 2007). However, 
during this modernization period, the atmosphere was such that each new concept 
and phenomenon was considered as threat, so changes in gendered identities were 
not institutionalized easily. Due to the paradoxical characteristics of the 
modernization process in Turkey, it resulted in ambivalences and contradictions. 
However, despite this aim of cleansing Islam of founding fathers, in the 1980s, Islam 
reappeared, with analysts of Turkish politics agreeing that the climate during the last 
quarter of the 1990s made Islamist discourse a part of politics once again. The 
Islamist RP (Welfare Party) in particular, became the body through which Islam’s 
engagement in politics was realized. For Gülalp, this development represented a 
“crisis of modernization” (2001: 440) that had a significant influence on identity 
politics. Specifically, the rise of Islamist discourse has become reified in the 
construction of identities in general, and of femininities and masculinities in 
particular with the rise of the AKP.  
 
 
4.2.4.1. Kemalist/Modern vs. Muslim/Traditional Man 
Currently, as a result of widespread social changes and the effects of 
globalization, the boundaries of masculinity and feminity are being redrawn as 
multiplicities of identities. In terms of masculinities, Turkish society itself has 
fabricated new forms of masculinities through its interaction with global images and 
identities. Class, ethnicity and, most importantly, religion have also been integrated 
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as determining dynamics into the construction of new masculinities. The power 
interplay between hegemonic masculinity and other masculinities has developed on a 
slippery ground shaped by the heritages and also ambivalences of Turkish culture, 
and currently the secularist/Islamist cleavage.  
While traditional man is symbolized by the kabadayı of the early Republican 
times, his opponent is secular/modern man. Modernity and secularism have been 
considered a threat to Turkish men and to their patriarchal supremacy. The 
reproductions and reconstitutions of masculinities have always favored male 
dominated hierarchies, so new forms of masculinities were taken as a threat to the 
sober Turkish masculine image.  
Body politics is another aspect of such a power conflict. In a political climate 
in which religiosity is considered as a part of political liberty, the importance of body 
politics has increased in a parallel way, especially concerning the veiling issue. 
Veiling has always been an arena of political contestation in Turkish politics because 
it is not only an issue of women’s autonomy and agency, but restrictions on veiling 
undercut the Islamic construction of masculinity (Çınar, 2005; Vojdik, 2010). 
Hegemonic masculinities regulate female bodies and construct themselves as 
dominant. For Çınar, controlling women’s bodies simultaneously “legitimizes  
(hegemonic masculinities’) power and authority to intervene with regard to bodies, 
construct the national subject, and dictate the boundaries of the public and private 
spheres” (2005: 59).    
 The construction of masculinities offers a critical lens for examining the 
veiling issue and its relationship to political power and the state. The debate over 
women and their bodies in Turkish history “(…) reveals how masculinities construct 
gender within a range of power, through the regulation of women’s bodies” (Vojdik, 
112 
 
2010: 664). Since the beginning of the modernization efforts of the early Republican 
period, women’s clothing has been a subject of reform. The newly founded state 
promoted the proliferation of the images of Westernized women in the public sphere, 
but also introduced some measures involving women’s status in society (Çınar, 
2005). Until the 1950s, the headscarf was not an element of political controversy in 
Turkey. In a paradoxical way, while the Turkish state constituted its secularism 
through the unveiling of the female body, the Islamist elite of the 1990s have 
constituted their Islamism by re-veiling the female body (Çınar, 2005).      
“The politicizing of Islam empowers and encourages Muslims to return to the 
historical scene with their own ethics and aesthetics” (Göle, 1997: 87). This process 
gave birth to the struggle around veiling as the most visible symbol of Islamization. 
This quest for the Islamic self is a modern movement for Göle: “The re-elaboration 
of an Islamic self via political empowerment implicitly addresses the impact of 
modernization, which has penetrated the most intimate spheres of everyday life from 
definitions of self to gender relations and ethical values” (Göle, 1997: 81). This 
pursuit of an authentic way of being engendered a critical awareness of both the 
traditional way of practicing Islam and of contemporary forms of Western 
modernity. Body politics is thus significant in revealing the new consciousness of the 
Islamic self as it resists secularism because the body has become the signifier of the 
resistance of contemporary Islamists to secularism (Göle, 1997: 89). Within Turkey, 
both hegemonic masculinities and Islamic masculinities have used the veiling debate 
to represent their competing ideologies. This debate is one of the sites of contestation 
in which these competing masculinities negotiate. “This local struggle for a 
hegemonic masculinity constructs local gender relations, yet it is also part of the 
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historical and contemporary struggle between the West and Islam” (Vojdik, 2010: 
684).   
In this perspective, veiling is one of the most important signs that authority 
and power perform in female bodies, and discussions on veiling offer crucial clues 
about the parties’ different positions, their conceptualizations of maleness, and the 
competing legitimacies as the veil signals the presence of an alternative hegemonic 
political project. 
In contemporary Turkey, the dualistic political discourse was triggered by this 
antagonism. Such an atmosphere has not only affected macro politics, but it has also 
and very importantly impacted on the micro politics of everyday lives. As all the 
shifts and continuities cannot be isolated from gendered identity constructions, 
masculinities and femininities have become penetrated by discursive practices. For 
instance, as mentioned before, one of the reflections of Muslim/traditional man is 
neo-Muslim masculinities that this dissertation problematizes. As it is discussed in 
the literature with the AKP, there is a shift in the discursive practices of Islamist 
tradition. The AKP represents neo-Muslim masculinities with a fine tuning of 
Muslim/traditional man. In parallel to this, the CHP represents Kemalist/secular 
masculinities with a fine tuning of Kemalist/modern man. Therefore, these two 
political parties represent competing masculinities in Turkish political atmosphere 
cherished by political cultural elements. 
 
 
4.2.5. The Domination of Leaders 
The above mentioned relationship between state and father also become 
visible in the hyper-importance of another dominant male figure in Turkish politics, 
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namely, party leaders. The leaders’ personal attributes have become more important 
than the parties’ public office. As Sayarı mentions, “[t]he importance of leaders in 
shaping political outcomes in Turkey stems largely, though not exclusively, from the 
near absolute control that they exercise over party organizations.” (2002: 3). The 
high degree of personalism in Turkish political parties has created leaders that are the 
dominant decision-makers in Turkish political parties (Rubin and Heper, 2002; 
Özbudun, 2000; Sayarı, 2002). The authoritarian or oligarchic structure of party 
organizations is a critical characteristic of Turkish political parties it that has led to 
political parties being reduced into one single figure. “While Turkey is a graveyard 
of political parties, political leaders rarely retire and hardly die. This is very much the 
outcome of the personality centric aspect of Turkish political culture. Thus, political 
leaders are more significant than ideologies or party programmes” (Yavuz, 2009: 
118). Turkish politics is an arena for their personalities rather than party ideologies, 
and Turkish political history has witnessed many significant leaders whose role 
surpassed their parties. That is also the reason behind that this dissertation 
problematizes not only gendered discourses of political parties but also their leaders. 
For instance, Süleyman Demirel, who is popularly known as baba (father), 
served as the leader of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) and True Path Party 
(Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) when he also served as Prime Minister and President of the 
Turkish Republic. During his long tenure in office, a combination of his popularity 
and his nepotism allowed him to retain control over his party members (Heper 2002: 
224). According to Heper, Demirel had both charisma and also strong personal ties 
with party members, and this leadership style facilitated his success in politics (2002: 
225).  
115 
 
Bülent Ecevit is another significant figure in Turkish politics. He has served 
as the leader of the Republican People’s Party and the Democratic Left Party 
(Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP). He has also served as prime minister several times 
from 1970 until 2002, before he died in 2006. “Ecevit’s leadership style combined 
elements of organizational control, ideology, rhetoric and policy” (Tachau, 2002: 
114). In 1974, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus “(…) propelled Ecevit to 
unprecedented heights of popularity” and since then he has been referred to as 
Karaoğlan, a folk figure evoking heroic images of social justice and glory. As an 
acquainted male image who protects the country, Ecevit gained popularity among 
Turkish citizens. At that time, he enjoyed a great deal of sympathy, and party slogans 
like ‘Ecevit is our hope’ and ‘Populist Ecevit’ reinforced this image of Karaoğlan 
(Tachau, 2002: 114).  
Another critical leader figure in recent Republican history is Tansu Çiller. 
She was the first woman to head a major Turkish political party, and also the first 
female Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic. For Ümit Cizre, “[w]hat made her 
accession extraordinary was that she was not only the first woman elected to the 
leadership of a political party in Turkey, but to a right-wing party, where the top 
cadres were always occupied by male politicians” (2002a: 89). Following Demirel’s 
baba (father) figure, she became the ana (mother) figure of the Turkish centre right 
electorate with her conservative stance. This ana figure represents the traditional 
image of womanhood in Turkey and “(…) within itself the implied positive qualities 
commonly linked with motherhood, she could portray herself and her politics as self-
sacrificial, modest, altruistic, and having the purest motives, including an unselfish 
concern for the nation” (Cizre, 2002b: 207). In addition to the ana (mother) figure, 
she also used the bacı (sister) symbol, which is another culturally important term for 
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women in Turkey. She also cultivated her feminine image of women in politics by 
taking care of her dresses.  
She was not the Kemalist woman professional or politician 
caricatured in forbidding, dark-colored, two-piece suits which 
underplayed one’s sex. She did wear suits with long skirts, but they 
were always feminine, chic, and complemented with fancy, striking 
scarves. She created a smooth, pleasing image with the pale, pastel 
colors she chose for her suits and lipsticks. (Y. Arat, 2009: 13) 
 
She did not hesitate to use her femininity and mother role in conducting 
politics. Especially, the mother theme was a rhetorical strategy that she used to 
justify her strength and power. For instance, in 1995, in a television channel, she 
rationalized her stance towards Kurdish problem by saying that “I have turned into a 
hawk like a mother whose son had been killed” (cited in Arat, 2009: 16). She tried to 
legitimize her position with gendered codes. Her reference to mother as a female 
challenge masculinized authority but, on the other hand, using the metaphor of hawk 
is in line with gendered roles within political world related to hawk’s ferocious 
character. As a hunting bird, hawk or, especially, being like a hawk is a common 
usage in Turkish language for courageous man. Hence, ironically, it can be argued 
that she expanded signs of authority (Y. Arat, 2009: 17). In this perspective, it also 
valuable to mention that while associating herself with traditional gender roles, she 
also used her gender as a strategic tool to gain advantage over her male rivals. While 
she gained the sympathy of women by her femininity and with her efforts to survive 
in a masculine arena, on the other hand, she behaved in a masculinized tone as well. 
“Çiller also wished to give the impression that she had such man-like attributes as 
courage, endurance, determination, and militarism” (Y. Arat 2009: 207). Her “(…) 
hawkish political gestures and dismissal of women’s issues” can be taken as 
examples of her man-like image (Y. Arat, 2009: 13).  Çiller’s “sultan like” leadership 
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style, meaning its personalistic and authoritarian nature, can be considered as a 
milestone in Turkish politics (Cizre, 2002a: 96). In Turkey, like its counterparts, the 
representation of women in politics is relatively low and “the few women who do 
break through, such as Indira Gandhi and Margaret Thatcher, do so by their 
exceptional use of men’s networks, not women’s” (Connell, 1995: 204). In line with 
Connell’s argument, in Çiller’s case it was “(…) Demirel who personally recruited 
Çiller to the DYP” (Cizre, 2002b: 199). Although she entered into politics with a big 
fanfare, her political opportunism, and her decision to form a coalition government 
with the Islam oriented Welfare Party (RP) decreased her popularity among the 
electorate.  
In sum, although she has challenged the image of politician, especially, prime 
minister, her man-like style has fostered gendered character of politician and way of 
conducting politics. Especially, from a perspective of leadership, she has cultivated 
male coding of authority. Being the sole actor of a given political party, maintaining 
tight control over their party, leaders in Turkey, even women, enjoy with internalized 
gender of politics. In short, politics in Turkey is men’s politics and an analysis of the 
AKP, CHP and MHP’s leaders will enable us to reveal the codes of Turkish political 
manhood. 
In conclusion, five main outlooks that have been identified, namely, the 
strong state tradition, militarism, Westernization, secularist/Islamist cleavage and 
domination of leaders, can not be isolated from an analysis of the construction of 
gendered identities in Turkish politics. These outlooks have also been imbued with 
codes of Turkish masculinities. The notion of father state, the hegemony of leaders, 
the rivalry between tough uncles and mon cher and  also the deep rooted antagonism 
between Islamists and secularists have been bourgeoned from the root of culture. In 
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the basis of how politics as a field ossifies the codes of Turkish masculinities, the 
next chapter will analyze political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, 
and their gendered discourse. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE GENDERED POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
 
 
The analysis of gender has lead scholars to unsettle the established 
conventions; especially it has challenged the boundaries of the politics and the 
political. Significantly, in the study of gender, re-reading self evident 
conceptualizations and phenomenon opened the ways to capture how it is implicated 
in structures of power. From the perspective of embeddedness of power and the 
construction of masculinities, questioning masculinized arrangements promote an 
alternative way. As state is generally assumed as the main site of masculinized 
hierarchy, an examination of gender of the state enables both the reader and the 
writer to comprehend the interplay of gender relations and state dynamics better. 
Especially, in a country that strong state is a historically determinant factor and an 
element of political culture, gendered traditions within state are vital. In addition, the 
strong role of the state “hinders the making of effective civil society” and this 
situation situates political parties as the main political institution in political arena in 
Turkey (Heper, 1992: 189). As mentioned before political parties are relatively left 
alone to function in the political sphere. Therefore, one who is intended to analyze 
the different pathways of masculinities in politics as a field in Turkey and their 
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encounters, political parties constitute the main unit of analysis. Its institutional 
structure and its discourses will shed light on the construction of gendered identities 
in general, masculinities in particular. Hence, this chapter will first analyze the state 
and political manhood and it will define the interplay among politics, gender and 
power. While discussing the gendered state in depth, it will examine the close 
relationship between the state and political parties in Turkey. The second part of the 
chapter will examine political parties, namely the AKP, the CHP and the MHP, 
official documents with a lens focusing on gendered discourses. 
 
 
5.1 The State and Political Manhood 
A researcher starting from a Marxist perspective of the state will probably 
reveal a puzzle about its machinery: that it is a machine of repression that enables the 
ruling class to ensure domination over the proletariat. For example, as Althusser 
points out, the state is first of all what Marxists call the “state apparatus” and “(…) 
the state has no meaning except as a function of state power” (1994: 108). 
Althusser’s important term, Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), offers a vital 
perspective for the analytical framework to be used here. For him, there are religious, 
educational, family, legal, political, trade-union, communication and cultural ISAs 
(1994: 110). These are different to the ‘State Apparatus’, which itself is not plural 
and, most importantly, functions through violence and direct intervention as a 
repressive force. ISAs, however, also function through ideology, so how they 
function is important. Especially in everyday life, both the State Apparatus and ISAs 
may function cooperatively to discipline and/or subject individuals (1994: 117). 
According to Althusser, this process of “interpellation”, of naming and subjugating 
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individuals is “[n]ourished by a myriad of ISAs that runs from absolute manipulation 
to patriarchal pliability with each enjoying a certain degree of autonomy, gender 
roles comprise a tapestry of teachings” (Bilgin, 2004: 26). Both men and women are 
subject to these teachings, and are also required to perform accordingly as deemed.   
From this perspective, this dissertation aims, by destabilizing the idea of 
maleness, to re-read and re-analyze two central assumptions about politics in modern 
Turkey: (1) that the state is virile; (2) that politics and manhood are embedded. As a 
first step to achieving this aim it is necessary to critically analyze relations between 
the state and gender, and, also between politics and gender.  
A generally accepted hypothesis about the state and gender is that modern 
states are inherently male dominated. However, there are also some critiques of this 
view in the literature. For instance, for Vickers, “if women achieve citizenship when 
men do, and if when they help create founding discourses, and achieve an earlier and 
higher ‘presence’ in state and political institutions, the resulting democracy will be 
more ‘women friendly’” (2006:2). She adds that “less militarized democracies often 
are more open to women’s participation” (2006: 3). Women’s early integration and 
participation in institutions simultaneously increases their presence in them. In line 
with Vickers’ argument, Helga Hernes (1987) also highlights the women-friendliness 
of modern states. She portrays women-friendliness as a deepening of democracy 
concerning state policies. Using these arguments that challenge the idea of the state 
as a masculinized hierarchy, allows one to develop new hypotheses that lead to new 
questions. However, as this dissertation does not focus on the degree to which the 
Turkish state is women friendly, it will mainly be organized around consideration of 
the leaders of various political parties and scrutiny of the discourses of masculinities 
related to them. The dissertation will mainly focus on the relation between politics 
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and masculinity by not ignoring the other gender and its significance in the whole 
network of power located in state apparatuses. In this, it follows Nagel, who argues 
that  
(…) to limit the examination of gender in politics to an 
investigation of women only, as much contemporary research has 
tended to do, is to miss a major, perhaps the major, way in which 
gender shapes politics - through men and their interests, their 
notions of manliness, and the articulation of masculine micro 
(everyday) and macro (politics) cultures (Nagel, 2005: 397, original 
italics) 
 
Hence, it is essential to re-analyze the relationship between politics and 
masculinities from a critical perspective. From the perspective that ‘the personal is 
political’, it is valuable to re-read the political from a gender perspective because 
gender is fundamental to the practice of politics. It is notable how systematically the 
political sphere has been identified historically with men and masculinities, making it 
necessary to ask the same questions as McCormack (2007:1): “Why have men 
traditionally been associated with the public political domain and what implications 
[does] this have for gender relations as a whole?” As MacCormack points out, 
although the term ‘public’ itself is gender-neutral, it has nevertheless been associated 
with a range of highly emotive moral values that were gendered in the masculine. For 
example, ‘public sprit’, ‘virtue’ and ‘service’ have all placed political action firmly 
within 19th century expectations of what it means to be a man (McCormack, 2007: 
3), and political historians, have taken the dominance of men as given where politics 
is concerned. Hence, both the argument that gender is political, and the association of 
the political domain with masculinities highlight the usefulness of establishing the 
concept of masculinities in the study of politics. This study will use a dynamic 
approach to politics that embraces power relations, discourses and everyday life.  
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In this dissertation, politics will be considered within the framework of 
Bourdieu’s understanding of field. For Bourdieu, “(...) a field may be defined as a 
network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions 
are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon 
their occupants, agents or institutions, (...), in the structure of the distribution of 
species of power” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 97). Politics is a multilayered 
network and an arena of competing relations for positions or simply, gaining power. 
Agents position themselves according to the rules of the field because the field 
impose rule of conduct. Hence, politics impose regulatory codes to its agents, namely 
politicians, and they behave accordingly to have authority and to be in power. The 
struggles of power are classificatory ones and position agents. According to 
Bourdieu field or the conditions of it pushes habitus in an adaptive way (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999: 102). The agents or politicians in the field of politics confirm 
to the rules and on the basis of the relationship between field and habitus, it can be 
argued that habitus and the field harmonically construct each other. Habitus adapts 
itself to the conditions required. However, on the other hand, it is critical to witness 
such a harmonious partnership in politics as a field in the framework of the 
construction of masculine identities. This dissertation problematizes this and it will 
be discussed within the context of Turkish political history in following chapters.   
Before moving into a discussion of the construction of different masculinities 
in Turkish politics as a field, the debate to follow here will adopt the same approach 
as Connell, namely, that a framework for theorizing the interplay of gender relations 
and political dynamics is necessary. As politics is fundamentally concerned with 
explaining the operation of power, the cultural turn has enabled researchers to 
criticize its subtler operations, namely subjective manifestations of power 
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(MacCormack, 2007: 24). Men’s gendered experiences of the political arena are 
critical here, and a gendered study of political men may take many forms. As already 
mentioned, the dominance of men politically has been considered as a given, so 
deconstructing the notion of manhood in the political sphere is of great value.  
Although masculinities may take many forms in any given society, for 
Connell, only one model is hegemonic, culturally dominant and instrumental in 
perpetuating the society itself. Nevertheless, alternative models should not be 
underemphasized (Connell, 1993). Connell helps us to understand the link between 
the political and the power of the state, and the place of gender in a society when 
social contexts are constructed within unequal power relations. Therefore, being 
aware that masculinity is not there, but that it is in-between, above or behind 
structures, it seems plausible to see the relationships between masculinity and 
politics as not static and being constantly renegotiated (McCormack, 2007: 19).  
With the awareness of the bottlenecks of defining masculinity and examining 
gendered power relations or manifestations of power, this dissertation takes a 
dynamic approach. If power is something productive and multiple, and gender’s 
construction is being shaped in whole discourses of gendered meanings and 
performances, taking masculinities just as the result of a patriarchal social structure 
will be misleading. The active process of gendering the political constitutes 
particular ways of conceptualizing society, thereby facilitating the exercise of 
political power. Hence, gender studies can be helpful to reveal subjective 
manifestations of power. MacCormack argues that politics is commonly conducted 
through gendered processes of interaction, networking and interpersonal 
relationships (2007). Thus, conceptualizations of masculinity are actively created and 
fostered through processes of inculcating common values and behaviours, 
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constructing power relationships, or negotiating the boundaries of inclusion and 
exclusion. Hence, political masculinities that power relations play crucial role is the 
notion that this dissertation is concerned with. This will also enable us to understand 
the changing ways in which the political self is conceived of in terms of gender.  
 
 
5.2 The Gendered Political Parties 
Bourdieu recognizes that naturalized gender hierarchies inculcate the 
superiority of some characteristics as masculine and also symbolically dominant. He 
therefore emphasizes that perceived dichotomies are gendered. Similarly, 
Hawkesworth argues that gender symbolism generates a logic in which rationality, 
competence and leadership are coded as masculine. She adds that the gendered 
understanding of power is embedded in “(…) structures of belief, that constitute the 
identities and aspirations of gendered political agents” (2005: 150). That is, not only 
discourses and symbols, but also the political cultures of a given country have 
cooperatively worked to establish practices that shape the gendered nature of the 
politics and the political. Having presented the dynamics of Turkish political culture 
in detail in the previous chapter, it is now necessary to discuss how the functioning 
of the state situates gender hierarchies, especially in a country where the strong state 
tradition is a determining factor of political culture and political parties are main 
machineries. 
To begin with, regarding the relation between the state and gender, there are 
no clear boundaries to discuss the theoretical framework. Connell, in his work “The 
State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal” (1990), addresses this 
problem and tries to explore the main ways of thinking about the relationship 
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between gender and the state. To move beyond the limits, Connell starts by 
recognizing that “gender is collective phenomenon, an aspect of social institutions as 
well as an aspect of personal life, and therefore internal as well as external to the 
state” (Connell, 1990: 509). Hence, as both gender and the state are broad terms, 
analyzing the relation between gender and the state is not easy. Connell takes gender 
as a “domain of human practice” while he takes the state as a “set of institutions 
currently subject to coordination” (Connell, 1990: 509-510). After outlining the main 
theories of the state, namely, the liberal tradition and Marxist theory, Connell argues 
that it is liberal feminism that has brought gender and, more importantly, the 
argument that “the state is gendered” into the literature (Connell, 1990: 513). For 
Connell, the idea of male state nuanced in two ways. The first is the 
conceptualization of the state as “the hireling or messenger boy of patriarchy” 
(Connell, 1990: 516). That is, following the argument of liberal feminism that the 
state is gendered, Connell claims that state is not neutral in its treatment of women. 
The second nuance for Connell (1990) is the elaboration of the state as an oppressor 
of the patriarchal power structure, an argument that relates to Mies’ comment about 
the state being “the general patriarch” (Mies, 1998). For Mies, just as the father is the 
individual patriarch of the family, so the state imposes rules and redresses 
inequalities among a country’s citizens. The latter argument, in particular, leads to 
challenging discussions which Connell uses to define the key pillars of his theoretical 
framework.  
The first one is that “[t]he state is constituted within gender relations as the 
central institutionalization of gendered power” (Connell, 1990: 519). This pillar takes 
the state to be the main organizer of gender power relations, and also analyzes the 
state as a reification of these power relations. This discussion is generally linked to 
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history, specifically the question of origins. The origins argument about patriarchy 
claims that “archaic states were organized in the form of patriarchy, (…) promoted 
patriarchal family forms,” while patriarchal forms of power has been recreated in 
practice (Connell, 1990: 520). In the 19th century, hegemonic masculinity was 
displaced by a masculine domination organized around themes of rationality 
(Connell, 1990: 521). For Connell, such a bureaucratization of the state system was 
closely linked to an emerging distinction between the public and private spheres 
(1990).  
The second pillar follows the first one in suggesting that the state, as the 
bearer of gender, is a gender regime (Connell, 1990: 523). For example, a common 
pattern is the gender division of labor, which indicates a masculinized state 
apparatus. That is, while men predominate within the state directorate (politics, 
bureaucracy, and judiciary) and the coercive apparatus (military, police), women 
prevail in human service state employment (e.g. teaching, nursing). Another 
component of the gender regime is the structure of power that denotes a gendered 
hierarchy. Connell emphasizes the significance of the bureaucracy as an organization 
of power within and/or without the state (Connell, 1990: 525). For him, the 
bureaucracy is a fundamental functioning system of the state that also involves 
personal networks and contacts. He argues that this system is “(…) socially 
organized on gender lines, with the enormous majority of elected officials being 
men” (Connell, 1990: 526).  
The third component is the structure of cathexis, which mainly concerns the 
emotional component of the gender regime of the state. As has mentioned before, for 
instance, the culture of nationalism has been constructed to emphasize masculinized 
themes such as honor, patriotism. Hence, within the framework of this dissertation, a 
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gender patterning of emotion within the conduct of politics is crucial. “There was 
almost no recognition of gender in this [political authority] literature, though it can 
now be re-read as a discourse about masculinity and the ways men can be attached to 
political leaders” (Connell, 1990: 526). Hence, as the patriarchal structure of cathexis 
should not be underestimated within the framework of the gendered nature of the 
state, political activities around this cathexis, that are simultaneously reconstructed, 
should be scrutinized. Overall, Connell’s work offers an important paradigm for 
investigating the gendered nature of the state as a central institutionalization of 
power and a regulator of gendered hierarchy. This approach makes it clear that 
scrutinizing the exercise of gendered power relations is an important aid for 
understanding the dynamics of political manhood.  
In addition to Connell’s analysis, it is also useful to draw on Lene Hansen’s 
arguments concerning the state and the gender ontology, epistemology and 
methodology of rationalist, standpoint and poststructuralist feminisms. She argues 
that all these approaches have a ‘concern’ with the way in which the state affects 
gender (Hansen, 2010). Her analysis of these three main approaches to gender 
focuses on the discipline of international relations. For rationalist feminism, the state 
is a utilitarian actor concerned with its own survival, so that “(…) gender is a 
variable that may impact state behavior or inverting the question where the state type 
or foreign policy might impact men and women differently” (Hansen, 2010: 20). For 
standpoint feminism, the state is a patriarchal organ that can be primarily critiqued 
regarding the historical separation of the public and private spheres (2010: 21). 
Unlike the first approach, standpoint feminism shifts the focus from an abstract 
conceptualization of the state to a concern with living men or, more especially, 
women. As Hansen mentions, standpoint feminism argues that women are impacted 
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by economic and security structures within and across countries (2010: 22). Finally, 
in contrast to standpoint feminism, post-structuralist feminism does not support the 
understanding that there is a concrete living female subject. Instead, it concerns itself 
with the significance of lived experience as texts and discourses (Hansen, 2010: 24). 
It can thus be argued that post-structuralist feminists follow Butler’s view of gender 
as performative, in that post-structuralist feminists’ main question is: ‘How do 
discourses construct subjects?’ Although this dissertation assumes an understanding 
of the mutual relation between subjects and discourses, the question of post-
structuralist feminists is still relevant in terms of its emphasis on lived experience. In 
addition, they emphasize that the public / private distinction has had critical impacts 
on both women’s and men’s political, economic and cultural identity constructions. 
For them, “(…) the expectation of how the proper public person acts and reasons is 
one that concurs with the masculinity assumptions previously reserved for men” 
(Hansen, 2010: 23). The constructions that locate ‘fragile’, ‘irrational’ women in the 
private sphere and ‘rational’, ‘decisive’ and ‘strong’ men in the public sphere thereby 
legitimize particular actions of individuals. According to Hawkesworth, gender 
symbolism privileges men by generating “a logic of appropriate behavior that shapes 
the individual’s self-understanding” (2005: 149). As this logic is embedded in 
routines and discourses, gendered power normalizes male dominance.  
In Turkey, state is the main agent of the politics and it can be argued that in 
Turkey the stateness is being reproduced within political parties. State power is 
operationalizing in the conduct of political parties’ way of doing politics. While one 
intends to deconstruct the conduct of politics and also the agent of this multilayered 
network in Turkey, he/she encounters with political parties and their leaders. As 
mentioned before, in Turkey there is a high level of domination of leaders in doing 
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politics. Moreover, in the framework of this dissertation, it is very valuable to discuss 
the negotiations of the state with political parties. As they constitute the main agents 
of the politics, their positioning towards the state is also very critical while 
discussing different pathways of masculinities in Turkey.  
In short, Connell and Hansen’s frameworks and supporting arguments, which 
enable us to analyze the different ways that manhood and its normative 
characteristics are attached to political leaders, and, also the ways by which the 
discourses of Turkish political culture construct subjects, are central to this 
dissertation.  
In this line, this dissertation attempts to discuss the different pathways of 
masculinities in Turkish politics as a field. Its methodological framework has two 
main parts. The first part will examine official party documents and will discuss not 
only gendered rhetoric of them but also how these documents enshrine the family as 
the central unit of society. The second part, the next chapter, will deconstruct the 
leaders’ speeches, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli, 
collected from the newspapers, Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, and Zaman between 2000 and 
2009. This time frame is significant as it covers two elections that gendered 
rhetorical strategies peak and also it mainly depicts a new period in Turkish political 
atmosphere with the rising democratization discourse and the governance of the AKP 
symbolizing “the return of the repressed” (Gürbilek, 2010:78).  
The analysis of the official party documents will present the institutional 
structure that gendered feminine and masculine actors operate. Hence, it is valuable 
to start with a brief analysis of political parties that will be followed by a discussion 
on political party programs and election manifests so as to reveal institutionalized 
discourse on gender. 
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5.3 Gender Discourse of the Official Documents of Political Parties  
Parties, as important political machinery, are significant institutions that 
exercise power within the state. In addition, parties are political institutions that seek 
influence in a state and usually consist of more than a single interest in the society 
(Ware, 2003). Political parties are different from pressure groups and civil societal 
organizations; they work within the state since the centrality of the state is the object 
of party activity (Ware, 2003: 6). For Robert Michels, in addition to political parties’ 
centrality in politics, studying them constitutes a vital branch of science as it “(…) 
occupies an intermediate field between the social, the philosophic-psychological and 
historical disciplines” (Michels, 1962: 6). Political parties have great importance in 
Turkish political history, too.  The role of political parties in Turkey cannot be 
detached from the whole discourse of Turkish politics if we are to understand to what 
extent or whether the party politics had an impact on understanding the dynamics of 
politics in Turkey. Therefore, re-reading the construction of politics through political 
parties will be very beneficial for analyzing the relation between manhood and 
politics. Moreover, taking political parties as the focus of the study allows comparing 
the ways in which different ideologies employ images of men and masculinities.   
Firstly, in line with Ware (2003:17), “it is not surprising that a comparative 
study of political parties should begin by considering parties as organizations that 
have or purport to have an ideology”. Therefore, this dissertation aimed firstly 
making ideological differentiation and then, analyzing parties’ different constructions 
of manhood. However, first, the limits of making such a classification among 
political parties seem apparent. For Ware, the answers to the questions of “Is there 
just a single ideological spectrum or many? Is there, another dimension, for instance, 
relating to lifestyle or personal values?” are not clear and dependent to society 
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(Ware, 2003). For the writer, examining only programmes of political parties without 
examining its doctrines, ethos, current position (in power or opposition) gives a 
limited understanding. Therefore, in the framework of this dissertation, the 
programmes of the political parties are analyzed to reflect their official discourse but 
they do not constitute the sole data. Election manifests are also significant for one to 
comprehend any given political parties’ stance. As election times are very critical in 
terms of parties’ positioning towards their opponents, election manifests reflect the 
current discourse and also position of the party as well. Hence, both party 
programmes and election manifests have the potentiality to reflect the political 
culture within the party itself. In addition, while examining the construction of 
manhood in political parties, the dissertation also, in a parallel way, analyzes or has 
the chance to compare different parties’ construction of masculinities with different 
background. By this way, it will question one of the argument of TESEV’s report on 
nationalism in Turkey that stresses out that men from left or right wing politics or 
Islamist are experiencing being men rather than being leftist, rightist or Islamist 
(Kentel, Ahıska and Genç, 2007: 264).  
The information on political parties’ discourse on gender, and masculinities in 
particular, were gathered through critical discourse analyses of party programs and 
election manifests of 2002 and 2007. The programs of the AKP, CHP and MHP 
examined with specific focus on men and women. Analyzing the gender discourse of 
political parties’ programs offered how political parties construct men and women 
and helped to identify the significance of family as the central unit within Turkish 
society.  
On the basis of political parties’ vital role in Turkish politics, party programs 
and election manifests serve as barometer to examine political elite discourse on 
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gender. Firstly, when the programs and manifests were analyzed with specific focus 
on women, the data reports that although women’s role and her rights are perceived 
and/or acknowledged, traditional family structures and intra-family division of labor 
remain its primacy. 
 
 
5.3.1 The Program and Election Manifest of the AKP: A New Approach? 
The AKP was formed in August 2001 after the closure of the FP (Virtue 
Party). The FP’s dissident reformist wing was the founding members of the AKP. At 
this point the party can be viewed as an offspring of the National Outlook tradition.  
There is a general understanding that the results of the 3 November 2002 
general election opened a new period in Turkish politics with the AKP’s important 
success as a newly established party. According to Heper (2003), the AKP is an 
outcome of the discontent felt by the members of the religiously oriented political 
parties in terms of the discourse and the praxis of those parties. Additionally, 
different from the MNP-SP line, the AKP’s cadre declared that they were not 
Muslim democrats but ‘conservative democrats’. The AKP’s aim is to identify itself 
as a holder of a fresh starting point in the general framework of Turkish politics. 
They aim to represent a new political perception, discourse, method and culture. This 
is articulated under their political identity as follows: “(…) a political identity that we 
express as conservative democracy represents a very significant approach not only 
for Turkey, but also for world politics”32. 
                                                 
32 From the speech delivered by the party leader R. Tayyip Erdoğan in the International Symposium 
on Conservatism and Democracy, on 10. January.2004.  
http://www.akparti.org.tr/siyasivehukuk/dokuman/ing.%20başbakan%20konuşma%20UMDS.doc 
Retrieved on December, 17, 2009.  
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 The AKP’s responsiveness to contemporary global order and its pro-European 
Union stance has been interpreted as the source of its positioning towards Islam. The 
AKP is also argued to be on centre right with its emphasis on democracy and de-
emphasis on Islam (Coşar and Özman, 2004: 68). On the other hand, Kalaycıoğlu in 
his study on psychological ties between the parties and voters, mentions that “(…) 
economic satisfaction and political Islam emerge as important sources” in 
determining the AKP (Kalaycıoğlu, 2008: 308). Hence, although the party de-
emphasizes Islam and refers to Western values such as democracy, human rights, 
effective civil society, Islam is a critical element of defining the party, at least for the 
voters. Kalaycıoğlu’s research indicates that “(…) those who identify closely with 
and systematically vote for the party do seem to be children of those parents who 
formerly identified with one of the National Outlook parties ( the MSP, the RP, the 
FP) (2008: 309). Yet, the AKP that ruled Turkey since 2002 election as the main 
party in power and consolidated its power with the 2007 elections, is a very 
significant actor of Turkish political life and despite its reformist discourse, Islam 
continue to play a significant role. Having the clues about the party, now, it is 
valuable to examine the party program with a gender lens.  
 First, from the perspective of the state, it is valuable to mention that official 
statist discourse since the establishment of Republic positioned Islam as the other, 
but especially, the post-1990 period challenged the old understandings. Islamist 
activist’s stance “(…) challenged the preconceived attributes that the secular 
establishment projected to Islamism, and they negotiated with ingenuity what Islam 
can entail in a secular democratic polity” (Y.Arat, 2005: 1-2). The AKP and its 
political discourse can be considered as the reification of this negotiation with the 
state. On the other hand, the AKP presents a new version of gender politics as Coşar 
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and Yeğenoğlu name as “neoliberal-conservative patriarchy” (2011: 560). This new 
mode “borrows from Islamic patriarchy” but also challenges the old parameters by 
its transformation in the women’s movement (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 560). 
However, the party still advocates a conservative approach towards social order and 
family (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011). Hence, this part 
critically analyzes the stance of the AKP towards gendered politics and questions the 
clues of neo-Muslim masculinities within the whole discourse of the party. 
When the program of the AKP is analyzed, it has a progressive approach 
towards women’s empowerment and it promises to improve condition of women in 
every aspect of social life. But, traditional understanding of gender has not been fully 
eliminated. The program pledges to take measures against violence and gain 
international standards on rights and freedoms of women. However, despite the 
egalitarian tone, the program highlights women’s role in the family. 
 In the party program of the AKP, it is stated that  
Dealing with the women’s every kind of problem that accumulated 
because of the negligence over the years is a subject that our party 
prioritizes not only because they constitute half of our society but 
also because, above all, they are individuals and are primarily 
effective on raising healthy generations. 33 
 
While they state the significance of the issue of women is highlighted, it is 
taken firstly from motherhood aspect. The focus on motherhood is repeating in the 
program of the AKP as follows “Efforts that will ensure the housewives to gain 
social security will be carried out. New areas of employment will be created 
                                                 
 
33 Kadınlar sadece toplumumuzun yarısını oluşturdukları için değil, her şeyden önce birey ve sağlıklı 
nesillerin yetiştirilmesinde birinci derecede etkin oldukları için, yılların ihmali sonucu biriken her 
türlü sorunlarıyla ilgilenilmesi, partimizin öncelik verdiği bir konudur. ( AKP Party program, 2009: 
28) 
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protecting the dignity of the domestic labor in the meantime.”34. Another example is 
that “Improvements will be made on social security and working conditions taking 
the women’s responsibilities regarding professional life, children and family into 
consideration.”35. Hence, in the framework of the preceding quotes from the AKP 
program it can be argued that women’s primary domain is home and child care is her 
main responsibility. While it acknowledges the empowerment of women and 
women’s participation into public domain, namely working in a paid job, the 
document does not ignore to glorify traditional division of labor.  
The election manifest of 2002 outlines women’s status from two contrasting 
perspectives. One is affirming the need to empower women’s status in society. As 
Coşar and Yeğenoğlu argue “(…) the party has liberally engaged in dialogue with the 
women movement” (2011: 557). The reform in the Turkish Penal Code (2004) and 
the amendment to the Law on Municipalities (2005)36 are some of the AKP gender-
sensitive policies. Stating that “Preventing violence against women, sexual and 
economic abuse and supporting and protecting the women in need will be among our 
primary policies”37 manifest the party’s awareness towards women’s position in 
society and this sentence is followed by “Preventive and educational efforts will be 
made for women and their families in the regions where women suicides and honor 
                                                 
34 Ev kadınlarının sosyal güvence kazanmasını sağlayacak çalışmalar gerçekleştirilecektir. Ev içi 
emeğin saygınlığı korunarak kadınlar için yeni istihdam alanları oluşturulacaktır. (AKP Party 
Program, 2009: 29) 
 
35 Kadınların çalışma hayatı, çocuk ve aile sorumlulukları dikkate alınarak sosyal güvenlik ve çalışma 
koşullarında iyileştirmeler yapılacaktır. (AKP Party program, 2009:29) 
 
36 This law “obliges municipalities with more than 50000 inhabitants to open women’s shelters” 
(Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 562)  
37 Kadına yönelik şiddetin, cinsel ve ekonomik istismarın önlenmesi, muhtaç durumdaki kadınların 
desteklenmesi ve korunması, öncelikli politikalarımız arasında yer alacaktır. (AKP Election manifest, 
2002: 76) 
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killings are seen often”38. Hence, the AKP’s official document acknowledges the 
primacy of women and her status in society. However, on the other hand, the other 
theme that is prominent is the emphasis on traditional gender roles and women’s 
roles in family. It is stated that  
Despite our women share the burden of life together with the men, 
they haven’t got the status they deserve. Our PARTY will consider 
this situation in every policy it will implement. Giving our women 
the social status to shoulder the social responsibility with the men 
will be our goal.39 
 
The sentence is followed by mentioning the background of this importance as 
“Our PARTY gives importance to resolving the problems of the women in order to 
raise healthy generations and ensure happiness in family”40 
The election manifest of 2007 marks the continuity in the party’s discourse 
on women. “The AKP government pursued family-centered policies in order to solve 
the problems of the women, children, aged and handicapped.”41. This statement 
exemplifies the AKP’s traditional stance towards the significance of family. Their 
promises in the case of being elected cover the reforms for the increasing status of 
the family as well. “Family Life Education will be generalized inside formal and 
non-formal education institution programs with the purpose of supporting on such 
issues as spouse selection, starting a family, having a baby, responsible parenting, 
                                                 
38 Kadın intiharlarının, töre ve namus cinayetlerinin sık görüldüğü yörelerde kadınlara ve ailelerine 
yönelik önleyici ve eğitici çalışmalar yapılacaktır. . (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76) 
 
39 Kadınlarımız hayatın yükünü erkeklerle birlikte paylaşmalarına rağmen, hak ettikleri statüye 
kavuşamamışlardır. PARTİMİZ, uygulayacağı tüm politikalarda bu durumu göz önünde 
bulunduracaktır. Kadınlarımızın, erkeklerle birlikte toplumsal sorumluluğu yüklenecek statüye 
kavuşturulması temel hedefimiz olacaktır. . (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76) 
 
40 PARTİMİZ, sağlıklı nesillerin yetiştirilmesi ve ailede mutluluğun sağlanması için kadın 
sorunlarının giderilmesine önem vermektedir. . (AKP Election manifest, 2002: 76) 
 
41 AK Parti iktidarı, kadınlar, çocuklar, yaşlılar ve özürlülerin sorunlarını çözmek için aile merkezli 
politikalar izlemiştir. (AKP Election manifest, 2007: 70) 
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family relations and domestic economy.”42. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
AKP’s discourse on women’s issues and gender equality demonstrate how traditional 
gender order is entrenched within the discourse of the party. In addition, although 
there is no reference to patriarchal order of the society, acknowledging traditional 
order encompasses indirect reference to the family and internalized gendered 
hierarchies.   
Family is the basis of the society and an important institution that 
play a part in creation of social solidarity. Road to social happiness, 
solidarity, peace, love and respect passes through family. It is clear 
that we owe our survival to our sturdy family structure to a great 
extent despite all the adverseness and economic problems.43 
 
As child-centered family is a very significant element of early Republican 
nationalist discourse, there is a continuous trend on glorifying family. Emphasizing 
women’s role as care giver circuitously accentuates male’s protective role, or in other 
words, traditional gender roles within the family.  
 
 
5.3.2 The Program and Election Manifest of the CHP: A Libertarian 
Approach? 
This party, the CHP, represents center left of Turkish party families (Ware, 
2003). The CHP, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as a very vital actor of Turkish 
political history, was the ruling political organization of Turkey during early 
Republican Period, 1923-1945. Under the leadership of this party, Kemalist elites 
                                                 
42 Eş seçimi, ailenin kurulması, çocuk sahibi olma, sorumluluk sahibi ebeveynlik, aile ilişkileri ve ev 
ekonomisi gibi konularda destek sağlamak amacıyla Aile Yaşam Eğitimi örgün ve yaygın eğitim 
kurumlarının programları içerisinde yaygınlaştırılacaktır. (AKP Election manifest, 2007: 74) 
 
43 Aile, toplumun temeli ve toplumsal dayanışmanın oluşmasında rol oynayan önemli bir kurumdur. 
Toplumsal mutluluk, dayanışma, barış, sevgi ve saygının yolu aileden geçer. Yaşanan bütün 
olumsuzluklara ve ekonomik sıkıntılara rağmen toplum olarak ayakta duruşumuzu büyük çapta 
sağlam aile yapımıza borçlu olduğumuz açıktır. (AKP Party program, 2009: 29) 
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conducted their modernization project that put great emphasis on the position of 
women. The images of new, modern, Kemalist, Turkish women were the signifiers 
of the newly founded Republic of Turkey (Kandiyoti 1987; Berktay 2004; Göle 
2004). In addition to women, men, the hidden side of the iceberg, were also 
important agents of the modernization project. Despite their hidden role, they were 
the cultural ideal of the mentioned project. They are the ones who are charged with 
modernizing the women and society, and also providing welfare. The borders of how 
the women exist in society as a modern individual are drawn by men. Men as a 
partner, husband or father gave social birth to the new women of the Republic. The 
significance of this modernization period lies in its strong attachment to the party 
even in current political atmosphere. Individuals who have voted for the CHP are 
children of parents who identified with the CHP in the past; hence, “(…) parental 
influence emerges as the most salient determinant of identification with the CHP.”  
(Kalaycıoğlu, 2008: 310). Especially, for the CHP, the sayings of ‘This is the party 
of my family’ or ‘We have voted for the CHP for years’ is very common in daily life 
conversation.  Another determinant is laicism/secularism, especially, Kemalism. The 
effect of Atatürk as the founder of the party, and the commitment to the ideals of 
Kemalism have influenced voters as well. ‘We have always voted for the party of 
Atatürk’ is another common saying among the electorate of the CHP. In this 
framework, it is worth to mention that the CHP represent the core of the Kemalism’s 
statist ideology and Kemalist gender policies can be read with reference to state 
feminism (Tekeli, 1986; White, 2003; Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011). Since 
Republican times, Kemalist women have bargained with patriarchal norms 
(Kandiyoti, 1988). Until 1980, Republican patriarchy hegemonised discourse on 
women and gender equity and emancipation of women has been voiced through 
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Kemalism (Coşar and Yeğenoğlu, 2011). After 1980, feminism started to flourish, 
especially with the rise of Islamist activists. In this context, another determinant is 
political Islam. In a political environment that political Islam of the AKP has been 
considered as a threat to Kemalist ideas, not only politicians of the CHP but also 
voters’ perception of the party as the guardian of the Republican norms has an 
impact on determination of party identification. Such a guardianship role has been 
considered as the legacy of Kemalism and this role epitomizes Kemalist/secular 
masculinities. It can be argued that the nostalgia on Kemalist/secular state reveals the 
deep-rooted codes of masculinities as long as the threat of Islam survives.  
In addition to modernization legacy, the CHP, as a representative of center-
left, is an important actor of Turkish political life. Although, the party has 
experienced declines and started to be known as “the party of congresses, political 
struggles and internal strife”, its deep rooted institutions, traditions make the CHP a 
very crucial actor in Turkish politics (Ayata, 2002). In addition, the analysis of the 
CHP in terms of the construction of masculinity vis a vis feminity, seems one of the 
best fields of examination because in line with Michels’ argument (1962), the CHP 
have been expected to have, in theory, as a leftist party, more liberal and democratic 
stance towards women and her participation in politics. However, as the statistics 
show it is the CHP that has the least numbers of women candidates in 2007 general 
elections. Therefore, it seems that the analysis of the CHP can “(...) furnish an 
unprejudiced analytical answer to questions” (Michels, 1962:51).  
When the official party documents of the CHP were analyzed the first 
expectation is about party’s egalitarian approach on gender. However, a critical 
analysis reveals the traditional codes imbued within the party. 
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The party program of the CHP states that “There can not be a democratic, 
developed, healthy and modern country without ensuring equality of women and 
men.”44. Such an egalitarian approach is apparent in the program. The program states 
one of the principles of the party as follows: 
It is the society where the women have the same rights and 
opportunities that the men have in administration, politics, 
professional life, education, law, universal rights and freedoms and 
in all other fields; live freely, away from every kind of social and 
physical pressure. It is the structural regulations that do positive 
discrimination in favor of the women when necessary in order to 
ensure this.45 
 
Although the preceding statement has a more equal perspective on gender 
equity, another article in the program reminds the close relationship between women 
and family very quickly. “Statutory provisions that take place in various laws and 
include discrimination against women or lack in protection of family will be 
changed.”46.  
The election manifest of 2002 and 2007 underlines the significance of gender 
equity for a democratic society and state that “Equality of women and men is an 
undisputable human right and an indispensible pre-condition of democracy.”47. There 
is clear continuity about the social and political equality of men and women. The 
                                                 
44 Kadın-erkek eşitliği sağlanmadan demokratik, kalkınmış, sağlıklı ve modern bir ülke olunamaz. 
(CHP Party program, 2009: 55) 
45 Kadının, yönetimde, siyasette, çalışma yaşamında, eğitimde, hukukta, evrensel hak ve 
özgürlüklerde ve diğer tüm alanlarda erkeklerle eşit haklara ve olanaklara, sahip olduğu, her türlü 
toplumsal ve ﬁziki baskıdan uzak, özgürce yaşadığı toplumdur. Bunu sağlamak için gerektiğinde 
kadının lehine  pozitif  ayrımcılık  yapan yapısal düzenlemelerdir. (CHP Party program, 2009: 23) 
46 Çeşitli  kanunlarda  yer  alan  ve  kadınlara  karşı  ayrımcılık anlayışı  içeren  veya  aileyi  korumada  
yetersiz  kalan  yasa hükümleri değiştirilecektir. (CHP Party program, 2009: 56) 
47 Kadın-erkek eşitliği tartışılmaz  bir insan hakkı ve demokrasinin vazgeçilmez önkoşuludur. (CHP 
Election manifest, 2002: 53) 
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election manifest of 2007 states that “The women will have their rights: Turkish 
women will obtain their rights in economy, education, politics and they will find 
their identity.”48. On the other hand, despite the official party program’s democratic 
stance towards women’s issues and gender equity, the election manifests differ on 
their approach to division of labor within family.  
The election manifest of 2002 states that “We will eliminate the young 
people’s economic dependency to their mother’s and father’s purses for their 
education”49. On the other hand, the election manifest of 2007 ignores women’s 
economic independence or her economic role within the family and puts that “We 
will save the university student from depending on his father’s purse”50. While, 
election manifest of 2002 and 2007 do not differ in terms of their whole discourse, 
such a break about the women’s empowerment is critical. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the CHP recognizes an egalitarian system by emphasizing democratic rules but 
the party does not internalize women’s empowerment especially her presence in 
working life.  
 
5.3.3 The Program and Election Manifest of the MHP: A Traditional 
Approach? 
The MHP is the party that represents the Turkish nationalist ideology in 
Turkey. Although the party started to move towards the center with the leadership of 
                                                 
48 Kadınlar haklarını alacak: Türk kadını, ekonomide, eğitimde, siyasette haklarına kavuşacak, 
kimliğini bulacak. (CHP Election Manifest, 2007: 63) 
 
49 Gençlerin eğitimlerini anne ve babalarının cüzdanına bağlı olmaktan kurtaracağız. (CHP Election 
Manifest, 2002: 47) 
 
50 Üniversite öğrencisini babasının cüzdanına bağlı olmaktan kurtaracağız. (CHP Election Manifest, 
2007: 55) 
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Devlet Bahçeli in 1997, after the death of their founding leader Alparslan Türkeş, the 
party still represents nationalist or far right outlook. According to Çınar and Arıkan, 
“(…) the MHP’s version of nationalism is predicated on an ambiguous definition 
oscillating between a cultural and an ethnic definition of the nation.” (2002: 25). 
However, compared to other political parties in centre, the MHP advocates a 
particularistic version of nationalism that is hostile to diverse ethnic groups.  
The first far right party of Turkish political history was Millet Partisi (Nation 
Party- MP) that was founded in 1948. After its closure, Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet 
Partisi (Republican Peasant Farmer’s Nation Party- CKMP) was founded in 1948. 
With the belief of state corporatism and an organic, homogenized nation under strong 
state control, the CKMP incorporated Turkish nationalism with specific reference to 
religion (Çınar and Arıkan 2002; İnce and Heper 2006). In 1965, Türkeş elected as 
party leader and in 1967 he was declared as great leader- başbuğ. The name of the 
party was changed into the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party-
MHP) in 1969. Although the party remained its marginal stance in Turkish politics, it 
had always received a certain degree of votes. After the military intervention of 
1980, the party was closed until 1993. In 1997, Türkeş died and Bahçeli as an 
“uncertain figure” of the politics came to the scene (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 30). 
Bahçeli and the leading elites of the party rebuild the support and trust both in the 
party and country. Voters’ support for the party doubled in the end of 1990’s and this 
led to Turkish people to consider the party as an alternative to other political parties 
not as a marginal option. Unlike Türkeş’s partisan leadership, his moderate stance 
and positive image affected the party’s policies. He could abandon several party 
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gestures and symbols (moustaches51, special Ülkücü greeting52) despite the powerful 
principles and doctrines of Ülkü Ocakları. Hence, it can be argued that the MHP has 
experienced a considerable evolution.  
In terms of the gender discourse of the party, it is valuable to mention that 
programs of the far right nationalist parties subscribe to traditional gender roles. In 
the framework of this dissertation, the party represents nationalist masculinities. It is 
hypothesized that the MHP is a virile party that gives emphasis to male wolfs who 
should protect the country and perform masculine duties such as protecting honor of 
asena53 and showing bravery. All these virile conceptualizations are historically 
embedded within party. It glorifies men as the protector and emphasizes women’s 
role within the family and the need to take a protective approach to women (Arat, 
2010: 27).  
The MHP is a nationalist right-wing party and it is not surprising that the 
party has a traditional discourse on gender. The party with its deep rooted tradition 
has developed an approach that enshrines the nostalgia on “Turkist nationalism” 
idolizing Turkish nation (Özkırımlı, 2011: 97).  
The official documents of the party subscribe to traditional gender roles and 
emphasize women’s role within the family. In the party program, it is stated that 
“Educational levels of the women will be increased and their social statuses will be 
strengthened by ensuring their participation more in development process, 
                                                 
51 The MHP mustache has a particular style and it is characterized by two ends extending downwards. 
It is different than conservative style of mustache that is called badem.  This mustache is small and 
neatly trimmed.  
 
52 Ülkücü greeting is particular by its style. It is simply touching the sides of the head instead of 
cheeks. 
 
53 Asena is the female wolf in Turkic mythology that is commonly used in the MHP’s political 
rhetoric. 
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professional life and decision making mechanisms.”54. This statement exemplifies a 
developmental approach on women’s issues but both in the programme and election 
manifests it is motherhood and family that are dignified. “Family institution is of 
great importance in protecting and maintaining national and moral values and 
passing them on to the next generations and also solidifying solidarity.”55 
The party programme reifies nationalistic and traditional approach on gender. 
The role of the family especially in raising children is taken as the foundation of 
society, and, in this line, the boundaries of women’s traditional sphere are not open 
to be challenged. The place of women is bounded with family. The election manifest 
of 2002 states that “We believe in the necessity of preventing the elements that 
weaken the family and its social functions by protecting the women and their rights 
and in the necessity of gaining women’s respectable status in society.” 56 The 
election manifest of 2007 replicates this approach. “An infrastructure will be built 
regarding preventing the elements that weaken the family and its social functions, the 
women taking a place in society by protecting the women and their rights.”57 
 
5.4. Re-situating Typologies of Masculinities in Turkey: Glorification of 
the Family and Traditional Gender Order 
                                                 
54 Kadınların   eğitim   düzeyleri   yükseltilecek,   kalkınma sürecinde,  iş  hayatında  ve  karar  alma  
mekanizmalarında daha fazla rol almaları sağlanarak toplumsal konumları güçlendirilecektir. (MHP 
Party Program, 2009: 61) 
 
55 Millî  ve  manevî  değerlerin  korunması,  yaşatılması  ve gelecek   kuşaklara   aktarılmasında   millî   
bütünlüğün   ve dayanışmanın pekiştirilmesinde aile kurumu büyük önem arz etmektedir. (MHP Party 
Program, 2009: 61) 
 
56 Aileyi ve sosyal fonksiyonlarını zayıflatıcı unsurların önlenmesi, kadının ve haklarının korunarak 
toplumda saygın bir yer edinmesi gerektiğine inanıyoruz. (MHP Election manifest, 2002: 61) 
 
57 Aileyi ve sosyal fonksiyonlarını zayıflatıcı unsurların önlenmesi, kadının ve haklarının korunarak 
toplumda toplumda saygın bir yer edinmesine ilişkin altyapı oluşturulacaktır. (MHP Election 
manifest, 2007: 103) 
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The general argument about the state is that it is the regulator of gendered 
hierarchy. Turkey, as a case manifests the predomination of men within state 
directorate, coercive apparatus with high percentage of men in offices. In addition, as 
it is discussed in the literature that, the system or the division of labor within the state 
has organized on gendered lines. Men dominate in infrastructural and coercive 
apparatuses of the state. Especially, in political parties, it is men’s politics and such 
domination is reified in official documents of the political parties as the main agent 
in politics as a field in Turkey. Men are expected to be the patriarch and women are 
expected to be housewife/mother. The traditional gender order has manifested itself 
within the borders of traditional family and its values. Especially, an analysis of 
political parties’ official documents and election manifests offered clues for 
revealing the different pathways of masculinities. However, although three political 
parties represent different political ideologies and approaches, they all do emphasize 
family and traditional gender roles, namely, breadwinner male and 
housewives/mothers female. As the typology of the masculinities in Turkey 
hypothesized the AKP represent a new approach in the gendered conduct and 
discourse of the politics. Despite its deep rooted Islamist background, the AKP splits 
apart from its old brothers and characterizes a new approach. This new approach or 
Coşar and Yeğenoğlu’s definition of “neoliberal conservative patriarchy” tunes itself 
with neo-Muslim masculinities. While they engaged in a dialogue with women’s 
movement, which opened ways for women to voice and also encouraged women’s 
representation in politics, they have also been persistent with the perception of 
women within the family as mother/housewife. On the other hand, the CHP 
representing a left wing party does not consistently advocate a liberal approach 
towards gender. They constitute Kemalist/secular mode of masculinities as 
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iconographic founding fathers who do know the best for the society. Finally, the 
MHP represent the deep rooted tradition of male gray wolfs who should protect 
society and women. They have idealized women as mothers as well. Therefore, as it 
is clear from their official documents, all three political parties glorify family and 
also women within the family.  
The family has a traditional and historical role in Turkey. Since Ottoman 
times, family has had a significant role in terms of the solidarity of the community 
and “(…) joint family cultural system prevailed” (Duben and Behar, 1991: 10). As a 
Muslim society, Islam ruled the family and formed a background to the regulation of 
the Ottoman Muslims’ domestic life (Vergin, 1985: 572). Conformity with the 
Islamic provisions, Ottoman family structure, namely extended family, positioned 
men as the head of the family. The system derived from Islamic law and its practices 
such as gender segregation, polygamy positioned women in a subordinate and men in 
a dominant situation. Hence, for the aim of creating new nation, a modern Turkey, 
Republican reforms aimed to break Islamic heritage especially those in daily life and 
private domain. For Zürcher, so as to achieve complete modernity, Kemalists aimed 
complete secularization of the family (2001: 181, italics mine).  
As family and traditional and/or old gendered division of labor are considered 
critical not because of reflecting Islamic way of life but also being the micro unit of 
the society, has been the main target of the Kemalist reforms. “The Ottoman family 
was seen as the microcosm of the society at large” and has been taken as the mirror 
that reflected the flaws in social and cultural life (Bilgin, 2003: 94). It can be argued 
that reforms were encapsulated in reformation of family life. Through abolition of 
religious marriage and polygamy in 1926 by the new code of Turkish civil law, the 
first step was taken. In addition, for the empowerment of women’s status, the young 
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Republic constituted “(…) a critical juncture for gender roles, which were mainly 
assigned as part of the nation building process.” (Çavdar, 2010: 349). Although there 
was no law or regulation banning women’s traditional clothing, Kemalist elites 
indirectly challenged old norms within the family, in particular and the society in 
general and they promoted education and labor market participation.58 As it is has 
discussed in previous parts, women were the carriers of the modernization project 
and  “[w]omen as homemakers and as mothers, who would raise the future 
generations of citizens according to the ideals of the state, were to disseminate the 
values of the Republic and construct the modern family” (Toktaş and Cindoğlu, 
2006: 738). Therefore, it can be argued that while such provisions empowered her 
role in society, it also reproduced her traditional gender roles and confined her in 
private sphere. Although visibility of women in public sphere was significant for 
Kemalist elites, “(…) there were cultural values that associated women’s roles 
primarily with the domestic sphere and which did not tolerate women’s participation 
in the public sphere” (Toktaş and Cindoğlu, 2006: 738). Hence, patriarchal structure 
within family “(…) has been buffeted by the successive transformations undergone 
by Turkish society” but it did not really turned “(…) the relationships between 
spouses upside down” (Vergin, 1985: 573). The deep family culture or a culture that 
glorifies family and its maintenance has prevailed. Despite the increase in economic 
dependence and socio-cultural reforms, there has been no reduction in the 
interpersonal relations between relatives, in other words, contrary to the Western 
model, in Turkey, a loosening of ties as a result of change has not been witnessed 
(Vergin, 1985). As family and its significance within the socio-cultural and economic 
                                                 
 
58 For discussions on absence of ban on women’s clothing see Y. Arat, 2005; Z. Arat, 1994 
149 
 
codes of Turkey is beyond the topic of this dissertation, it was critical to mention it 
here.  
To sum up, when leading Turkish political parties’ official documents were 
analyzed, it has been found that their discourses manifest the deep rooted traditional 
gender order. For Bourdieu, masculine domination is the eternalization of gender 
order and it is also naturalized and embedded into processes and networks (Bourdieu, 
2001: 23). Within the field of politics the agents unwittingly accept the limits of their 
realm and such official documents reflect the reification of self evident networks. 
Although, all parties have relatively egalitarian approaches, they all define women 
predominantly in the private realm and within family. Women’s societal roles and 
idealization of family continue to be major themes. Every political party glorifies 
family and the traditional division of labor. Both the AKP and the MHP stress the 
issue of woman under the heading of woman and family. The CHP, as a centre left 
party, does not classify women and emancipation of women under the heading of 
family. Although both the AKP and the MHP are historically more conservative 
parties, especially the AKP’s traditional stance is critical when compared to its 
commitment to democratization. Çavdar, in her study that examines Islamist 
moderation and the resilience of gender, discusses the case of the AKP and mentions 
that  
While women seem to be encouraged to participate in public life, 
their traditional roles within the family are contradictorily 
prioritized and even encouraged. Therefore the JDP’s (Justice and 
Development Party) own policies constantly undermine the 
discourse that more women should participate in public life (2010: 
350) 
   
Çavdar links such a paradox to the historic legacy inherited from the Islamist 
movement. Hence, in this framework, Norris and Inglehart aptly argue that the real 
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gulf separating Muslim societies from their Western counterparts is the values 
concerning gender equity (2003). For the writers, “(…) the values separating these 
[Western and Islamic] cultures have much more to do with eros than demos” (Norris 
and Inglehart, 2003: 65). Hence, the core clash between the West and Islam is not 
over political values but it concerns gender equity and sexual liberalization. In line 
with this argument, not only the AKP but also the CHP has paradoxical stance 
towards gender equity. Despite its centre left positioning that endorses an egalitarian 
approach on gender, the party has not internalized gender equity and women’s 
empowerment as the statement of “We will save the university student from 
depending on his father’s purse” approves. It can be argued that only the MHP meets 
the expectations as a nationalist party subscribe to traditional gender roles under a 
protective approach. Women’s roles in the making and also maintenance of nations 
as mothers have enshrined in the official party documents of the MHP, and hence, it 
indirectly positions men as the head of the family to protect women and promotes 
patriarchal family forms. As nationalism and masculinity is embedded, as it has been 
discussed in previous chapters, “[i]t is therefore no surprise that the culture and 
ideology of hegemonic masculinity go hand in hand with the culture and ideology of 
hegemonic nationalism” (Nagel, 1998: 249).  
To conclude, despite the different ideological stances of the AKP, the CHP 
and the MHP, the boundaries drawn for women and, relationally men, mark the 
traditional discourse that preserves its deep-rooted place in Turkish political culture.  
With Bourdieuan lens, it can be argued that historical mechanisms’ structuring of 
political subjects’ repertoire manifest itself in the reification of the traditional gender 
roles. As official documents of the political parties substantiate such a reification of 
traditional gender roles and its continuity despite the breaks and shifts in discourses, 
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it also has standardized gendered hierarchies and also gives rise to what Bourdieu 
(2001) calls legitimation and authorization. Accordingly, the next chapter will 
analyze three leaders’ accumulation of capitals or habitus with reference to their 
positioning in the field. Bourdieuan perspective will enable to comprehend 
multifaceted networks within the parameters of the encounter between habitus and 
politics as field in Turkey.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
TURKISH POLITICAL MANHOOD: DIFFERENT HABITUS IN 
THE SAME FIELD 
 
 
 
After the analysis of the macro perspectives, namely the state and political 
culture, in this part I will elaborate on the leaders, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli.  
This chapter will employ Pierre Bourdieu’s theory and conceptualizations in 
two ways: (1) as an analytical tool to scrutinize the construction of masculinities, 
specifically political manhood in Turkish political parties; and (2) as a guide to 
discuss masculinities while examining whether or not different ideologies refer to 
different masculine performances in Turkish politics, in which masculine domination 
has been associated with the public, political and militaristic domain.  
Before engaging into a discussion that uses Bourdieu’s theory on gendered 
identity construction to analyze the gendered nature of Turkish politics, it is 
worthwhile starting with a preliminary question: How does gender operate as a 
system of oppression? As masculinity is not there, but rather is in-between, above or 
behind structures, and as politics can be considered as a naturally virile area, the 
construction of masculinities in politics is a very significant and controversial issue. 
153 
 
It can be argued that the act of politics has always been masculinized as it has been 
dominated by the masculine. In other words, by being associated with a range of 
masculine values loaded with strong emotions, such as bravery, honour, pride and 
strength, the nature of politics is gendered in the masculine. While politics has been 
systematically equated with men and masculinities, the private sphere has been 
coupled with women and their duties in the private sphere, such as caring and 
sensitiveness. Within the field of politics, that is, the dominance of men has been 
taken as given. In examining this unambiguous and unexplored area of study, this 
dissertation argues that Bourdieu’s questioning of masculinity offers a valid 
analytical framework that includes the original use of conceptualizations such as 
field, habitus, and embeddedness of historical roots.     
 
 
6.1. Adapting Bourdieuan Perspective 
Before moving onto the discussion itself, it is helpful to give some 
introductory analysis about the party leaders introduced in the previous chapter, and 
a justification for why this dissertation attempts to introduce Bourdieu’s 
conceptualizations as an analytical tool.  
Turning first to Bourdieu, his concept of habitus expresses both the way in 
which individuals become themselves and also the ways in which those individuals 
engage in various practices. Habitus is thus a “durable” yet also “transposable” value 
that remains with individuals across contexts (Bourdieu: 1991). When an individual 
confronts a situation and he/she generates an idea with reference to his/her 
perception, this results into an action. Hence, the social world, as a field of struggles, 
is a mobile one in which one can occupy any position. An individual’s social position 
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is therefore multidimensional, and his/her preferences distance himself/herself from 
other groups of people. For Bourdieu, class fractions reveal themselves only at the 
economic level, so they are static (1991, 2001). However, for him, while divisions 
are definite, positioning and capital are something active. He therefore extends his 
original notion by defining four sub-groups of capital: economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic. Economic capital, basically income and wealth, is strongly related to one’s 
positioning. Inherited family wealth, property and savings are obvious examples of 
individual economic capital. Economic capital, though, cannot be separated from 
other forms of capital. Social capital, for instance, is essentially the aggregation of 
acquaintances and social networks. For Bourdieu, in addition to relations and 
recognition, all social ties may produce a network that allows a dynamic 
accumulation of one’s self to develop other opportunities. Symbolic capital depends 
on the negotiable prestige and honour of an individual, so its value may vary and 
change according to the symbolic value assigned by others to the object. It exists in 
collaboration with other forms of capitals. Finally, cultural capital refers to an 
individual’s socially valued experiences, accumulated knowledge, and aesthetic 
preferences. This is also closely linked to the notion of habitus. As one’s habitus can 
be revealed through one’s reactions, posture and language, one can transform or 
preserve it according to one’s social position. It is the capacity to differentiate and 
appreciate, hence ended in individual’s preferences. According to Bourdieu, “life 
styles are systematic products of habitus” (Bourdieu, 1984:170), meaning that 
habitus is the reflection of cultural capital on choices and tastes. The institutionalized 
form of cultural capital is the formal certificate, such as the degree or diploma. 
Therefore, all embodied perceptions, ideas and actions can be transformed into a 
certificate which then defines an individual’s social positioning.  
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In short, according to Bourdieu’s theory, an individual’s positioning is related 
to their possession of various combinations of capital. Bourdieu especially highlights 
the significance of social origin and education for the investment in one’s self. 
Therefore, the personal histories of political party leaders are very significant as they 
contain important factors in the analysis of how the habitus of each leader determines 
his construction of political manhood. Accordingly, a brief analysis of the three 
political party leaders – Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli, 
specifically in terms of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital – is valuable 
at this part. 
 
 
6.2. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: Kabadayı (Tough Uncle) of/for Everyone 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, born in 1954, grew up in a conservative family. His 
father was a captain in the state maritime agency and his mother was a housewife 
(Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 160). His primary school religion teacher had a strong 
influence on his future education. As Recep Tayyip was very successful in his 
lessons, he advised him to continue his education in a İmam Hatip School – a 
vocational school to train government employed imams - that was located on the 
opposite side of the Golden Horn from Erdoğan’s home suburb of Kasımpaşa 
(Dündar, 2007).59 The Imam Hatip made a very strong impression on Erdoğan’s life. 
About those years he once mentioned that 
I owe everything to the Imam Hatip School I attended. My life was 
predestined in that school. I learned there patriotism, love for 
                                                 
 
59 Can Dündar’s documentary on political party leaders constituted a very useful source for the 
dissertation. Dündar prepared this documentary series for NTV before the 2007 national election. The 
whole series is available at www.candundar.com.tr.  
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fellow human beings, service for the country, worship of God, 
environmental sciences, a spirit of solidarity, and wishing for 
others what I want for me. (cited in Heper & Toktaş, 2003: 163) 
 
After graduating from high school, he obtained his BA degree from Marmara 
University Faculty of Economics and Commercial Sciences in 1981. During his 
undergraduate education, he was a football player. In addition, he became actively 
involved in politics, too. He was a member of National Turkish Student’s Union 
(Milli Türk Talebe Birliği), and also attended the seminars held by the National View 
Association (Milli Görüş Teşkilatı). This association was a branch of the National 
Order Party (MNP-Milli Nizam Partisi) and the National Salvation Party (MSP- Milli 
Selamet Partisi). In 1976, he became head of the MSP Beyoğlu Youth Branch, and 
later head of the Istanbul Youth Branch of the same party. While his active 
engagement with politics continued, he married Emine Gülbaran, who met him 
through her membership of the Idealist Women’s Association – an Islamist 
organization founded by Şule Yüksel Şenler, an important journalist in the Islamist 
milieu. Although Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once mentioned that “I have never fallen in 
love”, Emine Erdoğan claimed that “I felt something that I had not felt until that 
moment” (Dündar, 2007).  In 1984, he became the head of Welfare Party (RP - Refah 
Partisi) Beyoğlu District Branch. As a very active figure of the party in 1986, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan was chosen as the RP’s candidate for Beyoğlu mayoralty. After 
losing that election, in 1994, the RP nominated him as the candidate for Istanbul 
Metropolitan Mayor. His success in that election represents a milestone in his 
political career. He served as mayor for four years before his famous speech in Siirt 
(1997) ended his mayoralty. In that public speech that denounced the closure of his 
party, reciting some lines of Ziya Gökalp’s poem: “The mosques are our barracks, 
the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers”. 
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These lines were considered as an attack to Kemalist regime by the courts and he was 
sentenced to a ten-month prison term, of which he served 4 months. After that 
speculative interlude, Erdoğan returned to play a significant role in the Innovators 
(Yenilikçiler) movement in the Virtue Party (FP - Fazilet Partisi), and this process 
ended in the opening of the Justice and Development Party (AKP - Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi). The national elections that were held in 2002 resulted in a victory 
for this party and Erdoğan became Prime Minister. Since 2002, he has continued to 
act as Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic following two further general elections 
victories. 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a very influential political figure in contemporary 
Turkey. His manner of acting and talking differ him from his counterparts. His 
aggressiveness in the conduct of politics has been legitimized by public due to his 
Kasımpaşalılık (Kasımpaşa origin) and kabadaıyılık (toughness). Erdoğan has 
utilized this in two perspectives. First, he is tough uncle, protector and guardian of 
everyone as he is representative of a powerful, brave man that embraces everyone. 
Second, he is there for everyone as the Prime Minister and he aims to respond every 
single need from every segments of the society.     
 
 
6.3. Deniz Baykal: The Guardian of Kemalism 
Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP until May 2010, was born in 1938. His 
father was an administrative officer in the Turkish State Liquor and Tobacco 
Monopoly (TEKEL) and his mother was a housewife. His father especially was a 
strong Kemalist. Baykal went to primary, secondary and high school in Antalya after 
his family moved there in 1944. He was a successful student, especially in English 
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and literature. With the motivation of his father, he spent each summer in a different 
city performing different jobs, before continuing his education in Ankara University 
Faculty of Law. After graduating, he went to the University of Columbia as a 
research fellow and finished his PhD in Ankara in 1963. After the military 
intervention in 1960, he became research assistant in the Law Faculty. Both during 
his undergraduate and graduate years, he was active in politics, participating in 
protest marches against the ruling the Justice Party’s (AP - Adalet Partisi) populist 
policies, and being the one who wrote the protestors’ public declarations. After 
returning from his research fellowship, he also completed his solicitor’s practice 
under the supervision of a politician, Turan Güneş, one of the leading figures of the 
new centre-left movement within the CHP during post-1965 period. During this 
intensive period, he married his girlfriend, Olcay Vural. Although the parents of 
Olcay had some reservations about their relationship, they married in a seaside town. 
Baykal once said about their marriage: “We went to Akçakoca together and decided 
to get married there. Then, we arranged every document in the quickest way. Our 
witnesses were officers from the municipality. We were wearing very casual clothes” 
(Dündar, 2007). After the CHP’s electoral defeat o in 1965 by the AP, the party 
reached a turning point. Baykal prepared a report on the elections that proposed some 
ways forward for the party. This report gained him distinction, especially among the 
leading cadres, and in 1973 Bülent Ecevit nominated him as a parliamentary 
candidate to represent Antalya. Therefore, he resigned from the university to become 
an official member of the party. He acted as Minister of the Finance until the 1977 
elections, and as Minister of Energy until the 1980 military coup. He was arrested in 
the post-1980 period and he was among a number of leading politicians sent to 
internal exile in Zincirbozan by the National Security Council (MGK - Milli 
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Güvenlik Kurulu). After the Zincirbozan period, he became a member of another 
leftist party, the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP - Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı 
Parti), acting, until 1992, as the SHP’s Secretary General. In 1992, the CHP was 
reformed and Baykal was elected as leader of the party. Following various intra-party 
crises and an election defeat, he resigned from his post in 1999. In 2001, he was re-
elected as the party’s leader, and served until 2010. On this occasion criticism of his 
private life after an alleged sex tape scandal involving a female party member – 
Nesrin Baytok – was leaked to the media played a major role in his resignation.  
Deniz Baykal is a very significant leader in his deep rooted political career. 
He has always devoted to Atatürkian principles as he has often positioned himself as 
the guardian of Kemalist state by being the leader of the CHP. As an academician, 
lawyer and especially, son of an administrative officer, he has devoted to Kemalist 
road and he has positioned as the leader of the Kemalist reactions towards the rise of 
Islam or namely the AKP. He has always idealized the role of responsible, well-
equipped administrative officer of the Kemalist/statist regime. 
 
 
6.4 Devlet Bahçeli: Devlet Baba (Father) of the Father State 
Devlet Bahçeli, born in 1948, is the leader of the Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi). Bahçeli comes from a large and well-respected 
Fettahlıoğlu family (Heper & İnce, 2006; Dündar, 2007), which is a Turcoman 
family having strong ties among its members. This close-knit family has had a 
significant impact on the course of his life. He went to primary school in Osmaniye, 
before attending the Private Çukurova Secondary School as a boarding student with 
his older brother, who has had a great importance in Bahçeli’s life. His father was 
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wealthy enough to give him the opportunity to continue his education in Istanbul, 
and he graduated from the Private Ata High School under the supervision of his 
relatives who lived in the city. During his studentship, his literature teacher became a 
particularly influential figure. This was Suna Toral, who first introduced Ülkücülük – 
the tone of the MHP’s ideological basis understood as the ideal of serving one’s state 
– to Bahçeli’s newly shaping intellectual worldview (Dündar, 2007). After 
graduating from high school, he went to Ankara Academy of Economics and 
Commercial Sciences – known today as Gazi University Faculty of Economics and 
Administrative Sciences. His first active political involvement, with the Republican 
Peasants’ Party (CKMP- Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi), coincided with his 
junior years in the university. He attended a seminar series held by Alparslan Türkeş, 
the heroic leader of the nationalists, and also met with a politically active youth 
group, the Ülkücüler, who founded the Ülkü Ocakları – the union of idealist militant 
groups. After his graduation in 1971, he started his academic career as a research 
assistant in the same faculty of the university, from which he gained his PhD. 
Although he has always been an introverted person, he formed very close relations 
with his students, and also with the young political activists of the Ülkü Ocakları. 
For example, he distributed his fellowship salary among needy students at the 
university (Heper & İnce, 2006: 875). He became known as Devlet Ağabey (older 
brother Devlet) or Devlet Baba (father Devlet) to everyone in his circle. As both 
brother and father are terms used to express high reputation, it implies that he was a 
very respected person and academician. During his academic career, he also acted as 
the president of the Association of Assistants of Academia and Applied Schools 
(ÜNAY), and also the Association of Idealist (Ülkücü) Financiers and Economists 
(ÜMİD-BİR). The 1980 military coup seriously affected the MHP, with many 
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members being given prison sentences. In 1987, just after the end of the political ban 
on pre-coup parties, Bahçeli resigned from his post in Gazi University upon an 
invitation from Türkeş to serve as Secretary General of the Nationalist Labor Party 
(MÇP - Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi). Bahçeli became the man behind the scenes, a 
very influential but less known face of the Party. In 1993, when the name of the 
MÇP changed back to the MHP, Bahçeli was actively involved in the process. While 
acting as an advisor of Türkeş, he also, however, became one of those pursuing a 
new political orientation against the party’s leader. After the death of Türkeş, the 
Başbuğ or Great Leader of the MHP, in 1997, Bahçeli was chosen to replace him. It 
is argued that his leadership has made a difference to the MHP’s electoral 
performance (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002; Heper and İnce, 2006). “Devlet Bahçeli’s 
credibility and the new positive image he brought to the MHP’s leadership was not 
only a result of his academic background or his personal image. Since he replaced 
Türkeş in 1997, he has shown a consistent devotion to the renewal of the party” 
(Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 32). He has devoted himself to the nationalist movement, in 
general, the success of the party, in particular. According to the list of Bahçeli’s 
priorities, “(…) the country comes first, the Party second and his personal political 
fortune third” (Dündar, 2007). It can be argued that’s why he has never married, 
instead living an isolated private life with his sister as a protective brother.  
 
 
6.5 Different Habitus in the Same Field 
Having provided some important details of the three leaders’ personal 
backgrounds, the next section aims to position them in Bourdieuan terms, by 
considering their accumulation of various forms of capital, their habitus. 
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As outlined in the earlier section, economic capital, a kind that is directly 
convertible into money, is the first important factor that shapes one’s positioning in 
life. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Deniz Baykal both originate from middle class 
families, while Devlet Bahçeli came from a higher social status, as his father was a 
rich merchant. While Baykal’s father was a strong Kemalist administrative officer 
who had fought in World War I, Erdoğan’s father was a conservative and religious 
figure who was working as a civil servant  (captain) , suggesting that these two 
leaders followed their respective father’s ideological orientation. On the other hand, 
although Bahçeli grew up in a family that supported the CHP, he became influenced 
by strong nationalist thought of his teachers in high school and university. Thus, it 
can be argued that the three leaders’ ideological differences have been shaped during 
their early socialization, though from differing influences.  
Turning to cultural capital, i.e. education, cultural credentials and aesthetic 
preferences, three leaders show significant differences. From analysis of their 
different family backgrounds, education and overall socialization, it is possible to 
derive some hints about the determinants of their cultural capital. As Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan grew up in a small, lower middle class district, Kasımpaşa, his manner of 
talking and behaving appears to have been influenced by that environment, well 
known for its particular form of masculinity – the tough man, kabadayı. In terms of 
his private life, he made an arranged marriage, an old but still living custom in 
conservative circles. However, what is critical about his marriage is also about the 
way that they have met in a political meeting of the party. Both were there with 
political motivations and this political ground has opened the way for their marriage. 
Despite their socialization in a close circle, during Erdoğan’s political career, his 
family has been publicly visible. Although this life style especially expensive and 
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huge wedding ceremonies, private education of his children in overseas and property 
holdings has been criticized by Kemalist and also Islamist circles, he and the his 
whole family are still conducting their family life publicly.  
In terms of his preferences in his daily life, his mode of dress has changed 
since the AKP became the ruling political party. Specifically, he looks much more 
modern than he did during the 1990’s when he was Mayor of Istanbul with his 
modern colorful ties and brand name sunglasses etc. In addition, unlike old customed 
Islamists who were labelled as takunyalı60 (those who wear bath clog) referring to 
their practices of Islam openly and publicly, Erdoğan has never been associated with 
takunya (bath clog) in the media. In spite of his background as a semi-professional 
football player, as a very masculine and competitive sport, today, he does not stand 
out as demonstrating any sportsmanlike characteristics except the games that he 
hosts.  
Regarding Erdoğan’s social capital, the Nakhsibandi religious order is 
important. As the initiative for the establishment of the National Order Party (MNP – 
Milli Nizam Partisi), the Nakshibandi order has been very influential in Erdoğan’s 
personal history. For example, when he started his political career, he regularly 
attended the Iskenderpasha seminary of Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku (Heper and 
Toktaş, 2003). Wealthy Islamic businessmen are also well-known aspects of the 
inner circle of Erdoğan.  
There are several recent incidents that can be given as the examples to 
indicate the nature of accumulation of the capital to Erdoğan’s political actions. The 
first concerns his reprimand, applauded in some circles, of Israeli President Shimon 
                                                 
60Takunya is a bath clog for ablution. Men are wearing these before the act of washing parts of their 
body using water for ritual prayers. Therefore, it has an Islamic connotation.  
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Peres during the 2009 World Economic Forum Summit in Davos. It has been 
considered that this angry exchange is in line with the image of his temperament as 
the Kasımpaşalı delikanlı – the tough man from Kasımpaşa. Moreover, after this rift 
between Erdoğan and Israeli President, he has been criticized by not conducting 
foreign policy in a proper way, namely mon cher style. He refused and mentioned 
that he is not like them. He has flirted with Kasımpaşalılık in a pragmatic way.  
In a similar way, while Erdoğan’s harsh reprimands of other politicians, and 
from time to time his use of slang language, are not generally regarded as strange or 
odd, however, Deniz Baykal’s attempts to use similar language are regarded as 
inappropriate to his secular/Kemalist image. At one point, Baykal himself reacted to 
this, saying “If kahvehane [low class coffee house] culture is positively regarded, I 
would not let him take over the kahvehane. If it is a talent then I can do it as well”61. 
This outburst and the critical reactions to it, raise an additional question of why such 
manifestation of anger is not regarded as appropriate for Baykal, but is for Erdoğan. 
The answer can perhaps be found in consideration of the sources of Baykal’s capital. 
Growing up in a strongly Kemalist family, Deniz Baykal was nurtured in a 
secular/modernist environment. Then, as a young college student, he attended the 
seminar series organized by two leftist political magazines, Varlık and Ulus, and, as 
already mentioned, he was one of the students who marched against the Democrat 
Party’s populist regime in 1960. After finishing his PhD at the University of Ankara 
Faculty of Political Sciences Mülkiye - a very deep-rooted politically leftist faculty - 
he started his political life as a deputy of the CHP in 1973. Until the recent sex tape 
scandal, he was CHP party leader since 1996. In terms of cultural capital, Baykal can 
                                                 
 
61 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=3722562 
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be categorized as having a less popular image than Erdoğan. For example, his wife, 
Olcay Baykal, is not a publicly visible woman, just like his other family members. 
Neither are the Baykal’s children publicly visible faces. Only during national 
holidays and national election days they appear in the media. Although Baykal did 
not follow any sports career in the past, he does generally run and swim but not 
playing a virile game that includes struggle and completion as Erdoğan did. In terms 
of social capital, his close friends are unknown, although he generally appears to be 
with his colleagues from the CHP. During his career, he has always paid attention to 
behave accordingly to his image with the responsibility of being the leader of 
Atatürk’s party or the guardian of the Kemalist regime.  
Devlet Bahçeli is the least known of the three leaders. In particular, there is 
very little information about his private life. He grew up in a crowded family before, 
like Baykal, experiencing university years that coincided with his active participation 
in political circles, strong nationalist ones in the case of Bahçeli. After gaining his 
PhD in Economics and working as a scholar until 1982, he started to involve himself 
more actively in politics as a member of the Nationalist Labor Party. He then 
abandoned his academic career and became involved in the nationalist Ülkü Ocakları 
very actively. In 1997, he became the leader of the MHP after the death of the party’s 
previous leader Alparslan Türkeş. As already mentioned, his private life is a puzzle. 
It is only known that he is single and lives with his elder sister. He has never been 
media-oriented. About the mystery of his private life, he said that “Just like the 
nationalist line, I am also very straight. There is no color” (Dündar, 2007).          
Hence, analyzing personal histories of political party leaders is in line with 
questioning how have the practices of being men been affected by their different 
habitus. As the three leaders have been socialized in diverse environments and have 
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developed different ideological stances, and in parallel, they have different 
positioning; they have experienced the practices of being men in a multilayered 
manner. In a Bourdieuan framework, what is practiced is the accumulation of habitus 
and different kinds of capitals within the field. Therefore, the mutual relation 
between habitus as a whole and the field shapes individuals’ practices. In this 
perspective, it is hypothesized that despite their different habitus in the same field, all 
leaders have reproduced masculine hierarchy. The struggle for power, or in other 
words male rivalry, is the main motive behind the construction of masculine 
identities and “[u]nlike ideologies that appeal to men’s minds, hegemonic 
masculinity taps into the deepest recesses of men’s psychosexual, social, and 
political identities.” (Kann, 1998: 28).  
As it is discussed in the previous chapters, in a political environment that is 
based on traditional gendered hierarchy enshrined by a glorified masculine imagery, 
masculinities are shaped and shaping. In parallel, habitus are structured and 
structuring. Hence, the tappings of hegemonic masculinity are embedded into the 
dynamic structuring of habitus including political identities. Although, Erdoğan, 
Baykal and Bahçeli have experienced different paths of masculinities with different 
accumulation of capitals, they all “(...) identify, stigmatize, punish ‘subordinated’ or 
‘marginal’ masculinities.” (Kann, 1998: 28). All these different positioning or 
habitus can be read as different paths that were followed. However, the conditions of 
the field, namely politics, structure their habitus. In other words, they all play with 
masculinities, and in the end, they reproduce masculinist strategies in politics. 
For instance, all leaders have grown up in different social settings. They do 
differ a lot in terms of their social circles as well. Their different socialization 
experiences have ended in different accumulation of capitals. In other words, they 
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have nourished from ideologically different political circles that carry them to the 
power positions that they have. Another difference that provides us clues about their 
habitus is about the way they got married. Unlike the traditional way that Erdoğan 
couple got married, Baykal couple married in an unconventional way by eloping to 
Akçakoca, small town by the sea. While Erdoğan couple followed the traditional way 
of finding their mates through a fellow colleague62, Baykal couple met and dated in 
college when her father had some reservations about this marriage due to his career 
in university, they eloped in a modern way and had civil marriage, not a conventional 
wedding ceremony. On the other hand, Bahçeli is still single and lives with his first 
family as the head of household.   
This chapter has demonstrated how the three leaders have different personal 
backgrounds that have led to differences in the kinds of Bourdieuan capital that they 
have accumulated and habitus that refer to lifestyles. To complete the analysis of the 
reproduction of masculinities in Turkey’s current political atmosphere, one should 
also take into account how different paths of masculinities are represented. 
Accordingly, the next chapter will analyze Turkish political manhood in 
general, different paths of masculinities in particular with reference to leaders’ 
speeches.   
 
                                                 
62 For details see: http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=225963 
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CHAPTER VII 
REPRESENTATIONS OF DIFFERENT MASCULINITIES 
 
 
After the analysis of official party documents, namely party programmes and 
election manifests, and also leaders’ different paths of masculinities, this part 
discusses the construction of political manhood in politics as field through the 
discourses of the leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. 
How politics and masculinities construct each other through masculine domination 
strategies will be revealed in this final part of the analysis. It also follows Bourdieu’s 
argumentation that argues “(…) practices should be seen as the product of an 
encounter between habitus and a field which are, to varying degrees, compatible or 
congruent with one another.” (Bourdieu, 1991: 17). 
This chapter will mainly be achieved by expanding on Bora and Tol’s 
approach. Bora and Tol (2009) analyze the construction of masculinity in Turkish 
political culture and the impacts of this discourse on various contemporary 
conceptualizations, specifically politics, power and leadership. Bora and Tol consider 
politics in three ways. Firstly, they view it as an arena, er meydanı, for leaders to 
prove their manliness by having to struggle with other political parties. This idiom is 
highly internalized by populist discourse. Secondly, they view politics as a kind of 
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test of courage in which men, the main actors of politics, should be courageous and 
brave, rather than being fragile or sensitive like women. Thirdly, they view politics 
as a realm in which every individual is male (Bora and Tol, 2009). Analyzing these 
arguments in depth, while taking gender to be “sexually characterized habitus”, can 
reveal how specific behaviors of appropriately feminine and masculine actors 
influence the political (Bourdieu, 2001: 104). 
This chapter deconstructs the party leader speeches in order to examine the 
construction of gender in general and masculinities in particular, through three 
Turkish political parties, the AKP, the CHP and the MHP. To investigate the 
gendered nature of Turkish politics, the three mainstream daily newspapers 
(Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman) are re-read through a critical lens that focuses on 
five determining characteristics of Turkish political life introduced in earlier 
chapters: the strong state tradition, militarism, Westernization, the secularist / 
Islamist cleavage and domination by party leaders, so as to reveal the different 
pathways of Turkish political manhood, namely neo-Muslim, Kemalist/secular and 
nationalist. This study, re-reads the data making use of Bourdieu’s theoretical 
framework, investigates the construction of political manhood in Turkey from the 
perspective of how do masculinities shape politics and how politics shape 
masculinities does. This not only enables the reader to examine the strong 
relationships between politics and masculinities, but also the congruent relationship 
with habitus and field. This dissertation primarily questions the role of the different 
personal histories, habitus, of the three party leaders on their construction of 
masculinities, and argues that these leaders practice more the praxis of being men 
rather than being leftist, rightist or Islamist, in line with the arguments of TESEV’s 
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report on nationalism in Turkey (Kentel et al., 2007: 264). In this line, as mentioned 
before, language is an important signifier. 
In previous chapters, it is hypothesized that what is valued in the linguistic 
market of politics is manhood. In other words, the “recognized power”, or symbolic 
capital, is shaped by the relative priority given to manhood and is legitimized by its 
credibility (Bourdieu, 1991). As individuals deploy their linguistic resources, it is 
critical to analyze the ways in which their linguistic techniques vary or not. 
Therefore, in the framework of this dissertation, not only the embeddedness of 
politics and masculinities is revealed but also how does the agent, namely the 
politician, position himself in the field is deconstructed.  
 “Men make up 82.5% of members of national parliaments worldwide, and a 
higher proportion of cabinets” (Parpart and Zalewski, 2008: xi). Such a percentage 
supports the argument that the political landscape has always been a men’s world. 
Thus Enloe defines politics as a “men’s club” (Enloe, 1989:6), as the arena of 
politics has overwhelmingly been populated by men and dominated by masculine 
aspirations.  
According to Zalewski and Parpart (2008), masculinity is associated with 
certain practices and discourses. Following Butler’s argument of performativity, 
Zalewski and Parpart claim that some performances of gender produce and also are 
produced, and that “(…) metaphors act as motors of discourse which work to frame 
and naturalize masculinist assumptions” (2008: 10). That is, metaphors and 
assumptions reinforce the relation between masculinity and power. This 
naturalization also contributes “(…) to the ongoing struggle to maintain gender 
hierarchies” (Parpart, 1998:203), by which certain qualities, such as aggression, 
rationality, bravery are valued as power enhancing and get defined as masculine. 
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This understanding offers a very dominating narrative of masculinity, or in other 
words, the rhetorical work of exclusion. While men are identified as the dominating 
one, women are recognized as the other. A discursive strategy operates in which the 
masculine/feminine dichotomy is constitutive of the public/private dichotomy 
(Zalewski and Parpart, 1998: 2008).  
Connell (1990) describes hegemonic masculinity as culturally idealized forms 
of masculine character linking male identity with traits such as physical toughness 
and competitiveness, and elevating these above other stereotypical gender or 
sexuality traits. Idealized forms of masculinity become hegemonic when they 
become unnoticed in a culture (Fahey, 2007: 134). The taken-for-grantedness of 
hegemonic masculinity consistently naturalizes the superiority of masculine 
characteristics. For Connell, a masculine politics, which concerns the making of 
gendered power, can take many forms (1995, 2005). For him, it is “the capacity of 
certain men to control social resources through gender processes” (Connell, 2005: 
205). While Connell highlights the kinds of practices in which conceptions of 
masculinity are embedded and masculinity politics has a structural basis, this 
dissertation specifically defines political manhood as practices through which 
masculinities are constructed in politics as a field.  
The next part will examine three leaders’ political manhood with a lens that 
scrutinizes different paths of masculinities.  
 
 
7.1 Politics is Male 
Men, the main actor of politics, should, according to his nature, be 
courageous and brave, rather than fragile or sensitive like women. In addition, 
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conducting politics is an act of bravery. In other words, men, as the natural protector 
of the country, should act in a domineering fashion, and they should perform their 
job in a way that properly pertains to be a real man. In Turkish politics, the speeches 
of political leaders illustrate very well how politics is combined with male codes, and 
how this is simultaneously associated with positively valued qualities. From early 
Republican times, conducting politics has been coupled with defending country as an 
honorable duty. “[V]irtue and masculinity were intimately bound up with the concept 
of honor” (Dickerman and Walker, 2000: 385). This connotation of honor has also 
been dependent on the evaluation of performance. A man could lose honor by 
violating norms, or through acts of cowardice.  
The most memorable example in Turkey of such an equation of politics and 
manhood dates back to the end of 1999, in the debate between the MHP and the FP 
concerning virility and cowardice. During the parliamentary budget plenary sessions, 
whilst challenging a MHP parliamentarian, one FP parliamentarian said, “We will 
test your manhood and cowardice in the matter of the rise of civil servants wages.” 
The MHP parliamentarian responded, “We can prove this anywhere you want.” This 
debate on manhood and cowardice occupied the media’s agenda for a long time, 
showing how politics as a field of proving manhood once again reasserted its 
position in the public mind. 
In a similar way, one ANAP deputy, Selçuk Pehlivanoğlu, claimed, “The 
MHP pretends to be a strong man in Anatolia but keeps silent in Ankara,’’ before 
adding, “The DSP says it is the honorable one but never subscribes to a document on 
behalf of the nation.’’ He also described the MHP as “A man in Anatolia; a coward 
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in Ankara,” and the DSP as “Pretending to be honorable but never performing.’’63 
Thus, being courageous and honorable are two of the most widely shared themes in 
Turkish politics. As markers of being good politicians, such qualifications are taken-
for-granted norms. For instance, “Prime Minister Erdoğan quoted from the famous 
philosopher Plato, mentioning that ‘cowards have never built a triumphal 
monument’. In the opening speech of the AKP camp in Kızılcahamam, he explained 
they [the AKP] do not do fearful politics.”64 As Erdoğan’s words exemplify, in 
masculine politics, cowards are not able to conduct such an important job, and their 
politics are courageous, as they ought to be. 
A statement by the MHP leader, Bahçeli, also underlines how politics itself is 
a man’s job, or should be: “Those who tell us [Why didn’t you hang Apo?], 
criticizing us for being timid and cowardly politicians, should take a look at the past 
and see who first used the term manly politics. Now they seek the power to rule by 
singing a couple of songs and talking poorly.”65 
                                                 
63 ANAP'lı Pehlivanoğlu, MHP için, "Anadolu'da erkeklik taslayıp Ankara'da çıtı çıkmayan" DSP için 
de, "Namusluyum diyerek millet adına hiçbir şeyin altına imza atmayan" ibarelerini kullandı. Selçuk 
Pehlivanoğlu, isim vermeden eleştirdiği hükümet ortaklarından MHP için, "Anadolu'da erkek, 
Ankara'da ürkek", DSP için de, "namusluyum diyerek icraat yapmayan" 
tanımlamalarınıkullandı.(24.12.2000)from 
http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2000/12/24/politika/politikadevam.htm 
64 Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan, ünlü filozof Eflatun’dan alıntı yaparak, “Korkaklar hiçbir zaman zafer 
anıtı dikememişlerdir” diyerek, Kızılcahamam’daki AK Parti kampının açılışında, korkak siyaset 
yapmadıklarını anlattı. (22.11.2009) from  
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=13011484 
 
65 Bahçeli: “Bize (Apo’yu neden asamadınız?) diyenler, bizi ürkek ve korkak politikacı olarak 
eleştirenler, geçmişe bir baksınlar erkek politika kelimesini ilk kullanan kim olmuştur. Şimdi iki şarkı 
bir söz, söyleyerek iktidara talip oluyorlar.” (27.10.2002) from 
http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/10/27/politika/butun.htm 
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As the statement of Bahçeli shows he is proud that his party is the first that 
used the term manly politics. The MHP, embracing radical nationalism in Bora’s 
typology, resorts a rigid approach when manly causes are at stake.  
As mentioned before, not only politics itself, but also the environment of 
politics is male. Masculinizing the whole atmosphere of politics verifies also how the 
relation between masculinity and politics is currently intertwined. In Turkey, the 
debate around the field of men (er meydanı) is repeatedly reproduced by politicians. 
In order to test their opponents’ degree of manliness and strength, leaders use the 
metaphor of the field of men. This field of men is also a describer of a very deep 
rooted tradition of oil wrestling in Turkey, where wrestling is an ancestral sport, 
represented primarily by the annual Kırkpınar tournaments, and one of the most 
virile games through which wrestlers test their strengths. Therefore, it is interesting 
that, in the popular imagination, politics has been equated with such an arena of 
struggle. Confronting the rival by inviting him to the er meydanı, that is the field of 
contest for men, is very common in Turkish political culture. For instance, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan once said of his opponents:  
These people have got stuck on some stuff, some snot that they 
made themselves. That’s why they go around telling the same old 
story from dawn until dusk. They’ve been on stage muttering 
‘election’ for four and a half years. We’ve just held an election, just 
wait and see. Now, we’re holding an election. The field of men will 
be set up on the 22nd of July. The wrestler and the dishonest one 
will be easily distinguished. 66  
 
 
                                                 
 
66 Erdoğan: “Bunlar takılmışlar bazı şeylere, takılmışlar kendi elleriyle yaptıkları bazı öcülere, sabah 
akşam aynı teraneyi söyleyip geziyorlar. 4,5 yıldır seçim, seçim diye ortadalar. Daha seçimi yeni 
yaptık, durun bakalım. İşte şimdi seçime gidiyoruz. Er meydanı 22 Temmuz'da kurulacak. Kim 
pehlivan, kim dürüst değil görülecek”. (17.05.2007) from 
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=540852 
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This statement of Erdoğan shows that the politician is a wrestler who 
struggles in the field of men.  
Such an invitation to the field never remains unnoticed by other politicians. 
Especially during times of heightened propaganda, the call for a test of manhood 
becomes a very common rhetoric. Obviously, men constitute the vast majority of the 
candidates for office and it can be argued that “men dominate the electoral playing 
field.” (Carroll and Fox, 2010:2). In addition, not only the candidates but also other 
significant actors during elections, namely, strategists, consultants, media experts are 
mostly men and beyond this dominance, the language of the election is gendered in 
masculine themes as well (Carroll and Fox, 2010: 2). Discourses during elections 
generally comprise metaphors drawn from traditionally masculine domains 
embedded in a given culture. In parallel, the leaders are also expected to act in 
accordance with normative masculine traits. “[O]ur expectations about the qualities, 
appearance, and behavior of candidates also are highly gendered. We want our 
leaders to be tough, dominant, and assertive – qualities much more associated with 
masculinity.” (Carroll and Fox, 2010: 3).       
To give an example for the gendered nature and atmosphere of the elections, 
before the national elections of 2007, Deniz Baykal challenged Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan by inviting him to a public debate. At that time, the debate between two 
leaders caused the tension to escalate. Baykal also published a newspaper 
advertisement in which there is an illustration of a television program with a bench, 
as if the program’s title is “Field of Men”. In this studio, there is an empty chair next 
to Baykal’s seat. The advertisement’s slogan was “I am here. Where are you?”67 
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Erdoğan did not accept Baykal’s call so there was no television debate. However, 
two years later, before the local elections, Erdoğan challenged other leaders in the 
same way, mentioning that “I struggled in this way. I invited them to the 
battleground; here is the field of men. Let them appear in the field. Since I was 18, I 
have been in the political arena; this is how I understood and performed in this 
way.”68 Here, Erdoğan gives reference to his past. He argues that what he learnt in 
the Islamist political environment has become a habit of performance. 
The relation between politics and man as its essential actor presents itself in a 
multi dimensional way. It not only underlines how the field of politics is or should be 
masculine, but also how does the masculinist necessity justify its means and ends. 
Such a masculinist necessity manifests itself in the male body, namely the male 
politician. 
 
7.2 The Politician is Male 
Politics is a multi layered frame for a researcher and, in line with Bourdieu, its 
actors are products of an encounter. In this dissertation, while the focus is on the 
meaning structures that coalesce around masculinities, like the field of men, hidden 
discourses are also significant.  
                                                                                                                                          
67 CHP Genel Başkanı Deniz Baykal, birçok konuşmasında Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a 
yönelik yaptığı "televizyonda tartışma" çağrısını, bu kez gazete ilanı ile dile getirdi. Gazetelere verilen 
ilanda, Baykal'ın yanında bulunan koltuk boş bırakılırken "Er Meydanı", "Ben buradayım, sen 
nerdesin" sloganı dikkat çekti. Başbakan Erdoğan'ın ise bu isteğe ne yanıt vereceği şimdiden merak 
konusu oldu. (16.07.2007) from 
 http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/0707/16/w/c0503.html 
 
68 Erdoğan: Mücadeleyi de böyle verdim. Buyursunlar meydana, er meydanı burada. Çıksınlar 
meydana. 18 yaşından bu yana siyaset meydanında bunu böyle anladım, böyle yaptım. (12.08.2009) 
from http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=12265921 
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Reading a text comprises a multitude of layers, so from this perspective the 
data was re-read through a critical lens to probe the multifaceted cultural constructs 
in order to decipher different masculinities and their constructions. Within the 
framework of assumption that the field of politics is male, its actors are bound by the 
laws of this game. In other words, the politician is gendered in masculine. 
One of the most gendered depictions of politics is its male subject. Politics as 
a field entails an interweaving of men’s power with a diverse range of 
representations. As Hooper (2001) argues, the area of politics reflects a world of men 
in which political men influence domestic and international affairs through their 
masculinist practices that embrace the symbolic links between masculinity and 
power.  Such a transmission of power reproduces a gendered hierarchy. The patterns 
of male authority are thereby legitimized within the field of politics, and masculine 
power positions itself in politics in line with the dichotomy between public and 
private. Through the public and private boundaries, life is divided into a number of 
highly gendered spheres. “Gender divisions and inequalities depend to a great extent 
on the segregation of social life into separate spheres for men and women, so that 
gender differences can be constructed and the lives of difference visible” (Hooper, 
2001: 91).  
While the private sphere inscribes a feminized realm, the public one is a 
masculinized arena. The private sphere represents the realms of families and 
individuals, while the public sphere includes the public and political dimensions. 
Hence, two gendered arguments combine, namely that the public is a male realm, 
and, accordingly, politics is men’s job. The outputs of such a gendered categorization 
are reified, not only in discursive practices, but also in social practices. Women with 
their traditional supporting roles remain outside the “traditional remit” of the political 
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world (Hooper, 2001: 92). Therefore, this gendered space reinforces associations that 
are crucial to masculinism, or simply masculinity and power.  
Turkish politics is also a site where masculinities are produced, reinforced 
and negotiated. The leaders of political parties use masculinist strategies, drawing on 
associations between manhood, sincerity, bravery and virility.  
Politics not only defines but also constructs masculinities. In politics as a 
field, bodies are identified in ways that subjugate them and their identities are 
constructed through displays and performative acts. For example, Devlet Bahçeli, in 
his speech before the national elections of 22th July, mentioned that “Our 12 women, 
in total 70 deputy candidates, will work with the enthusiasm of Ulubatlı Hasan69 
[Hasan of Ulubat] who planted the flag during the siege of the city [Istanbul]”.70 This 
sentence is a good illustration of how the political subject is masculinized, and also 
heroized, to the extent that even women should perform masculinist practices like 
men. 
Another example of such a clear gendering of the political subject is another 
dispute between Tayyip Erdoğan and Deniz Baykal. In this instance, Erdoğan 
challenged Baykal by asking  
It’s neither a feast nor a festival, so one would ask to a man where 
is it coming from now? They started this one year ago. It didn’t 
work so they had a break for some time. You told people that you 
were loyal to the laws and the constitution. What happened now? 
Why are you being disloyal now? Where’s your respect for Turkish 
                                                 
 
69 Ulubatlı Hasan (Hasan of Ulubat) is a legendary Turkish martyr. At the successful siege of Istanbul, 
Ulubatlı Hasan was among the first who climbed the walls of Istanbul, who, when he reached the top, 
planted the flag of the Ottoman Empire and defended it until other soldiers arrived. Thus he is a very 
heroic figure for Ottoman- Turkish history. For detailed information, see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ulubatl%C4%B1_Hasan retrieved on 19 September 2011.  
 
70 MHP’nin İstanbul’daki 12’si kadın 70 milletvekili adayı 22 Temmuz seçimlerine, kentin fethinde 
surlara Türk bayrağını diken Ulubatlı Hasan ruhuyla çalışacak. (18.06.2007) from 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6728319 
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Grand National Assembly (TGNA)? Where’s your loyalty to 
democratic parliamentary system? Where’s your commitment to 
democracy? What happened? 71 
 
In this saying, there is a dispute around previous promises of Baykal.  
Erdoğan’s strategy is to intimidate Baykal in an acceptable way within the field of 
politics where masculinist challenges are legitimate. In this game, the subject who 
has the right to ask and challenge is masculine. Man is the natural power holder and 
these “symbolic associations have implications for the way men and women are 
imagined to be” (Yanagisako and Delaney, 1994: 3).     
Another example of the etiquette of virility between politicians took place 
during the presidential elections in 2006. The President, as the head of the state, 
enclosed the gendered symbolism that lies in the notion of President as caretaker, 
protector of the people or simply the leader of the father state in Turkey. Svendsen 
(2007) defines this gendering of the presidential post as “paternal Presidentialism”. 
“The gendered symbolism of the presidency makes it difficult for voters to imagine a 
woman in the office” (Svendsen, 2007: 104). Images of the caring man or the genteel 
patriarch serve as an effective rhetorical framework for the concentration of 
masculine traits in politics. In contrast to female caring, male caring, or the caring of 
the breadwinner in the family, is more independent. As Svendsen notes, “the 
President as an all-knowing father and citizens as dependants who need to be cared 
for” is a deep-rooted rhetorical tool (Svendsen, 2007: 104). Such a gendered 
construction of the presidential position is embedded into Turkish political cultural 
                                                 
71 Erdoğan Baykal’ı eleştirirken şöyle der: “Bayram değil, seyran değil, nereden çıktı bu iş? Sorarlar 
adama, “Ta bir sene önce bu işe başladılar. Baktılar tutmadı bir ara verdiler. Hani siz yasalara 
sadıktınız, hani siz anayasaya sadıktınız, ne oldu, şimdi niye sadakatinizi ayaklar altına alıyorsunuz, 
hani siz TBMM'ye saygılıydınız, hani siz demokratik parlamenter sisteme sadıktınız, hani siz 
demokrasi bağımlısıydınız, ne oldu?” (14.12.2006) from  
http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/cumhuriyet2006/0612/14/t/c0514.html+
adama+sorarlar. 
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rhetoric as well. Thus, during the last presidential elections, Baykal criticized the 
process, claiming that “I couldn’t promote any man that I want as President of the 
Republic. I expended a lot of effort to achieve this. What about you [Erdoğan]? Were 
you able to make someone you want to be President of the Republic? What’s the 
outcome? Is it fine?”72  
At that time, due to speculation that Erdoğan would propose himself as a 
candidate for the presidency, Devlet Bahçeli challenged Erdoğan: “I won’t be a man, 
if I don’t drag you [Erdoğan] down from the Presidency by Parliament’s decision and 
sue you to the Supreme Court.”73 Such a confrontation reveals that the most 
important political success test in Turkey is through manhood. In this perspective, it 
can be argued that ideal gender imaginary in politics as a field compromises the 
configuration of masculine practices that are widely accepted.    
Two of the most significant characteristics of Turkish political men are their 
sincerity and virility. These two characteristics are also the most widely used 
rhetorical strategies of the leaders. Erdoğan once said to Baykal, “Do not whine – be 
brave”. 74 Whining is certainly not a feature inscribed into political men. Rather, the 
hegemonic form of masculinity in politics entails the ability and capacity to be 
decisive and tough. These characteristics make a politician a virile man. Erdoğan has 
repeatedly confronted Baykal in his speeches and use of the expression of the virile 
                                                 
 
72 Baykal: İstediğim adamı cumhurbaşkanı yapamazdım. Ben onu yapmak için çaba harcadım. Yaptın 
mı istediğin adamı? Ne oldu? İyi oldu mu? (27.12.2006) from 
 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=5685758 
 
73 Bahçeli: “Seni (Erdoğan) Meclis kararıyla Cumhurbaşkanlığı’ndan indirip, Yüce Divan’a 
vermezsem adam değilim.” (10.07.2006) from 
 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=4724783 
 
74CHP Lideri Deniz Baykal’a yönelik “Mızıkçılık yapmayacaksın, delikanlı olacaksın” diyen 
Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'a (...). (12.04.2007) from 
 http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6320395 
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man: “I tell Mr. Baykal that my nation will make only a virile man a Prime 
Minister.”75 Baykal has also responded in that way, once mentioning for example 
that “You’re in office, but you have not become a complete man yet. Whatever you 
do, you can never be a man,” continuing to say that “You are a plunder, you are an 
impostor, and hence your name is Erdoğan.”76 Here, there are two critical points to 
be discussed. The first one is that confrontation in politics is achieved through the 
testing of manhood. This is the most legitimate way of challenging opponents. For 
success in politics or, in other words, achieving power and eventual hegemony, the 
political subject seeks to establish his masculine performance through crediting or 
discrediting his manhood. The second critical point concerns the list of required 
qualifications. Being honest and decisive are preconditions for being man. 
Otherwise, the politician faces being named as unmanly. “Giving men the stamp 
unmanly could be seen as a part of the same process that subordinates women and 
legitimizes male power and authority” (cited in Svendsen, 2007: 31). Thus, such a 
list of positive ideals for male behaviors challenges not only women but also men.  
Another popular discourse on manhood in Turkey is kabadayı. As it is 
discussed before, kabadayı symbolizes traditional conservatist masculine image and 
also the protector of the order according to his own sense of justice. This hyper 
masculine figure manifests itself in Erdoğan’s charismatic leadership. Related to 
rough neighborhood that he socialized in, namely Kasımpaşa, many people consider 
                                                 
75 “Ama ben Sayın Baykal'a şunu söylüyorum; benim milletim adam gibi adamı başbakan yapar.” 
dedi. (01.03.2009) from http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=820624 
 
76CHP Genel Başkanı Baykal, Sinop’ta Başbakan Erdoğan’a sert eleştiriler yöneltti. Erdoğan’ı 
maganda üslubuyla konuşmakla suçlayan Baykal, “Sen iktidar olmuşsun ama adam olamamışsın. 
Bundan sonra kırk fırın ekmek de yesen olamazsın” dedi. Erdoğan’a “Senin işin talan, gücün yalan-
dolan, adın da Erdoğan” diye seslenen Baykal, yolsuzluk ve yoksulluğun katlanarak arttığını söyledi. 
(01.03.2009)from 
http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/0903/01/w/c0113.html 
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him as kabadayı.  His aggressive way of talking has also been legitimized as a 
signifier of his Kasımpaşalılık (being from Kasımpaşa). Yavuz mentions that 
A kabadayı is an identity based on reputation, authority and honor. 
It is normally a male and respected authority figure in his 
neighborhood. His authority is not derived from his knowledge, 
kinship lineage or state power, but rather from the existing cultural 
code. A kabadayı is respected as a protector of the weak, needy and 
oppressed against a formal or informal power structure. (2009: 119) 
 
Therefore, such an authority legitimizes itself in politics as a protective 
paternal figure. The courage, strength and also self-confidence are characteristics of 
kabadayı who represent a leader figure resisting against dangers and protects needy 
ones. Erdoğan’s background justifies his aggressiveness and his natural 
characteristics of being courageous, strong man have political ramifications as well.  
Kabadayı manner of Erdoğan is a theme of dispute in Turkish politics. 
Baykal has criticized Erdoğan’s way of talking and behaving so many times. For 
instance, Baykal said that 
It is wrong to approach the President’s attitude in an obstinate 
manner, reacting and turning it into an occasion of political 
hostility, and to challenge him.  I advise them to quit such behavior 
immediately.  It is not appropriate to do politics on delicate issues 
with a kabadayı tone.  We do have respect for the President; 
however, we believe that the step taken by Turkey towards 
democratization should be finalized.77 
 
On the other hand, Baykal also challenges Erdoğan with test of toughness and 
also reproduces the rhetoric on kabadayı. Once, he mentioned that 
The seat you have sought now is yours. We, as members of the 
parliament from the CHP are all ready for support.  Bring in the 
                                                 
 
77  Baykal, ''Cumhurbaşkanı'nın tavrına karşı bir inatlaşma, tepki gösterme, siyasi husumet vesilesi 
haline getirme, meydan okuma yaklaşımları yanlıştır. Öyle yapmaktan bir an önce vazgeçmelerini 
öneriyorum. Kabadayı üslubuyla hassas konularda siyaset yapmak doğru değil. Cumhurbaşkanına 
saygımız var ama, Türkiye'nin demokratikleşme doğrultusunda atmış olduğu adımın 
sonuçlandırılması gerektiğine inanıyoruz'' dedi. (23.12.2002) from 
http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/cumhuriyet2002/0212/23/t/c0515.html+
kabaday%FD 
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files… You can call the previous period to account, but you should 
bring yourself to account too. Don’t let your account fall into 
previous periods. One day you will be brought to account. But do 
not wait for it, be brave, be kabadayı.78 
 
Inviting Erdoğan to be brave and behave accordingly reproduce the 
relationship between politician and toughness. While criticizing such a way of 
conducting politics, Baykal also flirts with this rhetoric. Once, he stated that “If this 
coffee house culture is to be approved, I shall not let go of this coffee house. If this is 
a merit, then we shall do it too.”80. Hence being kabadayı is a merit for a real 
politician. All defining characteristics of kabadayı can easily be legitimized in 
politics as a field. In line with Bourdieu, an emphasis on manhood is fashionable in 
the linguistic market and the speeches of leaders illustrate how masculine and/or 
masculinized the field of politics by positioning men as the patriarch and women as 
other.  
Another discourse around manhood or the characteristics attached to being a 
good politician is delikanlılık81 (young manhood). As it is discussed above, 
politicians reproduce the significance of delikanlılık in politics in Turkey. Cevdet 
Selvi, the Vice President of the CHP, said that “A delikanlı (young man) wouldn’t 
get somewhere by hiding, and does not take advantage of the situation, he would be 
brave” in response to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s saying “Be delikanlı” 
                                                 
 
78 Baykal: “Dokunulmazlıkların kaldırılması talebini yineleyen Baykal, ''İstediğiniz koltuk elinizde. 
CHP milletvekilleri olarak hepimiz destek vermeye hazırız. Getirin dosyaları... Geçmiş dönemin 
hesabını sor da, sen kendi hesabını da ver. Hesabınız geçmiş döneme sarkmasın. Gün olur sen de 
hesap verirsin. Ama bekleme, cesur ol, kabadayı ol.'' (05.09.2005) from 
http://garildi.cumhuriyet.com.tr/sayfa.cgi?w+30+/cumhuriyet/cumhuriyet2005/0509/05/t/c0414.html+
kabaday%FD 
 
80 Baykal, “Eğer bir kahvehane kültürü olumlu görülüyorsa, kahvehaneyi ona bırakmam. Marifetse o 
zaman biz de yaparız.” (31.12.2005) from 
 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=3722562 
 
81 Delikanlı (young man) is a term that refers to male adolescent who is supposed to and also has 
potential to be  aggressive, enthusiastic, fearless. It is a positive characteristics attached to young men.  
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(young man) towards the CHP82. In addition, he adds that as Hürriyet reported: “A 
delikanlı would not sell off the State that he is responsible of to anybody. It is not 
possible to call a Prime Minister a delikanlı if he is tongue-tied while his soldiers 
were put a sack over their heads. A delikanlı Prime Minister never lies people. He 
would never disrespects to people. A delikanlı person would never purchase a ship to 
his son while the youth in that country is unemployed. A delikanlı would not send his 
children to school with someone else’s money. You might be a militant or a tough 
uncle; however, while you come to head of the state you should pay attention to your 
words and never disrespect anyone.”83 Selvi refers to the honesty, straightness, 
chivalry as characteristics of a delikanlı or a proper person- man, for the conduct of 
politics. While such a gendered understanding assembles men, it also excludes 
women. As these examples from Turkish politics and its legitimized language depict 
the natural features of being men, it has political ramifications for both genders. 
From this perspective, it can be argued that political power functions in gendered 
terms, with the main issue being the naturalized gendered hierarchy and it’s 
contribution to the production of the political subject in general, and political 
manhood in particular. 
 
                                                 
82 CHP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Cevdet Selvi, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın, CHP'ye yönelik 
'Delikanlı ol' şeklindeki sözlerine karşılık, ''Delikanlı adam, saklanarak, gizlenerek, bir yerden fırsat 
yakalayıp bir yere gelmek için istemez. Başta söyler'' dedi. (12.04.2007) from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=526944 
 
83 “Delikanlı adam, sorumlu olduğu ülkeyi kimseye kayıtsız şartsız teslim etmez. Askerinin başına 
çuval geçirildiği zaman, dut yemiş bülbül gibi kalan bir başbakana delikanlı demek mümkün değil. 
Delikanlı başbakan, halkın yüzüne baka baka yalan söylemez. Mağdur insanların yüzüne hakaret 
etmez. Delikanlı adam, ülkenin gençleri işsizken, kendi çocuğunu gemi sahibi yapmaz. Delikanlı 
adam, çocuklarını başkasının parasıyla okutmaz. Geçmişte militan, külhanbeyi olabilirsin ama ülke 
yönetimine geldiğinde üslubuna bakacaksın, kimseye hakaret etmeyeceksin.” (12.04.2007) from 
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=6320395 
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7.2.1. The Other: Woman 
Although this dissertation does not aim to analyze the lack of women’s 
representation in politics, in general, and in Turkey, in particular, on the basis of the 
relationality of gender, it is necessary to point out that women are the quintessence 
other of politics as a field.  
Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, women have been at the center 
stage of politics. As the carrier of the Kemalist modernization project, “(...) women 
were given the responsibility to endorse and represent both the traditions that were 
deemed worthy of preservation as well as the transformation that the Westernizing 
state propelled” (Y. Arat, 1998: 3). The first concrete step of women’s involvement 
into politics was taken by Nezihe Muhittin and her colleagues. They attempted to 
establish the Women’s Public Party in 1923 (Tekeli, 1998: 341). However, this 
attempt was blocked by the male political elites, so that the women’s efforts ended in 
the establishment of the Turkish Women’s Association, which had some impact on 
gender awareness. The second significant step towards women’s emancipation was 
taken in 1934 when suffrage was granted to women. This political right extended 
women’s relationship to the state as citizens. However, as mentioned previously, the 
borders of women’s activism were set by the state’s founding fathers, and those 
parameters defined by men were limiting so that “[w]omen would aspire to be equal 
to men in the public realm and perpetuate their inequality in the private realm.” (Y. 
Arat, 1998: 4). On the other hand, compared to previous times, women had the 
opportunity to penetrate various areas in public life, but politics was generally one of 
the least popular sites of women’s representation.   
Not only during the single party period, but also afterwards, women’s 
representation in politics has remained low. After the transition to multi party 
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politics, women’s organizations were oriented towards philanthropic goals (Çakır, 
1996: 751). As Çakır (1996) reports, even women’s associations established in the 
1970s with left-wing agendas did not address gender equality as their counterparts in 
the West did. Then, in 1980, the military intervention suspended party politics for 
three years. Ironically, however, this military repression “(…) gave way to identity 
politics which allowed women to address their problems by focusing on gender 
oppression”, and there has been an increase in the awareness and also reference to 
women’s issues (Z. Arat, 2008: 14). While the traditional gender roles of women and 
their duties in the private realm have continued to preserve their primary place, the 
post-1980 period has led to a new understanding concerning women’s employment. 
“The principle of equal pay for equal work which is mentioned only in four political 
party programs issued in the 1960s and 1970s becomes a common reference in 
programs adopted in the 1990s and later” (Z. Arat, 2008: 16). It is clear, therefore, 
that there has been a pattern of change towards a more equal understanding. 
However, it is also worth to re-mention that most political party programs also 
announce their strong commitment to preserve traditional family structures and the 
gendered division of labor. As Z. Arat notes, “practically in all party programmes, 
including the contemporary ones family is espoused and enshrined as the central unit 
of society and culture” (2008: 12).  
In this framework of analyzing the quintessence other of the field of politics, 
it is valuable to emphasize the significance of veiling as a site of manifestation of 
gendered power relations. As this dissertation does not aim to analyze veiling, this 
issue reifies masculinist construction of gender within the field of politics.  
Through regulation of women’s bodies, politicians instrumentally use veiling 
issue. The main point about this discussion is that not only secularists but also 
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Islamists strategically use women’s body and position her as dependant. Especially, 
as Vojdik argues, the antagonistic nature of Islamists and secularists position veiled 
women as “a proxy” (2010: 664). For the author, the main question is that “how do 
women respond to the gendered relations of power constructed by competing 
masculinities?” (Vojdik, 2010: 664). Hence, veiling as an ideologically loaded issue 
embraces not only questions regarding femininities but also masculinities. In the 
framework of this study, the above mentioned question is out of scope and focus of 
another study but its projections is significant as it is a contestation arena for 
competing masculinities.   
 
 
7.3. Ma(i)nly Political Parties: Neo-Muslim, Kemalist/Secular and 
Nationalist Masculinities Coalesce 
The projects discussed throughout the dissertation, namely power, nation-
state, nationalism, militarism, Kemalism, can be described as masculinist projects 
“involving masculine institutions, masculine processes and masculine activities” 
(Nagel, 1998: 243). As Nagel aptly argues as it is discussed in previous parts,  
 
 
This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the 
making and unmaking of states: as citizens, as members of the 
nation, as activists, as leaders. It is to say that the scripts in which 
these roles are embedded are written primarily by men, for men, 
and about men, and that women are, by design, supporting actors 
whose roles reflect masculinist  notions of femininity and of 
women’s proper place. (1998: 243)  
 
Man as the main actor, founding father, guardian soldier shapes not only 
macro but also micro politics. The associations of masculinities and the political 
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domain have generally taken for granted and the domination of men in politics has 
been eternalized. Not only men’s gendered experiences but also the normative 
conceptualizations of masculinities are actively created and re-created in an active 
process. Bravery, courage, virility, strength, honor, toughness are the mostly 
embedded characteristics attached to being male politician, accordingly define the 
contours of political manhood. In this line, this study followed the usefulness of 
establishing the concept of masculinities in the study of politics so as not to miss the 
main actor and the “(…) way in which gender shapes politics – through men and 
their interests, their notions of manliness, and the articulation of masculine micro 
(everyday) and macro (politics) cultures.” (Nagel, 2005: 397, original italics).  
This dissertation re-reads and re-analyzes the most apparent, most familiar 
and most evident conceptualizations with the guidance of Bourdieu’s analytical tools. 
Bourdieu’s agenda has been very helpful to capture the ways in which masculinized 
norms shapes the conduct of politics and engender politician.  
First, Bourdieu’s notion of field offered a dynamic paradigm for defining 
politics. Field as the arena where “(…) the game is played” draws the boundaries that 
habitus operates. In this dissertation, Turkish politics examined as a field, or arena of 
struggles for legitimation structured by dominant and subordinate positions. The 
agents, namely politicians, occupy a position with the aim of having legitimation. 
Politicians are hierarchically positioned in the field through the overall volume of all 
capitals they possess, especially through the relative weight of cultural and symbolic 
capital. From the perspective of symbolic capital, prestige that can be obtained by 
being elected situates politicians. For instance, the results of elections positioned 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister while it positioned Deniz Baykal and 
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Devlet Bahçeli as oppositional leaders. Hence, the results of elections define the 
prestige of leaders by its relatively high weight over other forms of capitals. 
Another aspect of symbolic capital is symbolic violence and symbolic 
violence operates in the usage of language. As it has been mentioned before, 
linguistic market of politics places the emphasis on manhood. In this line, Bourdieu 
(1991) argues that, the socially constructed dispositions of the linguistic habitus 
involve its own legitimized system: 
The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis 
and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the 
conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic 
market, dominated by the official language. (1991: 45) 
 
This state language becomes a norm and it legitimizes itself. For Bourdieu, it 
is reproduced by institutions and agents as well. From this perspective, it can be 
argued that language exists within legitimized borders and it is the “oral production 
of habitus” (Bourdieu, 1991: 46). In politics as a field, that “oral production of 
habitus” coalesces and forms a strategic discourse that values manhood. Hence, not 
only the field itself and its agents but also the language is structured and structuring, 
or in other words, reproduces gendered hierarchy. For instance, the idiom of er kişi 
(man/male person) is often used by the leaders. Erdoğan once said “When somebody 
dies –referring to Muslim funeral rituals-, he won’t be treated as Prime Minister or 
President, he will be treated as a male person. However, they don’t understand.”84 
Such a gendered usage is very common in Turkish language. This choice from the 
linguistic market can be considered as a way of privileging manhood by signifying it.  
                                                 
84 Erdoğan: Kimse musalla taşına yatırılırken Cumhurbaşkanı ya da başbakan niyetine yatırılmıyor. Er 
kişi niyetine yatırılıyor. Ama onlar bizi anlamıyorlar. (24.07.2007) from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=6391764 
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Another common usage is adam olmak (being/becoming men). In Turkish, 
olmak (being/becoming) represents a process, or in other words, the achievement of a 
status of maturity. That is, only a mature person, who is also male, is qualified to be a 
citizen and thereby perform politics. This is another legitimized way of naturalizing 
masculine citizen. Devlet Bahçeli, in one of his speeches, pointed out that, “Now, we 
all have a conviction that we can never be a man. We can never achieve and never 
become successful. For this, we need some kind of support.’’85 This sentence 
exemplifies not only the superior and/or ideal position of being man but also draws 
boundaries for being a man. An appropriate level of support is necessary for being 
man and performing civic responsibilities. Hence, the accumulation of capitals is 
decisive factor in the constructions of political manhood as the encounter of language 
and symbolic capital depicts.   
The accumulation of leaders’ capitals contours their construction of political 
manhood as it reflects their habitus. The practices are outcome of varying 
accumulation of capitals that shape habitus within the field. It can be argued that in 
the basis of their congruent relationship, politics and masculine themes nourish each 
other but despite the different positioning of the leaders, the outcome as practice 
coalesces. In other words, in the politics as a field, all leaders have different 
accumulation of capitals and in line different positioning related to their habitus as 
they have different posture, way of talking, behaving, greetings etc. However, 
despite these differences, they use or reproduce masculinist strategies in the same 
way. For instance, for Bourdieu, the ways of speaking is a manifestation of the 
                                                 
 
85 Bahçeli: “Şimdi, hepimizde bir kompleks var, ''Biz adam olmayız. Biz birşeyi başaramayız. Biz 
şunları gerçekleştiremeyiz. Bunlar için bir takım desteklere ihtiyacımız var.” (27.09.2002) from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=100258  
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socially structured character of habitus. The difference between Erdoğan’s 
aggressive ways of talking and Bahçeli’s quiet way of talking can be given as an 
appropriate example to two different ways of talking. Related to their different 
habitus, their ways of talking unconsciously position them in the field of politics but 
both practice of being men or strategically use and, in parallel, reproduce the 
advantage of being men in the field of politics. While Erdoğan has been criticized for 
being improper by acting aggressively, Bahçeli’s calmness has won recognition, 
especially, in the framework of the party’s changing image.  
In his book Masculine Domination (2001) Bourdieu mentions that on the 
basis of “labeling of nature”, men predominate women and “(…) need to increase his 
honor by pursuing glory in the public sphere” (2001: 51). Masculine politician plays 
virile games and responds to “countless imperceptible calls to order” (Bourdieu, 
2001: 59). Such an unconscious positioning situates him near to his manly brothers 
while excluding feminine traits.  
At this point, while analyzing different constructions of political manhood in 
Turkey, engaging different pathways of masculinities is inevitable. From the 
perspective of neo-Muslim masculinities, for the accumulation of capitals and 
accordingly, for the habitus of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Islam plays a decisive role. 
The conservative family that he has grown up, the education that he gained in Imam 
Hatip School and his engagement with deep-rooted Nakshibandi order has shaped his 
habitus. Although, he and the AKP rejects being Islamist, his positioning has fed 
from the Islamist appeal. In line with neo-Muslim masculinities, both the leader and 
the top cadres of the AKP flirt with a fine tuning of Islam and/or Islamist past. As 
Özkırımlı argues, the AKP is situated within the parameters of nationalist discourse 
and he adds that  
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[t]his can be seen in the nationalist language employed by the 
leaders of the movement (especially Prime Minister Erdoğan), the 
nationalist symbolism they fall back upon, and their National 
Outlook background. But a more fundamental indicator of this 
movement’s symbiotic relationship with nationalism is that it has to 
a great extent shed its elements advocating Islamic unity (ummah). 
(2011: 97) 
Although, the discourse of the party is nationalist, it is different than official 
nationalism and that’s why they clash between each other. The statement of Erdoğan 
about the “99 percent Muslimness of Turkey” that he repetitively makes proves this 
reference to ummah. Erdoğan once mentioned that “who respects to the EU process, 
respects to the activities carried out in the EU member states. Because, I wonder 
whether in which member states do have the application that exist in Turkey in 
where 99% of the population is Muslim.”86 This reference to the unity of Muslim and 
its importance in the international politics is not rare in the discourse of the AKP. 
Another example is that “However, there are approximately 30 ethnic elements in 
Turkey. You usually write this fact, as well, the religion is a kind of cement in 
Turkey in where 99% of Turkish people are Muslim.”87 This statement of Erdoğan 
that defines religion as the cement that unifies people of the nation-state has been 
criticized by secularists. For Kemalist/secularist who positions themselves as the 
guardian of the Atatürkist reforms, religion, or Islam, could not provide the cement 
to unify the nation. Men as the founding fathers of the nation-state, have equipped 
with protecting the state with their highly educated, sophisticated manners in a mon 
                                                 
86Erdoğan, "AB sürecine kim saygı duyuyorsa, AB üyesi ülkelerdeki icraatlara da saygı duysunlar. 
Çünkü yüzde 99'u Müslüman olan Türkiye'deki bu uygulama, AB üyesi ülkelerden acaba 
hangisindevar?(13.11.2005)from 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=228512&keyfield=4DC3BC736CC3BC6D616E2045726
46FC49F616E 
 
87Erdoğan: Ama Türkiye'de ise 30'a yakın etnik unsur var. Bunu her zaman sizler de yazıyorsunuz, 
yüzde 99'u Müslüman bir ülke Türkiye'de din bir çimentodur.” (11.12.2005) from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=3634007 
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cher style towards any threat, especially Islamic fundamentalism. That can be 
considered as the reason behind Deniz Baykal’s continuous references to Atatürk. 
Once, he stated that “Protect Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, secular and democratic 
Republic by your votes.”88. Moreover, Baykal once discussed the empowerment of 
women in Turkish politics and mentioned that “We should pave the way for women 
in politics. The basis of increasing the female efficiency doesn’t exist in our parties. 
However, the structure of the CHP is very suitable for that basis, because we are a 
social democrat party. Social democracy is female, as well. We see the world with a 
lens of women. We, the social democrats, don’t have a supercilious, adamant and 
challenging understanding. The women are an uncommitted force and now they 
should become active and make the radical change. Thus, the determinant forces will 
be disengaged. Our social democracy draws its strength from Anatolian renaissance, 
from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and contemporary social democracy”89 In this speech, 
Baykal clearly mentions the roots of the CHP and puts emphasis on social 
democracy. He defines social democracy as feminine, and his party as gender 
sensitive. However, at the end of the speech, he also gives reference to the unique 
father of the state, Atatürk. In this perspective, it can be argued that the paradoxical 
                                                 
88 “Vereceğiniz oyla Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'e, laik, demokratik cumhuriyete 
sahip çıkın."( 30.10.2002) from http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=106626 
 
89 Baykal dün CHP kadın kolları il başkanlarının düzenlediği toplantıda, yeni 
solu şöyle tanımladı: ‘‘Siyasette kadınların önünü açmak bize düşer. Kadın 
etkinliğini arttırmanın altyapısı henüz partilerimizde mevcut değil. Ama 
CHP'nin yapısı bunun için çok uygundur. Çünkü biz sosyal demokrat bir 
partiyiz. Sosyal demokrasi de feminendir. Dünyaya kadının bakış açısıyla 
bakar. Biz sosyal demokratlar olarak tepeden bakan, astığım astık, 
kestiğim kestik diyen, meydan okuyan maço bir anlayışa sahip değiliz. 
Kadın, siyasetimizin ihtiyat kuvveti olarak beklemektedir ve artık devreye 
girerek köklü değişimi gerçekleştirmelidir. Böylece haksız yere bugün 
belirleyici durumda olan güçler devreden çıkacaktır.’’ "Sosyal 
demokrasimiz Anadolu rönasansından, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ten ve çağdaş 
sosyal demokrasiden güç alır." (16.01.2001) from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-217217 
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nature of Kemalist form of patriarchy glorifies founding fathers and Republican 
guardians and also reproduces traditional gendered hierarchy.  
Finally, the MHP with its nationalist masculinist discourse nourishes 
masculine themes and idols. For instance, as it has mentioned before, grey wolves 
are significant symbols of the Turkish ancestral past. “On the last day of General 
Assembly of Victory, after Devlet Bahçeli took place in protocol tribune, the exit of 
Turks from Ergenekon was animated. The demonstration called “the Grey Wolves 
from Ergenekon to 2000s” was carried out by 18 riders. Bahçeli mentioned that ‘We 
need more (deputies) in order to adopt our program by ourselves just like the gray 
wolves’”90 As it is clear from the speech, they identify themselves with gray wolves 
that immortalize heroic Turkic past. They also use this rhetorical discourse for 
threatening the others. “The grey wolves will breath down the AKP’s neck. You will 
pay the price. You will definitely pay for supporting separatism and the lives of 
martyrs”91 This statement gives reference to gray wolves as the protector of the 
sytem and also as a means of threat towards the AKP. Nationalism and its emotions 
have always nourished masculine themes and, in this way, it can be argued that, 
especially in nationalist politics, it is hard to “(…) distinguish as either nationalistic 
or masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to 
                                                 
90 Zafer Kurultayı'nın son günü, Devlet Bahçeli'nin protokol tribününde yerini almasından sonra, 
Türklerin Ergenekon'dan çıkışı canlandırıldı. ‘‘Ergenekon'dan 2000'e Bozkurtlar’’ adı verilen 
gösteriyi, 18 atlı gerçekleştirdi. MHP Genel Başkanı Devlet Bahçeli, partisinin Sıvas mitinginde 
yaptığı konuşmada, yeni Meclis'te daha fazla MHP'li milletvekiline ihtiyaç bulunduğunu söyledi. 
Bahçeli, ‘‘Kendi programımızı kendi başımıza bir bozkurt gibi uygulayabilmek için daha çoğuna 
ihtiyacımız var.’’ diye konuştu. (15.10.2002) from  
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=103593 
91 AKP hükümetinin kaçmaya hazırlandığını, ancak hesap vermeden kaçamayacaklarını söyleyen 
Devlet Bahçeli, “Bozkurtların nefesi AKP’nin ensesinde olacak. Tek tek hesap vereceksiniz, bedel 
ödeyeceksiniz. Bölücülüğe verilen cesaretin, canların ve şehitlerin hesabını mutlaka vereceksiniz” 
diye konuştu.(...) (06.08.2006) from 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=4878505 
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manliness” (Nagel, 1998: 252). The field as a continuous test of manliness glorifies 
masculine and/or masculinized themes such as bravery, duty, strength. Another 
commonly used reference to manhood among the MHP parliamentarians is about 
soldiering. In every congress of the party, party members support their leaders by 
saying “We are the soldiers of Alparslan Türkeş. Devlet (state) will head the State.”92 
“Devlet (state) will head the state” has been a very popular discourse since Bahçeli 
rule the party. Here, the reference to state and the emphasis put on soldiering 
manifest the significant symbols of the nationalist discourse. The unity of the nation 
and soldiers protecting it are important male figures for the solidarity of the state and 
the leader of the MHP should lead this movement. Such an understanding promotes 
the nationalist typology of manhood with an emphasis on the unity of the nation-state 
and potent politician who can conduct this honorary duty. 
To sum up, it can be argued that, in line with Bilgin’s assumption, Islamist, 
Kemalist, secularist, conservative, modernist discourses originate from and also 
contribute to the same political culture and are nourished by common cultural pool 
(Bilgin, 2004: 182). 
 
 
                                                 
92 (...) Salon dışında bir grup partili ''Biz Alparslan Türkeş'in askerleriyiz'' sloganları atarak ''tekbir'' 
getirirken, içeride de ''Devletin başına Devlet gelecek'', ''Başbuğ ölmedi kalbimizde yaşıyor'' şeklinde 
sloganlar atıldı. (05.11.2000) from http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-195481 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Analyzing gendered field is full of paradoxes as it covers an examination of 
multilayered dynamics. In this line, for the gendered field of politics in general, 
political parties in particular, this dissertation followed a dynamic route with a lens 
reading through internalized discursive practices and rooted institutional culture. 
Especially, going beyond the limits of the familiar examination of gender, namely an 
analysis of femininities, has been a challenging experience while I attempted not to 
miss “the major” actor in the study of politics (Nagel 1998: 2005). 
 The active gender politics has shaped and also been shaped through men and 
the normative notions of masculinities. Hence, scrutinizing the embedded notions of 
politics and manhood has commenced with two questions: “How does politics shape 
the construction of masculinity?” and “How does the construction of masculinity 
shape politics?”  In line with this, both the construction of masculinities and politics 
itself first implicated a key conception: power. 
As a loaded notion, power is very critical in understanding social construction 
of gender. Natural ways in which differentials of power are embedded in culture 
constitute crucial domains for identities. In line with Foucault’s understanding, as it 
is discussed in Chapter 2, power flows through a network of disciplinary institutions, 
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namely school, family, religion, law, etc. Norms that are replicated establish social 
relations and construct subject positions or identities. To put it clearly, power shapes 
the determinants that are imposed upon the individuals. These determinations bring 
the rules of conduct in a given area and become formative as well.  
First, on the basis of how broad the scope of defining the political and 
manhood, this dissertation has used a dynamic definition of the political. With the 
acceptance of the whole web of conditions, this study focused on processes and 
relationships through which men conduct gendered lives. Therefore, to strengthen the 
approach while it did not ignore essentialist definitions’ normative characteristics of 
manhood, it also concerned with multiple constructions of masculinities. In this 
framework, this study defines political manhood as men’s gendered experiences of 
political world.   
Secondly, with the awareness of bottlenecks of defining masculinity and 
examining gendered relations of power, this study emphasizes a relational approach. 
On the basis of relationality of gender, it was clearly significant to scrutinize the 
processes of inculcating common values and behaviors and also negotiating the 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.  
At this point Bourdieu’s analysis of gender has came into prominence. 
Bourdieu’s conceptualizations have used as an analytical tool to examine the 
construction of masculinities in Turkish political parties. While politics has been 
traditionally and systematically equated with men and masculinities and dominance 
of men has been taken as given, it was significant to capture different relationships, 
processes and discourses or in other words to incorporate the subjective 
manifestations of power in Turkish socio-political and cultural atmosphere. Herein, 
Bourdieu’s theory has allowed a more comprehensive reading of experiences and 
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practices. Bourdieu has offered an alternative methodological account to comprehend 
social reality. His way of bridging the dualism of objectivity and subjectivity has 
offered a relational mode of thinking that “(…) unmasks social reality and its many 
inflections, which are merely concealed behind a veil of commonsense 
understandings and discourses.” (Özbilgin and Tatlı, 2005: 859).  
Bourdieu mainly argues that a “spontaneous knowledge” of the social world 
may lead to internalization of “everyday notions” (Karakayalı, 2004: 353). Hence, 
breaking the most self-evident relationships has offered a more active approach and, 
most importantly, it has opened the way for focusing on the relationships among 
practices, habitus, capital and field. Politics exposes the notion of power that is 
entrenched into the construction of masculinities. Politics, and the competing 
dynamics within, feed power or in other words the struggles for power. At this point, 
what is significant to consider is the nested relationship between politics and 
manhood, and, a gendered study of political men may take many forms 
In this framework, this dissertation first developed typologies of masculinities 
in Turkish politics as a field. (1) Neo-Muslim; (2) Kemalist/Secular; (3) nationalist 
masculinities were drawn to understand multiple constructions of masculinities with 
reference to the AKP, the CHP and the MHP. In order to move into a discussion of 
discourses of masculinities, drawing typologies constituted a crucial step for a 
cognitive map that defines the relationships between main Turkish political 
paradigms and masculinities.  
As a second step, so as to comprehend local dynamics, Turkish political 
culture has been analyzed. As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkish political background 
from modernization project to today’s political atmosphere has been examined with a 
lens of gender and five main pillars of Turkish political culture were identified, 
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namely, (1) the strong state tradition; (2) militarism; (3) Westernization; (4) the 
secularist / Islamist cleavage; (5) the domination of political leaders. In addition, 
Chapter 4 traced different paths of masculinities in Turkish political culture by 
questioning deep-rooted patterns of Turkish masculinities. (1) Father State (Devlet 
Baba); (2) Every (male) Turk is born a soldier; (3) Mon Cher vs. Kabadayı (Tough 
Uncle); (4) Muslim/Traditional versus Secular/Modern Man, were examined in 
parallel with the main pillars of Turkish political culture. Hereby, Chapter 4 shaped 
the boundaries of the field and the main reference points to understand Turkish 
politics and its culture.  
To begin with, modernity has always been a reference point for Turkish 
politics. Modernization, or Westernization in Turkish political atmosphere, has 
provided a blueprint for Turkish political history and has strongly affected its 
political culture. The formation of Turkey as a nation-state was considered as an act 
of nation-building and a social engineering project, within which the re-construction 
of the identities were crucial parts. In particular, from the perspective of gendered 
identities, the new citizens of the Republic were feminized and masculinized by the 
state through transformative reforms. Although women have been the subject of 
several studies on the effects of modernization reforms on identities in Turkey, the 
effects on men has remained hidden. However, throughout the Kemalist 
modernization project, men were the cultural ideal, charged with the task of 
modernizing women and society, as well as with the duty of providing welfare. 
Changing the dress code was one of the first reforms, as it signified the visibility of 
the new men. The law on Clothing (1925) suggested wearing a hat and a tie, thereby 
symbolizing both the disengagement from traditional masculinity and loyalty to the 
newly formed Republic. In addition, the modern Turkish man was expected to 
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possess a healthy masculine body as the bearer of national reforms. As the new 
culture of nationalism was constructed to emphasize supposedly masculine attributes, 
such as honour, patriotism, bravery and duty, the revolutionary men of the Republic 
would have to demonstrate that they were the protectors of society. Meanwhile, 
attending new kinds of entertainment, such as balls and theatres, were considered as 
the symbols of performing the modern daily life. Therefore, men were situated as 
protectors of order, and also mentor to guide citizens. 
Throughout the years, characteristics attached to modernity have become 
constitutive reference point for the construction of masculinities in Turkey. 
Kemalist/secular masculinities have consolidated their domain of practice and closed 
the doors for alternative constructions of masculinities. However, Islamist discursive 
formation started to be ossified in construction of identities in post-1980 and it has 
situated its own masculinities. Although Islamist reflections on gender has been 
generally revealed through women and their bodies, based on the relationality of 
gender, men and their construction of identity has also been affected. For instance, 
the reason behind the issue of veiling has become the most visible are of contestation 
on women and her body.   
In the 2000s, however, the boundaries of masculinity in Turkey are being 
redefined by a multiplicity of identities, related to widespread social changes and 
effects of globalization. Although some stereotypes of Turkish masculinity, such as 
kabadayı (tough uncle), Mehmetçik (soldier), father of the father state remained 
ossified within popular culture, Turkish society itself has nevertheless fabricated new 
forms of masculinities through its interaction with global images and identities. 
Class, ethnicity and, most importantly, religion have been integrated as influential 
factors in the new construction of masculinities. The resulting interplay of power 
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between the hegemonic masculinity and these other masculinities has taken place on 
a slippery ground shaped by the heritages of Turkish culture and, currently, 
secularist/Islamist cleavages. The emergence of alternative ideals has leaded to the 
destabilization of traditional patriarch, and, the instability of gendered relationship 
has disrupted the pre-established norms. Especially, neo-Muslim masculinities 
represented a shift in the field where Kemalist/secular masculinities have 
predominated. Moreover, strong nationalist emotions have always fed masculine 
themes and constructions of masculinities in parallel. Nationalist ideals in line with 
nationalist masculinities have always served to popularize and also reinforce ideas of 
bravery, duty, courage. The imperceptible calls to nationalist themes of masculinities 
were flourished in any ground necessitating solidarity of the nation and its father. 
Hence, since political culture is a constitutive sphere for identity formation, 
the meanings, symbols and ideals spontaneously draw the boundaries for an analysis 
of the construction of Turkish political manhood. Having the main corners of Turkish 
political culture and the its traces within typologies of masculinities, Chapter 5 
mentions that the political parties in Turkey – the AKP, the CHP and the MHP- 
reflect the historical gender order and reify their traditional stance in party programs 
and election manifests. Although the parties under concern represent different 
positions, they glorify family and, in parallel, confine women into private realm 
while situating men as protector. Therefore, it is argued that party programs and 
election manifests mirror the gendered nature of political parties.  
In line with the main contours drawn by political culture and in parallel by 
being associated with a range of highly emotive masculine values, such as bravery, 
honour, pride and strength, it can be argued that the nature of politics is gendered in 
masculine. This self evident conceptualization was deconstructed with Bourdieu’s 
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analytical methodological way, in other words, by adopting his notions into the 
analysis. As it discussed in Chapter 6, Bourdieu’s theoretical schemata offered to 
capture the ways of dynamic positioning of the political parties, in general, the 
leaders, in particular. The leaders, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Deniz Baykal and 
Devlet Bahçeli, and their personal histories were analyzed with reference to their 
accumulation of capitals and habitus in line.   
In this context, habitus was the main theoretical apparatus for this dissertation 
as it is the accumulation of dispositions. As a broad and inclusive term, habitus 
denotes to an individual’s multidimensional social position. Individual’s preferences 
position himself/herself. “Individuals use strategies to transform, allocate, and 
distribute their volume of capital among different forms, which, in turn, determine 
the boundaries of their agency – that is, the sphere of their active action and 
voluntarism- within the habitus and the field they are acting in.” (Özbilgin and Tatlı, 
2005: 864). Therefore, habitus, capital and field collaboratively effect individual’s 
positioning and this is an unconscious accumulation process. The field in which the 
positions are taken is an arena of production, and, in the framework of this study, the 
relation between habitus and the field was critical for the writer.  
For Bourdieu, the conditions of field structure habitus, and on the other hand, 
habitus is constitutive of the field (Bourdieu, 1992: 127). In a relational context, the 
governing characteristics of the field structure habitus. As field is the social setting 
that habitus operates, the field of politics adjusts habitus by defining power positions; 
hence, habitus is submitted to the rules of the field. On the other hand, in the field of 
politics different habitus could not reveal their diversity as the practices of political 
manhood have promoted a form of hegemonic masculinity that justifies dominant 
authority. In this line, if this is a dynamic relationship, the changing patterns are 
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supposed to be reflected in the functioning of the field. In addition, practice is the 
total outcome of habitus and accumulation of capitals in the field. However, the 
analysis of the leaders’ personal histories expose that despite their different 
accumulation of capital, or in other words, being rightist, leftist, nationalist, Islamist, 
they experience the praxis of being men.  
To sum up, in the Chapter 7 that analyzed the ways in which politics and also 
politician is gendered in Turkish politics, it is concluded that masculinist domination 
strategies were used as a rhetorical tool. Despite continuities and discontinuities in 
the field, the changing ways in which the political self is conceived of in terms of 
gender and, also, the gendered processes of interaction fostered through inculcating 
common values, ended up in the construction of manhood as dominant. The 
patriarchal arrangements have constituted deep structure of ma(i)nly political 
interactions.  
Although for some readers, this topic of inquiry can be considered as 
monolithic on the basis of its discussions on self evident conceptualizations, the 
originality of this study lies behind its way of questioning. Bourdieu’s analytical 
tools provided the writer not to be lost in the puzzle of questions and, also more 
significantly, taken for granted conceptualizations. Habitus, field and capital offered 
to capture the constantly changing nature of gendered relations and strategic 
positioning in politics.  
In addition this study can also be taken as a fresh encounter for Bourdieuan 
analysis and Turkish politics. Bourdieuan dynamic perspective has opened the ways 
for understanding the hidden, self-evident conceptualizations about the 
embeddedness of masculinities and politics. Moreover, in the framework of “the 
congruent relation between habitus and field”, in Turkish politics as a field different 
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habitus could not reveal their diversity. The different constructions of masculinities 
coalesce in the conduct of politics. Despite their different backgrounds and 
positioning, a similar form of masculinity has justified itself and political parties, in 
general, the leaders, in particular, have un/consciously reproduced this dominant 
authority. Therefore, Turkish politics and the discourses of political parties as a case 
pose a critical ground for the relation of habitus and field that illustrate the integrity 
of traditional roots in a non-Western society. 
This study can also be considered as a valuable step for further studies in 
Turkey, especially, if one’s aim to go beyond the limits of political culture, namely 
the dichotomies and antagonisms. As Kandiyoti aptly argues “(…) a moratorium 
should be declared on focusing on the binaries of religious vs. secular, western vs. 
non-western or global vs. local in favor of more rigorous institutional analysis that 
will give a better understanding of  the politics of gender. This will require detailed 
attention to fluid networks of influence at the global, national and local levels and 
engagement with a multiplicity of actors, interests and practices.” (Kandiyoti, 2011: 
10). As the elements of political culture, its antagonisms and the whole networks of 
discourses, symbols, and ideals depict that deep rooted masculinities left no room for 
alternative masculinities.  
Although Turkey is experiencing an engagement with new networks and 
actors, the continuous reference to old, deep-rooted dualisms left no suitable ground 
for the flourishing of new masculine identities. For instance, although gay 
movements are challenging traditional discourses, it is still discussed in the 
framework of the reasons behind the rise of gay identities as opposed to 
heterosexuality, not the discourses of homosexuality. Hence, this dissertation can be 
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considered as a step towards new areas of studies analyzing the multiple discourses 
of masculinities that challenge longstanding traditions.  
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